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Evaluating the effectiveness of Thabo Mbeki’s political mediation in the Zimbabwean 
conflict of 2008, following the disputed election outcome, is the principal objective of this 
study. The Ripeness Theory of mediation and conflict resolution that was proposed by 
William Zartman and developed by other scholars is deployed as the theoretical 
framework of the study. The study argues that the principal measure of the effectiveness 
of mediation lies in its success in resolving conflict in a sustainable manner. This is in 
view of consensus in literature that the shift of conflicts from the inter-state to the intra- 
state domain, in the post-cold war era has brought with it increasing attention to issues of 
human security, human rights and democratisation in mediation and conflict resolution. 
Resultantly, a compelling need for the effective resolution of such conflicts, and guarantee 
of the enforcement of human rights, security and promotion of democratisation as part of 
mediation, has arisen. There is therefore a general convergence of views in mediation 
literature that addressing the structural causes of disputes guarantees the sustainable 
resolution of conflict. It is in the context of these developments and views in international 
relations and politics that this study evaluates, using the Ripeness Theory, the 
effectiveness of Thabo Mbeki’s mediation in Zimbabwe. The argument advanced is that 
often case mediated agreements are not effective mechanisms for the sustainable 
resolution of conflict and the achievement of democratisation and durable peace.  
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Abstract 
 
Evaluating the effectiveness of Thabo Mbeki’s political mediation in the Zimbabwean 
conflict of 2008, following a disputed election outcome, is the principal objective of this 
study. The Ripeness Theory of mediation and conflict resolution that was proposed by 
William Zartman and developed by other scholars is deployed as the theoretical 
framework of the study. The principal measure of the effectiveness of mediation lies in its 
success in resolving conflict in a sustainable manner. There is consensus in conflict 
resolution scholarship that the post-cold war era has witnessed a marked shift of conflicts 
from the inter-state scene to the intra-state domain, such as the one in Zimbabwe, 2008.  
This shift has brought with it increasing attention to issues of human security, human 
rights and democratisation in mediation and conflict resolution. As a result, a compelling 
need for the effective resolution of such conflicts, and guarantee of the enforcement of 
human rights, security and promotion of democratisation as part of mediation, has arisen. 
There is also a general acceptance, amongst scholars, that the success of mediation 
goes beyond the signing of mediated agreements as often case conflict has re-ignited 
after the signing of peace agreements.  For that reason, the argument that mediation is 
counter-productive as it often puts a lid on the can of conflict without resolving the 
underlying conflict issues has achieved currency. There is therefore a general 
convergence of views in mediation literature that addressing the structural causes of 
disputes guarantees the sustainable resolution of conflict. It is in the context of these 
developments and views in international relations and politics that this study evaluates, 
using the Ripeness Theory, its limits noted, the effectiveness of Thabo Mbeki’s mediation 
in Zimbabwe, and the argument is advanced that often case mediated agreements are 
not effective mechanisms for the sustainable resolution of conflict and the achievement 
of democratisation and durable peace. Civil society groups need to be involved to expand 
the scope of negotiations and limit effects of mediator partiality.  
Key Words: Conflict resolution, Government of National Unity, Human Rights, 
International Mediation, Quiet Diplomacy, State Sovereignty, Zimbabwe. 
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Preamble 
 
Not all ‘negotiations’ appear to be the result of a ripe moment. Negotiations may be a 
tactical interlude, a breather for rest and re-armament, a sop to external pressure without 
any intent of opening a sincere search for a joint outcome. Thus, the need for quotation 
marks or for some elusive modifier such as ‘serious’ or sincere negotiations  
William Zartman (2001: 9) 
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Terms and Concepts Used 
 
Quiet Diplomacy 
In the context of this study, Anstey (2007:434) explains quiet diplomacy as President 
Thabo Mbeki’s policy response to Zimbabwe, involving a combination of measures that 
include behind the scenes engagement, secret negotiations, refraining from any public 
criticisms of any of the parties to the mediation and not disclosing the details of any deal 
until an agreement is reached. 
 
Government of National Unity (GNU) 
Rfers to a coalition government formed by all the major political parties in a country. 
According to Mhandara and Pooe (2013:12), the governing coalition is designed to 
accommodate all participating political players in government structures with a view to 
diminishing potential for conflict and enhancing prospects of national stability, integration 
and development. In the case of Zimbabwe, the GNU was between ZANU-PF, the MDC-
T and the MDC-N. 
 
Conflict resolution 
It is conceptualized as the methods and processes involved in facilitating the peaceful 
ending of conflict. A wide range of methods and procedures for addressing conflict include 
negotiation, mediation, arbitration and diplomacy. 
 
Low power interventions 
Anstey (2007: 434) explains low power intervention as a mediation approach of 
confidence building between warring parties, which involves non-confrontational, non-
judgmental and less public forms of communication intended to minimize risks of 
sensationalism and alienation of the parties involved. According to Anstey (2007: 434), 
quiet diplomacy is one such approach. 
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Sovereign authority 
It refers to the full right and power of a state to govern itself without any external 
interference. This forms the basic principle underlying the Westphalian model of state 
foundation. 
 
War on terror 
This refers to the international military campaign by the United States (US) and its allies 
to counter terrorism. The campaign was started by the then US President G.W Bush in 
2001, following the September 11terror attacks on New York twin towers. 
 
Principled mediation 
For the purposes of this study, Anstey (2007: 437) explains principled mediation as a 
mediation approach of integrity and assertive impartiality which seeks to assist all the 
parties involved to build a workable political environment to sort out their own future rather 
than an approach that protects the interests of a particular party.  
 
Mediation 
Bercovitch (2006:291) explains mediation as a process of conflict management through 
the intervention of a skilled and impartial third party, who facilitates a mutually acceptable 
negotiated settlement, on issues that form the substance of the dispute between the 
parties. As a conflict management approach, mediation is pacific, non-coercive and non-
binding.  
 
International community 
According to Nyakudya (2013:89), it refers to a phrase used in international relations to 
refer to a broad group of people and governments of the world and their common view 
point towards issues such as governance and human rights. 
 
Neo-imperialism/ Neo-colonialism 
Mutisi (2012:166) explains these as policies by the US and other western countries 
perceived by African countries as schemes to maintain indirect political and economic 
xii 
 
control of other countries. This is perceived to be done through interference in another 
country’s internal affairs. The GoZ for example perceived the MDC as a surrogate of the 
British and hence a tool to advance the neo-colonial and neo-imperial interests of the 
British.    
     
Regime change 
Regime change refers to the practice of removing a government from power through 
underhand maneuverings. In the context of this study, Mutisi (2012: 166) explains that 
the GoZ associated such maneuverings with the aspirations behind the promotion of 
western democracy through economic strangulation and the creation of the MDC.   
 
Gukurahundi 
Gukurahundi refers to the military operation carried out by the Government of Zimbabwe 
(GoZ) from 1983-1984, to arrest the disturbances and chaos perpetrated by ‘dissidents’ 
in the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces.  
 
State militarization 
For the purposes of this study, Qobo (2008: 170) explains state militarization as the 
practice by the GoZ to create more space for the military in civilian affairs. 
 
Operation Murambatsvina 
Also known as operation drive out rubbish was an urban clean-up exercise that was 
carried out by the GoZ in May 2005, targeting MDC supporters. The operation justified by 
the GoZ as necessary to eradicate illegal dwellings and eliminate informal trade led to 
forced migrations and displacements,  with 700,000 people in cities losing their homes 
(Masunungure 2007:22).   
   
Third Chimurenga 
Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP):   refers to the land reform exercise carried 
out by the GoZ in 2000 under the banner of the third chimurenga or the agrarian 
revolution, which was characterised by violent invasions of white owned commercial 
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farms throughout the country. According to Makumbe (2006:56), FTLRP was carried out 
in response to the political dynamics of the post-referendum situation as the MDC 
presented a formidable challenge to ZANU-PF rule.  
 
Harmonised elections 
It refer to the parliamentary, presidential and local government elections that Zimbabwe 
simultaneously held for the first time on 29 March 2008.  
 
Track I actors 
This refer to the political elites such as heads of state, diplomats and high ranking 
government officials. 
 
Track II actors 
Trach II actors refer to non-state actors such as civil society organisations, academics 
and churches. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1. Introduction 
 
This introductory chapter aims to lay the background and setting of the study whose gist 
is the subject of mediation and conflict resolution. In international diplomacy mediation 
continues to play a prominent role as a pacific form of conflict resolution (Jones 
2000:647). Underpinning this fact is the extent and heterogeneity of third party 
involvement in international disputes, which also includes conflicts in Africa, in the post- 
cold war era. Bentley and Southall (2005:55) correctly argue that for Africa, the reluctance 
of the West to become heavily engaged in African conflicts relegated that responsibility 
to African regional countries to resolve African problems, which in the post-cold war era 
have increasingly become intra-state, with an emerging trend of post-election conflicts.  
Arising from the above, since the advent of majority rule in South Africa in 1994, as an 
emerging regional power; the country has taken a central and leading role in conflict 
resolution on the continent and beyond. While both Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki 
both played an increasingly major role in conflict resolution on the continent, arguably 
Mbeki took an even more prominent role, leading to his presidency being described by 
scholars as a foreign affairs presidency, (Barber 2005:1089, Olivier 2003:815, 
Adebajo,2016:10). This observation is predicated on Barber’s assertion (2005:1089) that 
by 2005, Mbeki was involved in negotiations to settle conflicts in Cote d’Ivoire, Sudan, 
Burundi, DRC, Rwanda and the Comoros as well as in mediation in Swaziland and 
Zimbabwe. It has been argued that Mbeki’s approach to resolving conflicts in all these 
countries, seems to  be in line with South Africa’s historical belief in the supremacy of 
negotiated conflict solutions (Adelmann 2004:265). It is largely appreciated that this 
position stems from the success of South Africa’s own negotiated settlement and Mbeki’s 
style of politics, which Nathan (2005:364) rightly observes to be in line with the overall 
framework of South Africa’s pacific foreign policy and Mbeki’s apparent preference for the 
art of persuasion and negotiations to the use of force. Willie Esterhyuse (2012:26) 
emphasises the point that Thabo Mbeki despised war as an approach to conflict 
17 
 
resolution. While Mbeki has on the overall been credited for bringing peace to various 
conflict zones in Africa in his role as a mediator, opinion has been divided over the 
effectiveness of his mediation in Zimbabwe; especially as far as the issue of ensuring the 
safeguarding of human rights is concerned. 
Accordingly, the seeming paradox and inconsistencies in Mbeki’s foreign policy over the 
principles of human rights and democracy have largely been of academic interest as they 
underpin South Africa’s foreign policy. Further academic interest has been drawn by 
Thabo Mbeki’s own brainchildren, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) and the idea of the African Renaissance (Olivier 2003:817). It is contended that 
the seeming inconsistency appears to be rooted in Thabo Mbeki’s own ideology of anti-
imperialism and Africanism, which to a large extent are considered to have had a bearing 
on Mbeki’s approach to the dispute in Zimbabwe. This position is pursued further by 
Nathan (2005:363), who elaborates and correctly observes that Mbeki’s outlook was 
rooted in three paradigms namely: democratic, Africanist and anti-imperialist and that if 
the three came into conflict, democracy and human rights would give way to anti-
imperialism and Africanism. On the overall, indeed one would agree with some scholars 
such as McKinley (2004:360), who have argued that Mbeki’s approach, particularly his 
policy of constructive engagement are considered to have entrenched and 
institutionalized Zimbabwe’s economic, political and humanitarian crises. Following the 
above arguments, it seems possible to conclude that Mbeki’s position on Zimbabwe 
appeared to be more concerned with regime security than the rights and dignity of the 
Zimbabwean people. This seems to suggest that Mbeki’s handling of the dispute in 
Zimbabwe was influenced more by concerns of state security as opposed to human 
security, thereby bringing to bear seeming inconsistencies and limitations in Mbeki’s 
approach to the issue of human rights and democracy, which this study seeks to 
investigate. 
In view of the above, the main goal of this study is to establish the approach that was 
employed by Thabo Mbeki in resolving Zimbabwe’s disputed 2008 election results, as a 
context for understanding the emerging and growing trend on the continent of contested 
elections outcomes and the effectiveness of (Governments of National Unity) GNUs as 
18 
 
dispute resolution mechanisms that have been employed to resolve the disputes. To start 
with, this chapter will give an introduction that touches on South Africa’s mediation role 
on the continent within the wider context of international diplomacy. It will then consider 
South Africa’s general approach to dispute resolution, which informs Thabo Mbeki’s 
approach to resolving the dispute in Zimbabwe. This will be followed by a background to 
the growing trend of contested elections on the continent and the concept of political 
power sharing as a preferred dispute resolution mechanism which has increasingly been 
employed by regional bodies such as the African Union (AU) and (Southern African 
Development Community) SADC. The rationale of the study and justification for the focus 
on Thabo Mbeki’s mediation approach will also be given. The chapter will then describe 
the research methodology and conclude by laying out the structure of the dissertation. 
1.1 Background to the Study 
 
Post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa has seen a fast emerging and disturbing trend of a rise 
in violent conflicts emerging from contested election outcomes, which are marked with 
endemic political instability and large scale violence. Examples that come to mind include 
elections held in Nigeria in 2003 and 2007, Kenya in 2007, Zimbabwe in 2008 and 
Madagascar in 2009. Emerging from this trend, there is consensus in literature that this 
growing phenomenon has undermined the credibility and quality of African elections and 
thereby the democratization of Africa at large (Cheeseman and Tendi 2010). Scholarly 
opinion has attributed this state of affairs to the power structures of African politics.  
According to Apam (2009:20), African politics is shaped by political patrimonialism, where 
political contestation becomes a zero-sum game for the ruling and opposition political 
parties, a situation that is mirrored in the conflict in Zimbabwe following the 2008 disputed 
election results. 
 
Arising from the above, Cheeseman and Tendi (2010: 27) correctly argue that there is an 
emerging trend on the continent, where negotiated settlements with power sharing 
elements, have become the preferred way of ending political crises emanating from 
disputed election results. In that regard, power sharing has increasingly become the 
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preferred mechanism for dispute resolution by regional bodies such as the AU and SADC, 
who are usually involved in resolving post-election conflicts. However, while this is the 
case, scholars such as Jarstad (2009:42) argue against the power sharing concept, on 
the basis that they are a constraint to democracy and may therefore not deliver 
sustainable peace. This is on the grounds that most power sharing deals are elite 
negotiated power sharing pacts, which tend to ignore popular election results. This 
background informs the focus of this study, which seeks to analyse Thabo Mbeki’s 
approach to resolving the 2008 disputed election results in Zimbabwe. Mbeki’s SADC 
mandated mediation efforts, which fall within the broader context of third party mediation 
in international diplomacy, culminated in the formation of a power-sharing arrangement 
between Zimbabwe’s disputing political parties. Given that there has been a rise in the 
frequency of contested elections outcomes on the continent and a growing preference for 
negotiated settlements with power sharing elements (Cheeseman and Tendi 2010:27), 
this study on Zimbabwe hopes to provide useful insights that can provide a clearer 
understanding of similar cases in Africa at large.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
African elections results have been prone to contestation and the resolution of the 
conflicts that emanate from such disputed election results has often involved regional 
bodies such as the SADC and the AU. In addition, the effectiveness of the dispute 
resolution mechanisms employed to resolve electoral disputes has been brought to 
question because of the seeming failure of such mechanisms to deliver sustainable 
solutions to contested election outcomes on the continent. Thus, the primary problem to 
be addressed by this study is on the frequency of disputed election outcomes in Africa 
and the effectiveness of the dispute resolution mechanisms employed thereafter which in 
particular reference to this study,  is on the effectiveness of President Mbeki’s conflict 
resolution in the Zimbabwe crisis following its disputed 2008 election outcome. 
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1.2 Objectives 
 
The study intends to critically analyse Thabo Mbeki’s approach to resolving the 2008 
disputed Zimbabwe elections outcome, as a context for understanding the growing trend 
of similar disputes in Sub-Saharan Africa and the mechanisms employed thereafter to 
resolve the disputes.  In order to achieve this, the study will: 
1. Assess the emerging trend and frequency of contested elections in Africa. 
2. Give an overview of dispute resolution mechanisms on the continent. 
3. Understand the Zimbabwean political dispute. The causes of the dispute 
will be explored.  
4. Understand Thabo Mbeki’s involvement in the Zimbabwean political dispute 
within the wider context of the African Union (AU) guaranteed and SADC 
mandated mediation.  
5. Assess the effectiveness of Thabo Mbeki’s approach and the contribution 
he made towards the democratization of Zimbabwe through the formation 
of the power sharing government. 
1.4 Key Research Questions 
 
The study aims to answer five key questions, namely: 
 What is the trend of contested elections in Africa? 
 What were the causes of the 2008 election dispute in Zimbabwe? 
 What was Thabo Mbeki’s approach to dispute resolution in Zimbabwe? 
 How effective was Thabo Mbeki’s approach and what was his contribution towards 
the democratization of Zimbabwe? 
1.5 Delimitation  
 
The study is demarcated according to both conceptual and geographical criteria. In terms 
of the conceptual criteria, the study is differentiated with reference to central concepts of 
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mediation with a view to conflict and dispute resolution within the context of human 
security. The study will therefore focus on how Thabo Mbeki in his approach to dispute 
resolution addressed concerns of both human and state security in Zimbabwe.  
Geographically, the study focuses on Zimbabwe.  In general, the study will cover Thabo 
Mbeki’s mediation efforts in Zimbabwe which started in 2002. However, the main focus 
of the study will be on the 2008 period, when Zimbabwe held its election whose results 
were contested. 
1.6 Rationale of the Study 
 
Assessing the state of scholarship on international mediation, one may argue as pointed 
out by Bohmelt (2010: 168), that while mediation is as old as conflict itself, the concept 
remains least understood, despite its growing  importance. Notably, Jones (2000: 647) 
rightly observes that little attention has been devoted to African peace processes, in spite 
of their growing significance on the continent. Evidently there is more scholarly concern 
and attention on conflict resolution and international mediation in particular, with regards 
to the developed world and institutions such as the United Nations (UN) than the less 
developed regions such as Africa for instance. 
In addition to the above, it can be argued that Thabo Mbeki’s mediation efforts in 
Zimbabwe are relatively recent, implying that it is an area that is yet to be adequately 
researched and understood. This would in that regard call for an in-depth study of Thabo 
Mbeki’s approach to dispute resolution in Zimbabwe, which will help scholars put the 
approach to dispute resolution in perspective. Additionally, there is a need to consider the 
scholarly interest in the proposed area of study because of South Africa’s international 
standing. The study will therefore attempt to provide a better understanding of the 
effectiveness of Thabo Mbeki’s mediation efforts, from the viewpoint that this may assist 
future studies to determine the effectiveness of approaches used by Kgalema Motlanthe 
and Jacob Zuma, former and current president of South Africa, respectively, who 
continued with the SADC mandated mediation in Zimbabwe after Thabo Mbeki. In view 
of the above therefore, the study seeks to contribute to knowledge that will give a clearer 
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understanding of the emerging trend of post-election disputes in Africa and the dispute 
resolution mechanisms that can be employed to deliver sustainable solutions. The case 
study involves the dispute in Zimbabwe, following its 2008 disputed election results. 
1.7 Rationale for studying Thabo Mbeki’s Mediation in Zimbabwe 
 
In attempting to understand the reasons for focusing on Mbeki’s mediation, it is important 
to state from the beginning that the Zimbabwe crisis is widely acknowledged as the 
dominant foreign policy issue of Thabo Mbeki’s tenure in office. This assertion is 
predicated on the international and domestic attention given to Thabo Mbeki’s policy 
towards Zimbabwe, therefore deserving further study. On this aspect, it is important to 
bring to mind, as correctly observed by Mckinley (2004:357) that Thabo Mbeki’s 
ascension to office in 1999 was paralleled by intensifying political and economic problems 
in Zimbabwe. Therefore, arising from the above, when Mbeki offered to mediate in the 
Zimbabwe conflict, there were a lot of expectations from the generality of Zimbabweans 
and South Africans alike for three main reasons. The first one being South Africa’s 
standing on the world stage, the second being Mbeki’s initiatives of an African 
Renaissance and NEPAD, which paradoxically propagated the entrenchment of 
democratic governance and values and therefore raised the hopes of many, and the third 
being that South Africa had direct interests in Zimbabwe’s conflict, given that the country 
was also directly affected by the situation in Zimbabwe. Arguably, Thabo Mbeki’s 
mediation approach towards Zimbabwe was not simply about Zimbabwe but also about 
South Africa’s integrity as a regional leader, a point warranting further study. The second 
reason in justification of a study of Thabo Mbeki’s mediation in Zimbabwe is that he was 
seized with the Zimbabwean crisis for a longer period than any of the mediators. His 
mediation effort started from 2002 to 2008, when he left office. Arguably, he played an 
indispensable role in laying the foundation for the formation of the government of national 
unity. 
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1.8 Research Methodology 
 
As this study is political in nature, it uses the qualitative research method which according 
to Neuman (1997:329), relies largely on the interpretive and critical approaches to social 
science. The rationale for using the qualitative research method in this study is based on 
its emphasis on interpretation of qualitative data from a variety of sources and not just a 
dispassionate presentation of statistical data, as would be the case with the quantitative 
research approach. 
It is argued that the emphasis in qualitative research is on methods of observation, 
interviews and analysis of documents, which include primary and secondary sources. As 
the study was a purely desk top research, interviews were not conducted. The study 
mainly consulted both primary and secondary sources.  Based on the fact that this was a 
SADC mandated mediation process, the primary and secondary sources used included, 
the SADC Election Observer Mission Report on the 2008 election outcome in Zimbabwe, 
SADC Summit  communiques, press releases and statements, in which the crisis in 
Zimbabwe was discussed, SADC Summit resolution and reports by the SADC Facilitator 
to Zimbabwe, which gave invaluable insights into the intricacies of African diplomacy, with 
regards to the handling of the dispute in Zimbabwe.  
The study also used journal articles and books on the 2008 disputed Zimbabwe election 
outcome and other documents by such various interest and observer groups as church 
organizations and civil society. The book by Bentley and Southall (2005) was mostly 
useful as a primary source. It gave an illuminating account and insights of South Africa’s 
overall approach to dispute resolution on the continent, which informed Thabo Mbeki’s 
approach to dispute resolution in Zimbabwe that is the power sharing concept widely 
dubbed in literature as the Thabo Mbeki doctrine. Given that Mbeki’s identity as an African 
and an anti-imperialist were central to his approach to dispute resolution in Zimbabwe, 
the biographic treatment given to Thabo Mbeki by Gevisser (2007) was useful in providing 
insights into Mbeki’s perspective on issues of Africanism and anti-imperialism. Journal 
articles also proved valuable and enriching to the study. 
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1.9 Data Analysis 
 
Following Newman’s observation that qualitative researchers organise data into 
categories on the basis of themes and concepts, information extracted from the different 
sources mentioned above was analysed and discussed thematically. 
1.10 Limitations of the Study 
 
The qualitative nature of the data used for this study generated several challenges. The 
first being that since this was a purely desk top research which in itself was useful given 
the sensitivities of discussing political issue in Zimbabwe, the quality of the data gathered 
was compromised with the absence of  insider and intimate perspectives. Further to the 
above limitation, the accuracy of the information used in some instances was 
questionable particularly as the source of data in some of the journal articles was 
unknown. The researcher tried to overcome this limitation by utilizing official sources or 
well-known research agencies to improve the quality and reliability of the data. 
1.11 The Structure of the Dissertation 
 
To address the research questions and analyse Thabo Mbeki’s approach to dispute 
resolution in Zimbabwe, the study is organized as outlined below: 
Chapter One: Introduction  
This chapter sets the scene by introducing the study. It comprises of a background and 
introduction, problem statement, rationale, methodology and limitations of the study. The 
statement of the problem and the objectives of the study are articulated in order to 
demonstrate the contribution that the study seeks to make in the discourse on conflict 
resolution in Africa. Overall, Chapter One outlines the background of this research and 
explains the importance of the research. 
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework 
This chapter delves into the theoretical framework of the study and thus explores in detail 
the theory that informs the study. This chapter acknowledges the challenges faced in 
utilizing the dominant theories of international relations such as realism, liberalism and 
constructivism for the study of conflict resolution. The chapter highlights William 
Zartman’s ripeness theory (2008), which the study identifies as best suited to study the 
conflict in Zimbabwe and Thabo Mbeki’s mediation efforts therein. In short, the ripeness 
metaphor posits that there are ripe moments in the life cycle of conflict, which if seized, 
will result in the successful resolution of conflict. The theory assumes that conflicts pass 
through a life cycle that encompass a number of distinguishable phases and that certain 
stages are more amenable to outside intervention than others. By implication therefore, 
a conflict cannot be resolved if it is not ripe for resolution. 
 
Chapter Three: Literature Review 
This chapter considers the scope of mediation, its success and effectiveness by 
identifying the variables associated with mediation success. The chapter seeks to 
interrogate the widely misconstrued association that is made between mediation success 
and the signing of a peace agreement by highlighting that peace agreements have often 
been the source of future conflicts.  This is done by highlighting the flaws of Zimbabwe’s 
previous mediated settlements starting with the 1979 Lancaster House Conference and 
the 1987 ZANU/ ZAPU Unity Accord.   
 
Chapter Four: Context of Thabo Mbeki’s Mediation in Zimbabwe 
This chapter seeks to situate the 2008 electoral dispute in the governance crisis in 
Zimbabwe which stems from ZANU-PF’s failure to democratize as well as the party’s 
apparent belief in its right to rule in perpetuity. The chapter outlines the many episodes of 
state sponsored violence in the post-2000 period to demonstrate that violence was used 
by ZANU-PF as a tool to maintain its stranglehold on power. This chapter also outlines 
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the various regional and international responses to the deteriorating political and 
economic situation in Zimbabwe. The chapter seeks to reinforce the argument that the 
principle of African solidarity was central in shaping Thabo Mbeki’s approach to resolving 
the 2008 election dispute in Zimbabwe and hence his justification for using the policy of 
quiet diplomacy in the  Zimbabwean mediation.     
 
Chapter Five: Conclusion 
This concluding chapter presents the findings, recommendations and conclusions of the 
study. It summarises the major findings of this research and at the same time gives some 
useful observation on Thabo Mbeki’s mediation in the Zimbabwean electoral and political 
dispute, by emphasizing interventions that address structural causes of conflicts.  
1.12 Conclusion 
 
The chapter gave a background and setting of the study whose gist is on mediation and 
conflict resolution. The chapter began by giving an introduction touching on South Africa’s 
mediation role on the continent. It was argued that South Africa’s general approach to 
dispute resolution informed President Mbeki’s approach to resolving the dispute in 
Zimbabwe. A background on the growing trend of contested elections on the continent 
was also given. It was argued that post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa was seeing a fast 
emerging and disturbing trend of a rise in violent conflicts emerging for contested 
elections. Examples of such elections were cited and include Nigeria 2003, Kenya 2007, 
Zimbabwe 2008 and Madagascar 2009. It was also argued that the power sharing 
concept had become the preferred mechanism for resolving disputes emanating from 
contested elections. The chapter also argued that regional bodies such as the SADC and 
the AU were increasingly employing the power sharing concept as a dispute resolution 
mechanism. It was however demonstrated as articulated in the problem statement that 
power sharing was a constraint to democracy and fell short in delivering sustainable 
solutions to conflicts. 
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The chapter explored the reasons justifying a focus on Mbeki’s mediation and these were 
cited as South Africa’s international standing, Mbeki’s initiatives of an African 
Renaissance and NEPAD, which propagated democratic governance and values and 
which therefore raised the hopes of many in bringing a solution to the crisis in Zimbabwe. 
It was also argued that South Africa had direct interests in the conflict in Zimbabwe as the 
country was directly affected by the situation in Zimbabwe. The chapter also discussed 
the research methodology. It was argued that as the study is qualitative in nature, the 
qualitative research method was employed. It was also noted that the research was purely 
desk top and that this was useful given the sensitivities of discussing political issues in 
Zimbabwe. The chapter also considered the various sources of data used and ended by 
giving the structure and outline of the dissertation. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2. Introduction 
 
To analyse Thabo Mbeki’s mediation approach to resolving the 2008 political dispute in 
Zimbabwe following its contested election outcome, the study primarily uses William 
Zartman’s Ripeness Theory. The Ripeness Theory has been severally employed as a 
framework for studying international negotiations and mediation. To note at this point is 
that as a field of study, international relations is dominated by theoretical frameworks of 
realism, liberalism and constructivism, which have dominated the study of conflict 
resolution in international relations. William Zartman (2008:3) argues that using realism 
as a theoretical framework to analyse conflict resolution poses a challenge in that while 
realism as a theoretical approach can explain conflict, it has no place for negotiation 
because of its structural determinism. Comparatively, Zartman (2008:3) also adds that 
while liberalism and constructivism have more room for conflict resolution and negotiation, 
they have done little to include negotiation into their premises.  
In view of the limitations of the power based approaches (realism, liberalism and 
constructivism) of international relations, the study has adopted ripeness theory as a 
useful analytical lens to understand Thabo Mbeki’s mediation approach in the 
Zimbabwean electoral and political dispute. What makes ripeness theory relevant to this 
study is that the theoretical approach was originally framed for conflicts in the ‘Third 
World’, notably Africa (Amer 2004:730). In that sense, the theory has been found 
applicable and useful as an explanation for the successful initiation of negotiations or their 
failure in countries such as Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Eritrea, South Africa Philippines, 
Cyprus, Iran and Iraq, Israel and Mozambique (O’kane 2006: 269).  With particular regard 
to Zimbabwe, the concept of ripeness has been used to analyse previous mediation 
initiatives in the country as follows; the 1979 Lancaster House negotiations (Stedman 
1991:2), the 1987 ZANU/ZAPU Unity Accord and the 2007 SADC mandated mediation 
by Thabo Mbeki (Anstey 2007: 415). It therefore follows that the theory is well placed to 
provide a useful lens to also analyse Thabo Mbeki’s mediation effort in 2008. Added to 
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that is the consensual position in literature on ripeness, which posits that the theory is a 
useful analytical tool because of its flexibility and predictive analytical capacity (Lyons et 
al 2008:5), which makes it easily adaptable to this study. According to Zartman 
(2000:235), ripeness theory also has a prescriptive value to policy makers seeking to 
know when and how to begin a peace process. 
Ripeness recognises the integral role played by both primary (disputing parties) and 
secondary parties (mediators) in conflict resolution. Ripeness considers the influence of 
contextual and process factors in conflict resolution. Contextual factors refer to variables 
concerning the dispute, the contending parties and their relationships, the mediator and 
the international context. Process conditions on the other hand focus on the nature of the 
mediator activities for example the utility and effectiveness of strategies that mediators 
may employ such as leveraged approaches or low power interventions associated with 
mediation approaches such as quiet diplomacy, to induce ripeness in conflict situations 
that are not ripe for resolution (Kleiboer 1996:361). In this chapter, the study seeks to 
highlight the relevance of the core concepts of ripeness theoretical framework to conflict 
resolution.  
2.1 Ripeness Theory: Propositions and Assumptions on Conflict Resolution  
  
It has so far been argued that rationalist theories of international relations, such as 
realism, liberalism and constructivism are not suitable to analyse Mbeki’s mediation 
approach. Whiting (2005 in Zartman 2008:3) explains that realism has no place for 
negotiation or mediation because of its precepts that are deterministic and institutionalist. 
On the other hand, while liberalism and constructivism have room for conflict resolution, 
they have failed to include negotiation or mediation in their premises (Zartman 2008:3). 
In this section of the study, it will be argued and demonstrated as already noted that 
ripeness theory is best suited to analyse Mbeki’s mediation approach towards the 2008 
Zimbabwe dispute as the theory offers some assumptions on how and when a third party, 
which is a mediator, should intervene in a conflict and also the shape of the mediation 
process that should be applied. The theory also offers assumptions on the conditions that 
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are necessary for the protagonists to consider negotiation as a way out of the conflict 
(Chinyere et al 2013:3).  
To begin with, the study notes that William Zartman is the pioneer in the research of 
ripeness in international conflicts (Aggestam 1995:87, Pruitt 2005:2). The theory was 
unveiled in 1985 and has been outlined in slightly different forms in Zartman’s subsequent 
work (O’kane 2006:268). However, in 2000, Zartman published an outline designed to 
clarify the theory. The study also recognises that Zartman’s conceptual framework has 
further been modified and refined by scholars such as Stephen Stedman, Richard Haas 
and Louis Kielsberg, Christopher Mitchell and Chester Crocker (Aggestam 2008:88). It is 
noteworthy; therefore that current literature on ripeness has produced four different 
versions or models of the ripe moment thesis, two of which arise from Zartman’s 
pioneering work and the other two models from the work of Stedman, Haas and Kielsberg, 
Mitchell and Crocker (Mitchell 1995:38). According to Mitchell (1995:39), the four models 
are characterised as follows: 
 The Hurting Stalemate (HS) or plateau model 
 The Imminent Mutual Catastrophe(IMC) or precipice model 
 The Entrapment model (ENT) and 
 The Enticing Opportunity (ENO) or planets in conjunction model 
 
The concept of ripeness was developed in an attempt to identify the appropriate moment 
for mediators to intervene that is when favourable conditions for a conflict settlement exist 
such as in situations where there is a public plea for help. In view therefore of conflicts 
where mediation is applied, ripeness also emphasises the shape and type of the 
mediation process that is used to induce ripeness. Anstey (2007:433) clarifies that types 
and shapes of intervention are contingent on many factors, which include the purpose of 
the process as defined by the parties and the mediator and the nature of the conflict and 
the forces sustaining it.  
To note is that the theory has become a central conceptual framework employed by 
researchers to explain the onset of negotiation processes and by policy makers to decide 
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on those conflicts amenable to resolution and positive interventions (Lyons et al 2008: 5). 
The ripeness metaphor posits that there are ripe moments in the life cycle of conflicts, 
which if seized, will result in the successful resolution of those conflicts (Pruitt 2008:3). 
Conversely, ripeness argues that attempts to resolve unripe conflicts will fail, regardless 
of the quality and skills of mediators who may be involved or the equitable nature of the 
proposals tabled (O’kane 2006:269). Ripeness assumes that conflicts pass through a life 
cycle that encompass a number of distinguishable phases and that certain stages are 
more amenable to outside intervention than others (Kleiboer 1996: 362). There are 
however conflicting views on what constitutes or how to recognise such moments 
(Kleiboer 1996: 362). In that regard, there are three divergent positions on when to 
intervene in a conflict. According to Kleiboer (1996:362), some analysists believe that 
conflicts follow the logic of “clock time”. This view argues that the duration of conflict in 
terms of days, months or years is linked to the persistence or change of attitudes of the 
adversaries towards the conflict. This position therefore supports the late entry, based on 
the thesis that mediation is most fruitful when failure to reach an agreement is precipitating 
an emergency. A feeling of emergency is believed to strongly increase the disputants’ 
motivation to moderate their intransigence and revise their expectations (Kleiboer 
1996:362). The second position is that negotiation needs to be initiated at an early stage, 
that is well before the adversaries cross a threshold of violence and begin to inflict heavy 
losses on each other. The argument underlying this position is that at such an early, pre-
violence stage, it is still possible to consider possibilities for settlement before the conflict 
has become too entrenched and the parties too flexible in their attitudes (Kleiboer 1996: 
363). The third position repudiates the logic of clock time and instead focuses on social 
or event time. According to Kleiboer (1996 :363) this position assumes that irrespective 
of days, months or years, a conflict is assumed to be ripe for resolution if certain events 
have taken place that affect the perceptions and attitudes of disputants. After looking at 
the various phases of a conflict, the important question to ask is what makes a conflict 
ripe for resolution? 
Lyons et al (2008:28) explain that what makes a conflict ripe for resolution in part, are 
mutually hurting stalemates (MHS) which refer to perceptions by conflicting parties of 
increasingly painful conditions, that will only yield further pain and ultimate catastrophe 
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for the protagonists, if left to fester (Pruitt 2008:5). Under these circumstances, the 
interests of the parties will not be achieved or even approximated, thereby requiring a 
need for the parties to find an alternative approach to relieve the stalemate. Ripeness 
also proposes that in addition to these painful stalemates, the parties must be able to see 
a way out of the conflict such as diplomatic alternatives like mediation or negotiation which 
are seen as feasible and likely to generate a peaceful outcome. In a sense, diplomatic 
alternatives provide opportunities of escape from a stalemate or ‘pain’. The underlying 
argument as explained by Aggestam (1995:87) is therefore that when the conflicting 
parties perceive a mutually hurting stalemate and a way out of their predicament, the 
moment is ripe for resolution. 
In essence, the study argues that Zartman’s theoretical construct offers an explanation of 
conflict resolution that focuses on perceptions, which in other words considers how aware 
the parties are of their conflict status, incentives, which looks at how motivated they are 
by the increasing pain imposed by the conflict and timing, which is concerned with how 
they seize upon the fleeting opportunity.  Ripeness is therefore a necessary initiating 
catalyst to transform conflict and is said to begin with a mutually hurting process 
(Aggestam 1995:87), which is the first ripe moment model to be considered. 
2.1.1 The Hurting Stalemate Model 
 
The HS model was initially suggested by William Zartman and later developed by 
Stedman and Haass. Zartman’s original HS theory intimately interlinks the concept of a 
hurting stalemate, which he describes as a deadlock, with the idea of an imminent 
catastrophe, which he describes as a deadline, as necessary for producing the 
circumstances that make a conflict ripe for resolution (Zartman 2000: 232). However, as 
recommended by Mitchell (1995:39), it may be reasonable to separate the two models 
for a clearer understanding, which is also essential for the purposes of this study. It is 
however important to look at Zartman’s original argument regarding the HS model. 
According to Zartman (2000: 252, Mitchell 1995:39), adversaries will be most likely to 
consider a negotiated solution to their conflict when they anticipate a long period of 
continually costly action such as fatalities in military confrontations, together with a low 
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perceived probability of achieving their goals and a looming disaster that abruptly 
threatens to increase still further the costs of continuing coercive strategies.  
Mitchell (1995:39) clarifies that the core argument of the HS model is that the most likely 
circumstances in which adversaries will seek a negotiated solution or a resolution of their 
conflict are those in which no party can envision a successful outcome through continuing 
current strategies, nor an end to increasingly unbearable costs. In Zartman’s words (in 
Mitchell 1995:39), “the mutual plateau must be perceived by both parties not as a 
momentary resting but as a flat, unpleasant terrain stretching into the future, providing no 
later possibilities for decisive escalation or for a graceful escape”. Similarly, Haass’s 
refinement of the HS thesis highlights four pre-requisites which include the existence of 
mutual perceptions among the parties about the need for agreement, which in other words 
means that the conflict would be exacerbated without a negotiated settlement (Aggestam 
1995:88). Secondly, the agreement has to contain compromises in order for the parties 
to arrive at a mutually satisfactory settlement. These compromises usually appear when 
the parties   are either strong enough to permit compromises or sufficiently weak making 
it difficult to avoid compromises. Thirdly, these compromises have to be mutual and 
adequate to allow the political leadership from each party to convince their domestic 
constituencies that national objectives have been preserved and finally, there has to exist 
a shared acceptance of the negotiation procedure by all the negotiating parties 
(Aggestam 1995:89). 
Stedman’s modifications have on the other hand focused on the domestic and internal 
politics of the parties involved. Stedman’s emphasis is on the function of internal changes, 
such as the emergence of new leaders, their perceptions and the consolidation of a 
divided leadership (Aggestam 1995:89). Stedman’s argument is that developments within 
the contending parties are critical for the emergence of ripe moments, in that for example, 
leadership change may create new opportunities for conflict settlement, as a settlement 
is in the political interests of the new leadership. By implication therefore, the political 
willingness of leadership to settle the conflict determines the ripeness of the situation 
(Kleiboer 1996:363).  
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Similarly, to Stedman, Kriesberg finds it important to consider domestic politics and in 
particular domestic pressures that may be exerted on a regime to initiate negotiation 
(Aggestam 1995:89). Kriesberg, who has extensively researched the field of de-
escalatory strategies has crystallised some necessary although not sufficient conditions 
for pursuing a strategy of de-escalation and negotiation. He stresses the significance of 
power balance or power asymmetry between the parties, their shared understanding of 
the conflict and the international context of the conflict. Kleiboer (1996: 368) concurs with 
this view and notes that most analysts argue that a balance of power between the 
disputants is crucial for successful mediation. Most ripeness theorists indicate that a 
marked power disparity will strengthen the stronger party’s view of the mediator as a 
stumbling block towards the achievement of total victory. The argument is that such a 
disparity will reinforce the stronger party’s unwillingness to accept mediation in the first 
place or will enhance its reluctance to make any concessions or compromises during 
mediation essential for attaining successful results.  
Anstey (2007:427) also agrees with this position. He argues that power imbalances 
aggravate conflicts by producing positional rigidities, where powerful parties tend to 
believe they can crush the other and see few benefits in negotiation. Weaker parties on 
the other hand often resort to intransigence rather than capitulation and are often unable 
to leverage or implement any solutions they propose. Anstey underscores this point 
through his analysis of the Mbeki led-mediation in Zimbabwe, where ZANU-PF as the 
powerful party was reluctant to enter into negotiations with the MDC, which by 
interpretation meant that the conflict was not yet ripe for resolution.  Added to that, Anstey 
(2007:436) observes that there are problems in trying to conduct mediations in scenarios 
of power asymmetry, especially for third parties with interests. According to Anstey (ibid) 
these realities render a mediator vulnerable to accusations of partiality by all those 
involved. Anstey (ibid) suggests that risk can be limited by adherence to procedural 
fairness and a low power intervention, which simply focuses on promoting dialogue and 
problem solving between parties. 
Before looking at the second model, it may be important to briefly consider the other core 
element of ripeness which Zartman links to the HS, which is a perception of a way out. 
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2.1.1.2 Perception of a Way Out 
As already alluded to, the other element necessary for a ripe moment, which according 
to (Aggestam 2008:87) is less complex and controversial, is the perception of a way out. 
Zartman (1989:273, 2000: 228) argues that parties do not have to be able to identify a 
specific solution, only a sense that a negotiated solution is possible for the searching and 
that the other party shares that sense and the willingness to search too. Without the sense 
of a way out, the push associated with the MHS would leave the parties with nowhere to 
go. William Zartman (1989: 273, 2000: 228) sums up the component of a perception of a 
way out by saying that the parties to a conflict have to perceive themselves to be in a 
hurting stalemate and must also perceive the possibility of a negotiated solution which is 
a way out.  By implication this would mean that the conflict is ripe for resolution; that is for 
negotiations towards resolution to begin. For a clearer understanding of Zartman’s 
arguments, the two core elements of ripeness discussed above are illustrated in the 
diagram below presented as Figure 1. 
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Diagram on Ripeness Theory 
 
 
FIGURE 1: Factors affecting ripeness, elements of ripeness, and the decision to negotiate 
(Source: Zartman, W: 2000: 230: International Conflict Resolution after the cold war).  
2.1.2 The Imminent Mutual Catastrophe Model 
 
The Imminent Mutual Catastrophe (IMC) model which is described as a ‘precipice’ in 
Zartman’s original thesis, offers the reinforcement or the alternative to the ‘plateau’ aspect 
of his original scheme. The precipice is described as, “a disaster that shortly threatens to 
overwhelm stalemated adversaries or even adversaries that are not particularly 
stalemated” (Zartman 2000: 252, Aggestam 1995: 87). The argument underlying the IMC 
is that parties in conflict will only consider conditions ripe for de-escalation and conflict 
resolution when they face an imminent major catastrophe of some sort. Worth noting is 
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that successful de-escalation in this model as underpinned by Mitchell (1995:40) depends 
on both parties facing undeniable disaster which could be a huge increase in costs and 
or a major drop in the perceived probability of success and victory through continuing the 
struggle. By implication, it follows that if only one side faces such a catastrophe, the other 
side will have no incentive to look for a settlement and will in that case sit back and wait 
for its adversary to plunge over the precipice and then move in to pick up the pieces, and 
privilege their own position.  
The question therefore raised by the IMC model regards the sort of circumstances that 
are likely to present imminent mutual catastrophes to parties in conflict.  One of the 
examples that ripeness scholarship presents, which is of particular interest to this study 
as it justifies the utility of ripeness theoretical framework in this particular study, is the 
case of the Rhodesian peace process (Anstey 2007: 417, Mitchell 1995:41)), where the 
advent of a Thatcher-led government in the UK, willing to recognise a Muzorewa regime, 
presented a new and potentially costly set of circumstances to the Zimbabwean leaders. 
At the same time, the general African rejection of Muzorewa and the successful escalation 
of the guerrilla war presented a similar precipice to the white dominated regime in 
Rhodesia. Both sides therefore faced different but interlinked potential catastrophes 
which forced them to consider a negotiated settlement (Mitchell 1995:41). 
Comparatively, a key aspect of both the HS and IMC models is that, for circumstances to 
be ripe for a shift to a conciliatory mentality, decision makers on each side need to 
perceive independently that their own side is approaching some unavoidable catastrophe, 
or that they are stuck in a costly situation with a low probability of success, even in the 
long term (Aggestam 1995, Mitchell 1995:41). Underpinning this point is the emphasis on 
the importance of the perceptual variables in both the HS and the IMC, a factor that 
becomes salient in the third Entrapment model. 
2.1.3 The Entrapment Model 
 
This model was pioneered by Frank Edmead and Allan Teger. In contrast to the HS 
model, the Entrapment Model (ENT) model argues that leaders become trapped into a 
continued pursuit of victory even when costs seem to have become unbearable. 
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Underlying this model is an irrational process by which costs become transformed into 
investments in a conflict that cannot be given up for less than complete victory (Mitchell 
1995:42). By implication therefore, the more costs are incurred, the more the reasons 
exist for carrying on. In the ENT model therefore, the hurt itself paradoxically becomes a 
reason for continuing. It therefore follows that the greater the hurt, the more the need to 
continue towards victory to justify the sacrifices, both psychologically and politically. In an 
ETN model, Mitchell (1995:43) notes that leaders involved in a protracted conflict go 
through a number of decision making stages. The first is characterised by concentration 
on the achievement of potential rewards (reward pursuit). The second is a justification of 
expended resources via further commitments, (cost justification). The third is 
characterised by the increasing salience of the goals of damaging the adversary and 
minimising overall losses (punishment and loss minimisation). The last stage is the 
exhaustion of resources and search for a way out (goal relinquishment). According to 
Mitchell (1995:43), the turning point psychologically occurs between the third and fourth 
stages when past losses are no longer regarded as investments in success, but become 
bygones to be reluctantly abandoned and when leaders’ thinking becomes dominated by 
the need to cut losses and minimise further costs, even if this means abandoning the 
promises of increasingly unlikely benefits of victory. 
In this model, Mitchell (1995:43) notes that third parties or mediators can play a much 
more active role in bringing about ripe circumstances rather than simply waiting for them 
to occur. At this stage, the model expects mediators to design a non- threatening and 
non-coercive process that will assist leaders in developing a conciliatory mentality and in 
moving towards a solution. Ripeness in an ENT model seems to involve moving parties 
from a mentality in which hurts and sacrifices become reasons for continuing rather than 
quitting to one in which anticipated costs and diminishing resources dominate decision 
making and viable and less costly alternatives present themselves. 
2.1.4 The Enticing Opportunity Model 
 
The Enticing Opportunity Model (EOM) model in its two versions was pioneered by 
Christopher Mitchell and Crocker. In contrast to the three models discussed so far, the 
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Enticing Opportunity model takes a more optimistic view of leaders in conflict, suggesting 
that a ripe moment can occur when leaders see a much better alternative way of achieving 
their goals than continuing with a costly struggle. New options open up or are created 
which cost less and offer more gains more certainly than continued violence and mutual 
coercion. The emphasis is on new benefits rather than existing or anticipated costs, on 
rewards for adopting alternatives rather than on sacrifices that have to be compensated. 
According to Mitchell (1995:44), the ENO model is probably the most diverse of the four 
as it brings into consideration a wide variety of possible factors that can contribute to the 
creation of such an opportunity. Crocker particularly emphasises that third party 
mediators can play major roles in the creation of appropriate circumstances for resolution. 
Crocker (in Mitchell 1995:44) suggests that the combination of the right set of 
circumstances includes the advent of new leaderships not committed or as committed to 
the goals or methods of their predecessors, a change of goals or level of commitment on 
the part of the adversaries’ patrons, the availability of new resources from which to 
construct an innovative solution and a change of priorities within elites in one or both 
adversaries. Mitchell (1995:44) identifies circumstances that fall into three major 
categories, which can encourage a settlement, namely inter-party, intra- party and extra 
system. These include such factors as the relevant terms on offer from the adversaries, 
the level of cohesion within each party and the vulnerability of external patrons to pressure 
from either one of the adversaries or from third parties. 
Mitchell (1995:45) however notes that for an opportunity to be enticing enough to 
persuade adversaries to think of moving towards a negotiated settlement, the prime 
determining condition appears to be that both leaders and followers on both sides should 
be able to see major rewards on offer through the pursuit of some negotiated solution. 
For leaders, one of these rewards must usually be an anticipation that they will continue 
to play some future leadership role. Mitchell (1995:44) adds that what seems to have 
enticed a number of adversaries into a negotiated peace process in a variety of conflicts 
is a shared belief that through a process involving negotiations followed by elections, they 
would win more cheaply the political power they were unable to obtain by coercive means. 
Mitchell (1995:44) cites the case of Zimbabwe, noting that the Lancaster House 
settlement was clearly facilitated by the belief of all three leaders, Muzorewa, Mugabe 
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and Nkomo that they would win the proposed elections that were part of the settlement. 
In that case, the two actual losers were prepared to accept the election results rather than 
returning to a winning and coercive mentality. Perhaps the question is whether the same 
beliefs were also held by Mugabe, Tsvangirai and Mutambara when they agreed to the 
power sharing agreement in 2008.  
2.2. Ripeness: Propositions and Assumptions on the Mediator 
 
Having looked at the core elements of ripeness theoretical approach, it becomes 
necessary to look at the relationship between ripeness and the mediator in detail 
particularly given that a mediator plays an integral role in inducing ripeness. Disputing 
political parties and conflicting groups make certain assumptions on mediation and the 
mediator and based on those assumptions, they also develop certain expectations that 
are based on their understanding and knowledge of the mediator and the mediation 
process itself. The sections below explore the mediator and the mediation process, and 
this will allow the study to prepare for its evaluation of Thabo Mbeki as a mediator in the 
Zimbabwean electoral and political conflict of 2008. 
2.2.1 Mediator Impartiality 
 
As already alluded to, ripeness recognises that mediator attributes which include 
impartiality; leverage and status are responsible for a mediator becoming accepted by the 
disputing parties, which in turn is vital for mediation success (Kleiboer 1996:368). In 
general, the issue of mediator impartiality refers to intention, consequence or appearance. 
According to Kleiboer (1996:368) in some cases, mediator impartiality is related to a 
mediator’s attitudes towards the conflicting parties and at other cases is related to a 
mediator’s stake in the substance of issues in conflict or at times to both. On the overall, 
there is consensus in ripeness literature that impartiality is essentially a matter of 
perceptions of the parties in conflict. Kleiboer takes the argument further by noting that 
the heart of the debate on impartiality lies on the effects of impartiality on the outcomes 
of mediation. The underlying argument according to Kleiboer (1996:370) is that, “mediator 
impartiality is crucial for disputants’ confidence in the mediator, which in turn, is a 
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necessary condition for gaining acceptability and which in turn is essential for mediation 
success. However, scholars such as Zartman and Touval (Kleiboer 1996:370) argue that 
mediator acceptability is not contingent upon impartiality but instead on a mediator’s bias 
towards one of the parties with two positions presented, first from the perspective of 
disputing parties and secondly from a mediator’s perspective. The first argument is that, 
from the perspective of the disputing parties, a biased mediator may be an attractive 
option as long as the mediator has particularly strong ties to the party with greater control 
over the outcome of the conflict. It therefore follows that whatever partiality results from 
these ties is balanced by the mediator’s greater capacity to influence that party. The party 
that does not have relations with the mediator hopes or expects that the mediator will use 
partiality to influence the adversary (Kleiboer 1996:370). 
The second position is that from a mediator’s perspective, it is more the exception than 
the rule to be partial concerning the parties and issues in international conflict. This is the 
case in that mediators often empower weaker parties in the interest of an equitable 
settlement to end human misery such as humanitarian crises. It is however noted that in 
international politics, peace-making is often intertwined with less altruistic self-interests of 
mediators. According to Kleiboer (1996:370), Zartman and Touval distinguish between 
defensive and expansionist motives. Defensive motives may emerge when a conflict 
between two states threatens a mediator’s interest. For example, a conflict between two 
neighbouring states may upset a regional power balance or may provide opportunities for 
a rival power to increase its influence by intervening in the dispute. On defensive interests, 
Anstey (2007:433) adds that mediation by a party with interests is normative, with 
influence over the parties based on the mediator’s status within the relational set of the 
conflict. In that regard, with their own interests at stake, a mediator’s acceptability lies 
less in neutrality and more in a perceived capacity to deliver a settlement. In such 
interventions, dyadic disputes are turned into triadic interactions with mediators adding 
their own perceptions, values and interests into the mix. Anstey (2007:434) asserts that 
it is normative for mediators in international relations to have interests in neighbours’ 
conflicts as it is understood to likely influence the process. The study argues that it is for 
this reason, the Mbeki was appointed by SADC to mediate the Zimbabwean dispute. 
However, as noted by McKinley (2004: 84-103) Mbeki’s approach was instead motivated 
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by securing South African government and private interests at the expense of 
Zimbabwean citizens. Anstey (2007:434) observes that there is an ethical crunch if a third 
party secures its own interests by colluding with a regime in the repression of its citizens. 
Zartman (2000:255) however suggests that a mediator cannot lean too far in favour of 
any party without a breakdown in the process. 
Partial mediators may also engage in mediation for expansionist motives driven by the 
desire to extend and increase their resources, influence and power. In the course of the 
debate on impartiality, some scholars who argue that mediator success is not contingent 
upon impartiality have examined whether other mediator characteristics in particular, 
leverage is a good predictor of more successful outcomes. The assumption behind 
leverage is that a mediator engages in behaviour that is designed to elicit information and 
exercise influence in order to reframe issues and persuade the parties. These tasks are 
best achieved not when a mediator is unbiased but when he possesses resources that 
either or both parties value Zartman and Touval (in Kleiboer: 1996 370). Impartiality in 
other words is considered subordinate to the possession of leverage by a mediator which 
is the next attribute to be considered. 
2.2.2 Mediator Leverage 
 
On the overall, leverage refers to a mediator’s ability to put pressure on one or both of the 
conflicting parties to accept a proposed settlement (Kleiboer 1996:371). This assumes a 
mediator has power and influence resources that can be brought to bear on the parties. 
Given that it is not clear which resources are crucial, ripeness scholarship distinguishes 
between sticks which are negative sanctions and carrots which are positive sanctions and 
between material aspects such as the possibility to withhold or supply economic aid and 
immaterial aspects such as the possibility to use moral or psychological pressure as 
Zartman and Touval argue in (Kleiboer 1996:371). To be noted is that there has been 
controversy in literature on the importance of leverage in achieving successful mediation 
outcomes. One argument that is presented asserts that leverage is indispensable for 
persuading conflicting parties to make concessions or for ensuring disputants adhere to 
agreements (Pruitt). In contrast, other scholars such as Yarrow (in Kleiboer 1996:371)) 
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claim that in certain instances, the mediator’s lack of political power might facilitate 
success rather than hinder it. The argument here is that the credibility and sincerity of a 
mediator may be enhanced because of his non-political nature and inability to “call down 
sanctions” of any kind. Such a lack of power provides a mediator with possibilities “to 
permit an open and relaxed relationship between human beings” Yarrow (in Kleiboer 
1996:371). It is also further argued that the possibilities of mediator acceptance may also 
increase when the mediator is strategically weak. 
Kleiboer (1996:371) notes that although there is scholarly disagreement on the impact of 
leverage, the consensual agreement is that mediation runs various risks when mediators 
use too much leverage. (Pruitt 2008: 1520) notes that first of all, the mediator’s promise 
of compensation can get out of hand. The first implication is that conflicting parties may 
become entirely dependent upon the mediator for further compensation in later 
negotiations. Consequently, a tripartite negotiation system may develop in which much of 
the bargaining that takes place between the mediator and the two parties revolves around 
establishing a price to be paid by the mediator for each concession made by both parties. 
In this case, Zartman (2000: 238) argues that the mediator is continuously required to put 
pressure on the negotiators. If the mediator decides later to take a passive role, there will 
not be any progress in mediation.  The second implication is that a mediated settlement 
that arises as a consequence of the extreme use of leverage may not last very long as 
the agreement is based on compliance with the mediator and not on internalisation of the 
agreement-changed attitudes and perceptions. Added to that, a too strenuous use of 
sticks can cause a party to withdraw its acceptance of a mediator or even to refuse to 
cooperate with any further mediation attempt. On the overall, there seems to be a 
relationship between impartiality and leverage. Consensus in literature emphasises that 
a neutral mediator’s lack of leverage is important, whereas partial mediators need 
possession of leverage to create successful results (Kleiboer 1996:372). The study will 
now turn to the attribute of status. 
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2.2.3 Mediator Status 
 
Another important factor enhancing a mediator’s chances of success is status. Status 
derives from a mediator’s personal reputation, track records and special expertise. Status 
also derives from organisational factors which have been distinguished into two; the 
institutional and positional status. The institutional status of a mediator derives from the 
identity of a mediator’s constituency. The argument is that a mediator seldom acts as an 
individual but usually as a spokesperson or representative of a national state or a 
nongovernmental organisation. In that sense, the standing, legitimacy, and in some 
cases, leverage of these mediating bodies or countries determine the status of the 
representative who acts as mediator (Kleiboer 1996:372, Anstey 2007: 433). The 
positional status of the mediator depends on their standing within their country or 
organisation. A mediator must have such a strong internal position that they can commit 
their government or executive to back up the things they say or do. For example, if a 
mediator promises compensation for concessions made by the adversaries, they must be 
able to count on the mediator being able to commit the mediator’s country or organisation 
to deliver. 
According to Kleiboer (1996:373), ‘two different propositions about the relations between 
mediator status and successful mediation outcomes have been developed’. The first one 
concerns the level of status. It is asserted that the higher the mediator’s status, the greater 
the chances of success. In the analysis of the 1976-1979 Zimbabwe settlement, Low (in 
Kleiboer 1996:373) demonstrated that the second round of mediation in the then 
Rhodesia probably could not have been sustained had it not been for the personal 
involvement of high status mediators such as British Foreign Minister, David Owen, 
United States Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, United Nations Ambassador and Andrew 
Young.  
The second proposition concerning mediator status focuses on the extent of rank 
equilibrium between mediator and representatives, that is, a mediator’s relative status. 
This position assumes that for mediation to be successful, the status of the mediator and 
the status of the representatives of the conflicting parties must be attuned. If the status of 
the mediator is lower than the representatives of the parties, any attempts at mediation 
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may not be taken seriously altogether. On the other hand, it may be as problematic when 
the mediator’s status is higher than the status of the representatives of the disputants.  
2.2.4 Mediation Strategies 
 
According to William Zartman (2000), ripeness within a conflict can develop within the 
conflict itself or be induced by external parties as third party mediators. Zartman (in 
Kleiboer 1996:375) identifies mediator strategies which Zartman distinguishes with three 
principal mediator roles as follows; the mediator as “communicator, as “formulator” and 
as manipulator”. The communicator is a passive conduit of and repository and serves as 
a channel of communication as contact breaks down between the parties in dispute. For 
example, the mediator may act as a go between to carry information, proposals or 
concessions back and forth between the conflicting parties. A more active role is played 
by the mediator as formulator. A formulator is capable of innovative thinking and helps 
the parties to redefine issues or to find a formula for the resolution of their conflict. If these 
are still not enough to bring about reduction of conflict, the mediator may have to use their 
leverage to manipulate the parties into agreement. In these situations, the mediator acts 
as a manipulator. Literature on mediator strategies Zartman (in Kleiboer 1996:375) has 
demonstrated that more active mediation strategies are more effective in international 
mediation and active mediation strategies can affect and be responsive to a wider variety 
of dispute situations than less active strategies. However, Kochan (in Kleiboer 1996:375) 
emphasises that a premature use of active strategies may ruin the mediator’s credibility 
and acceptability and when conditions are not ripe for settlement, a mediator should 
refrain from active or aggressive tactics but when conditions are ripe a settlement may 
not occur unless the mediator engages in such tactics. 
In line with mediation types and shapes, Anstey (2007:434), elaborates that the different 
forms of mediation as proffered by Zartman can be applied to induce ripeness in a conflict. 
Anstey categorises them into two which include a low power intervention approach 
associated with quiet diplomacy and a more power based intervention associated with 
principled mediation (Anstey 2007:434).  A low power approach associated with quiet 
diplomacy as advocated by Nathan (in Anstey 2007:434) involves non-confrontational, 
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non-judgemental methods and less forms of communication. The argument behind this 
approach is that ‘it minimises risks of sensationalism and alienation of parties involved’ 
Nathan (in Anstey 2007:434). The process is also intended to offer opportunities for 
dialogue between parties, confidential advice, problem solving out of the public eye and 
to build confidence between parties that dialogue may bear fruits for all. Any pressure on 
the parties is therefore exerted privately to limit potential damage to trust relations. Nathan 
in Anstey (2007:434) argues that for Africa, crude power brokerage by external powers 
has tended to aggravate rather than de-escalate conflicts. To that end, Nathan (in Anstey 
2007:434) advocates for a low power approach as explained above.   
2.3 Critique of Ripeness theory 
 
It has been demonstrated that ripeness is descriptive and prescriptive of conflict dynamics 
and their resolution. However, according to Anstey (2007:434), the major challenge with 
ripeness is with its conception of mediator attributes particularly mediator impartiality and 
its relational concepts of mediator interests. Ripeness posits that it is normative for a 
mediator to have interests either defensive or expansionist in a neighbour’s conflict, as it 
is understood to likely influence the mediation process. However, as Anstey points out, 
the influence can become negative when a third party with defensive interests is 
motivated by securing and protecting their own interests, such as trade, investments and 
diplomatic at the expense humanitarian crises situations particularly, where gross human 
rights abuses exist. Consequently, this may translate to sustenance of the conflict instead 
of its resolution. The other challenge with ripeness lies in its notion of mediator perception 
of the conflict, which can either be subjective or objective (Aggestam 1995:98). In other 
words, as pointed out by Groom (in Aggestam 1995:98), for the mediator, this builds to 
“what we think causes the conflict determines what we think we can do about it”. This 
then suggests that the conceptual framework of the conflict by the mediator can also 
influence mediator strategies that can be applied to induce ripeness. Ripeness highlights 
these as low power interventions for example quiet diplomacy or high power interventions 
which are more leveraged and constitute the use of ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ but which are 
considered effective in conflicts with irrational disputing parties . A low power intervention 
associated with mediation approaches such as quiet diplomacy is held to be pursued by 
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mediators who want to protect their own policy interests by avoiding confronting regimes 
that repress their own citizens. In a sense and as argued by Anstey (2007: 434), such a 
mediation approach is counter-productive to the effective resolution of conflict and would 
therefore call for the use of a more leveraged mediation approach. Lastly, the other 
challenge with the ripeness approach is that it is only concerned with the successful 
initiation of negotiations. This then suggests that ripeness does not address the success 
or failure of conflict agreements or settlements, which are central to the sustainability of 
conflict resolution.   
2.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that the ripeness theory is descriptive and prescriptive of 
conflict dynamics and its resolution and that the theory is also concerned with the 
successful initiation of negotiations. The chapter has also argued that ripeness theory 
recognises mediator attributes such as impartiality, leverage and status as central to 
successful and effective mediation outcome. The chapter has also shown that mediation 
strategies such as low or high power interventions are dependent on mediator conception 
of the conflict and will in turn influence the effective resolution of conflict. On the overall, 
the chapter demonstrated that in view of the challenges and limitations found in the power 
based approaches of international relations; realism, rationalism and constructivism due 
to their failure to include mediation and negotiation in their premises, ripeness theory was 
employed  to analyse President Mbeki’s mediation approach to the 2008 Zimbabwe 
conflict. The chapter argued that this is on the basis that the same theoretical framework 
was successfully used to analyse the 1979 and 1987 mediation processes in Zimbabwe.   
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CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3. Introduction 
 
The measurement of the success and effectiveness of diplomatic overtures and mediation 
is in how they resolve conflict and guarantee durable peace. Indeed, one of the central 
issues to the study of international mediation is ascertaining its effectiveness and success 
in resolving conflicts in a sustainable manner, particularly in view of the shift of conflicts 
from the interstate to the intra-state domain, in the post-cold war era. This shift has 
brought with it increasing attention to issues of human security and human rights 
(Maclean 2005:3). Arguably, intra-state conflicts have been on the increase since the end 
of the cold war in the 1980s (Quinn 2013: 388). There is convergence in mediation 
literature that these conflicts have tended to be violent and intractable and have in that 
regard engendered scholarly scrutiny and interest on mediation approaches best suited 
for the resolution of such conflicts. This would therefore seem to suggest that a mediation 
approach such as quiet diplomacy is regarded to be an ineffective approach in conflicts 
with human rights implications (Anstey 2007:434, Maclean 2005: 3).  Further, there is also 
consensus in scholarship that mediation in intra-state conflicts has tended to be 
constrained by the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, which to date continue 
to guide international relations.  
Scholarly attention has also been drawn to ascertaining mediation success, with 
questions such as; does a negotiated settlement necessarily imply mediation success? 
And also; does it provide the basis for the sustainable resolution of conflicts? Zartman 
and Touval (in Maclean 2005:3) posit that conflict mediation tends to be declared 
successful “if a formal agreement promising the reduction of conflict is achieved”. 
However, this assertion appears to ignore that some conflict situations have deteriorated 
and violence has recurred soon after successful ceasefires (Maclean 2005:3). In a way, 
this confirms the observation by Bercovitch (2006: 83) that in spite of its popularity, 
mediation is generally considered to be counter-productive as it has often “put the lid on 
the can of conflict without resolving the underlying issues”. This chapter will demonstrate 
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that mediated agreements may in fact be the source of future disputes (Quinn 2013: 388, 
Bercovitch 2006:85). Zimbabwe is a case in point; having had three landmark negotiated 
settlements, which are generally viewed as flawed mechanisms for conflict resolution. A 
particular reference is made to the Lancaster House Agreement Novak (in Ndlovu-
Gatsheni and Benyera 2015:19) as will be demonstrated in this chapter. The chapter will 
first look at the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement, through which the post-independence 
settlement in Zimbabwe was negotiated and which according to Qobo (2008:167) 
contained some of the seeds that led to the contemporary crisis in the country. The 
Chapter will also look at the subsequent mediated settlements; the ZANU/ZAPU 1987 
Unity Accord and the 2008 Government of National Unity. However, to put the study in 
context, the chapter will begin by exploring the definition of mediation and its various 
approaches, given the scope of the concept of mediation. The chapter will also look at 
the dynamics of intra-state conflicts and the related concepts of sovereignty and non-
intervention. 
3.1 Defining Mediation  
 
Before delving into the mammoth task of defining international mediation, the study will 
attempt to put the concept of mediation in context by recognising and noting from the 
outset that mediation is another form of third party intervention, which is considered as 
one of the methods for the peaceful management of international conflict (Bercovitch and 
Keashley 2004:152-153). The chapter will therefore start by differentiating mediation from 
other forms of third party interventions, which have been identified by Bercovitch and 
Keashley (2004:152-153). 
Conciliation: a trusted third party provides an informal communication link between 
the warring parties with the purpose of identifying the issues, reducing tensions 
and encouraging the parties to shift their negotiation positions. 
Arbitration and Adjudication:  a legitimate and authoritative third party renders a 
binding judgement to the parties. 
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Consultation and Problem solving: involves a third party facilitating analysis of the 
conflict and the development of alternatives through communication and diagnosis 
based on an analysis and understanding of conflict processes. 
Peacekeeping: involves the provision of military personnel by a third party or 
parties to supervise and monitor a ceasefire to undertake humanitarian activities 
or attempt to prevent open hostilities between the parties. 
As already alluded to, defining mediation is no mean task given its diversity as will shortly 
be demonstrated. In light of this view, Jackson (2009:33) argues that there is no unitary 
definition of the concept of mediation as it covers an enormous scope and is multifaceted. 
Bercovitch (2006:290) agrees with this view and asserts that mediation takes various 
forms. Jackson (2009:33-34) elaborates that the various definitions of mediation range 
from a focus that is outcome oriented (Young 1967 :34, Black and Mouton 1985:15 in 
Jackson 2009: 33-34), which looks at what mediators hope to achieve, to a focus on the 
act of intervention itself (Douglas 1957: 70, Singer 1990:20 in Jackson 2009: 33-34) and 
lastly to a focus on neutrality and impartiality of the mediator (Bingham 1985:5, Folberg 
and Taylor 1984:7, Spencer and Young 1993:195 in Jackson 2009: 33-34). According to 
Mitchell (1981:287), an outcome oriented definition would thus define mediation as “any 
intermediary activity undertaken by a third party with the primary intention of achieving 
some compromise settlement of the issues at stake or at least ending disruptive conflict 
behaviour”. A definition of mediation that focuses on the act of intervention is for example 
and according to Moore (1986:6 in Jackson 2009:33-34) defined as “an elaboration of the 
negotiation process which involves the intervention of an acceptable, impartial and neutral 
third party who has no authoritative decision-making power to assist contending parties 
in voluntarily reaching their own mutually acceptable settlement”. 
Similarly, a definition of mediation that distinguishes features of impartiality and neutrality 
is according to Moore (1986:14) defined as the “intervention into a dispute or negotiation 
by an acceptable, impartial and neutral third party who has no authoritative decision 
making power to assist disputing parties in voluntarily reaching their own mutually 
acceptable settlement of issues in dispute”. Jackson (2009:34) contends that the pitfall 
with the above definitions is in their attempt to assign exclusive roles or strategies to one 
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kind of mediation. The challenge is that this overlooks the dynamics of the mediation 
process and does not help in understanding the reality of international mediation (Jackson 
2009:34). To overcome this limitation, the study will use the broad and general definition 
of mediation proffered by Bercovicth (2006: 291) who asserts that mediation “ is a process 
of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties’ own efforts whereby the 
disputing parties or their representatives  seek the assistance or accept an offer of help 
from an individual, group, state or organisation to change, affect or influence their 
perception or behaviours without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of 
the law”. This definition has several notable features that can be implied from it. First; the 
definition emphasises that the main goal of mediation is to manage conflict. Second; that 
mediation is flexible and can be structured in very diverse ways (Bercovicth 2006:290), 
which means mediation does not follow any set structure or process. In other words, 
mediation is adaptive and responsive (Bercovitch 2007:168). The definition also suggests 
that any mediation situation has some commonalities, which the study recognises as the 
parties in conflict, the mediator, the process of mediation and the context of mediation 
(Bercovicth 2006:290-291). As alluded to before, the study notes that mediation is one 
type of third party intervention, which is utilised to end conflict. When mediation is 
employed for this purpose, the question becomes how is it possible to gauge its success?  
This question is addressed in the next section. 
3.2 Defining Mediation Success 
 
Some scholars assert that given the complexities of the mediation process, it is difficult 
to come up with a universally accepted criterion for measuring success (Jackson 
2009:47). There is in that sense no clear theoretical answer as to what factors account 
for mediation success or indeed how to define it. The main reason is that mediation is 
multidimensional (Jackson 2009:47), in that it is not a uniform practice and as such, it 
would be a futile exercise to draw up one set of criteria to cover all the possible constructs 
of success. Kressel and Pruitt (1985: 196 in Jackson 2009: 47) agree with this view and 
express their doubts on “…. whether a unified theoretical and empirical literature on 
mediation success will ever be possible?” Kleoboer (1992:8 in Jackson 2009:47) terms 
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mediation success as an “elusive notion”, while Beardsley (2006:360, 2008:724) terms 
definition of mediation success as “inconsistent”. In view of the above arguments, 
scholars clearly define mediation success differently. It should be borne in mind from the 
outset that mediation objectives and outcomes are central to assessing mediation 
success. However, as noted by Beardsley (2010: 395), success is difficult to judge if one 
does not understand the mediation’s initial objectives; for example, was it just to get the 
protagonists to interact and communicate or was it aimed at a settlement.  
The study recognises that various attempts have been made to define mediation success 
in terms of short and long term success, mediation effectiveness, or objective and 
subjective criteria. Zubek et al (1992 in Beardsley 2010:395) explain short term success 
as concerned with the immediate outcomes that are observable at the time of mediation. 
These outcomes include whether the disputing parties reach an agreement, the quality of 
the agreement in terms of whether it speaks to the most important goals or issues raised 
in the mediation process and the parties’ feelings of satisfaction immediately following the 
mediation. However, according to (Sisk 2001 in Beardsley 2010:395), while a short term 
definition of success is useful for some purposes such as research, it has some limitations 
associated with it, namely that it runs the risk of measuring an “illusory success” in that 
even after a peace agreement is reached, conflict may still recur. Sisk (2001 in Beardsley 
2010:395) cites Rwanda as an example of this and notes that “the Arusha accords for 
Rwanda were meant to end a bloody civil war. However, instead, the agreements 
collapsed in the 100-day genocide that left 800 000 dead”. Long term measures of 
mediation success are therefore considered to be useful in overcoming the challenges of 
“illusory success”, associated with short term measures.   
Long term measures of success are concerned with delayed outcomes that are 
observable after an interval of time has passed, for example, whether the parties have 
complied with the agreement and whether there was an improvement in their relationship 
and an absence of further problems in the aftermath of the mediation (Pruitt et al 
1993:314). Kleioboer (1996: 361) notes that despite the differences over the long and 
short measures of mediation success, there is consensus that mediation success is to be 
judged by the mediation outcomes, which go beyond the signing of an agreement. This 
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would therefore seem to suggest that what becomes crucial is the durability of the peace 
agreement.  
According to Beardsley et al (2006:58), using mediation effectiveness as a measure of 
mediation success is assessed in terms of a formal agreement, post-crisis tension 
reduction and contribution to crisis abatement. Scholars of effectiveness take as their 
starting point the mediator’s or parties’ objectives Kleoboer (1996:362). This view 
considers effectiveness as a function of whether the mediation achieved its expectations, 
which Beardsley (2010:395) however concedes to be difficult to quantify. Touval 
(2003:94) on the other hand places achievement of objectives, the decrease in conflict 
and resolution stability as factors relevant for ascertaining mediation effectiveness. 
However, Kleiboer (1991:6) argues against using mediation effectiveness as a measure 
of mediation success. She asserts that this goal based approach to defining success has 
to struggle with the question of whose goals will be used, which goals are crucial, how to 
quantify vague goals and how to account for changing goals.  The last criteria for defining 
mediation success are in terms of subjective and objective criteria. Bercovicth (2006: 293) 
posits two broad evaluative criteria for measuring mediation success based on the 
normative criteria, namely; the subjective and objective assessments. The subjective is 
based upon the perception of the parties to the conflict or the mediator’s perception with 
regards to the attainment of mediation objectives (Susskind and Cruichshank 1987 in 
Jackson 2009: 50).  
In this regard, mediation according to Bercovitch is successful when the parties are 
satisfied with the process and the outcome; that is; the outcome is seen as fair and done 
within the prescribed time in the case of international mediation. Bercovitch’s objective 
criterion is concerned with the behaviour of the disputants upon termination of mediation 
and determines the extent of change that has taken place. If disputants continue to 
interact in the same dysfunctional manner, the mediation process is said to have failed. 
On the other hand, the mediation is regarded as a success when it contributes to the 
elimination of violent behaviour, bringing disputants to the negotiating table (Sargyan 
2003 in Jackson 2009:50). A successful mediation also influences the protagonists to 
embrace a formal agreement that settles many of the issues in dispute and produces new 
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and more productive interaction (Jackson 2009:51). Questions however remain on 
whether the signing of a peace agreement necessarily implies mediation success. The 
Zimbabwe example of mediation, starting with the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement, to 
the Government of National Unity in 2008, is a good example of the ambiguity surrounding 
mediation failure or success. This observation is affirmed by Nathan (2005:11) who 
asserts that ‘peace is not attained when parties sign an agreement’. They must still 
implement the agreement and adhere to its provisions. This would seem to suggest that 
the signing of an agreement is a non-event if it is not followed by commitment from the 
parties. In corroboration of this view Glurr (2000 in Anstey 2007:434) states that: 
Internationally brokered settlements and the atmospherics of ceasefires, 
amnesties and signing ceremonies that accompany them are often a façade 
behind which protagonists jockey for political advantage and resources that fuel 
the next round of fighting”. 
Mhandara and Pooe (2013:6) add that while mediation can succeed in cursorily 
addressing conflict through a peace agreement or a coalition government, it has limited 
ability to enforce the implementation of the agreement made by the parties to a conflict. 
By implication therefore, the success of mediation effort is underwritten by the willingness 
of the parties to the conflict; first to accommodate each other’s demands and to embrace 
the mediator’s suggestions. This then brings us to a discussion of the factors that affect 
mediation failure and success. 
3.3 Factors Affecting Mediation Failure and Success 
 
Because mediation is one of the most important methods of managing conflicts, 
(Bercovitch 2002:4), much effort has been placed on determining which factors are 
important for mediation success. There is, consequently a wealth of literature on 
mediation success. This chapter examines some of the literature on successful mediation, 
and it structures this material according to the contingency model for mediation, which is 
described in the next section of this chapter. 
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3. 3.1 The Contingency Model 
 
The contingency model was originally designed by Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille 
(1991), for the purpose of systematically studying mediation. One of its basic tenets is 
that the outcome of mediation, whether successful or not, is contingent upon a number of 
contextual and process variables (Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille 1991:9). In this 
regard therefore, a number of variables, related to the nature of the parties and their 
conflict can be clustered as context variables, whereas other variables related to the 
mediator and their strategies can be clustered as process variables. The next section of 
the chapter will look in detail at the context variables; already explained as the nature of 
the parties and their conflict;  
3.3.2 Nature of the Parties and their Relationship 
 
The two variables that reflect the nature of the parties are the previous relationship and 
the power difference between them. Both of these variables are discussed below; 
3.3.3 Previous Relationship between the Parties 
 
One variable which reflects the nature of the parties is their previous relationship. A 
conflict has at least two or more parties who are in an adversarial relationship. The 
“primary parties” are those who are directly engaged in the adversarial relationship and 
their decisions or behaviour can be influenced by other “indirect parties” to the conflict 
(Hampson, Crocker and Aall 2004 in Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Willie 1991:12). The 
primary parties may or may not have had a previous relationship that may or may not 
have been conflicting. The way to categorise the previous relationship between the 
parties is to distinguish whether it was friendly, antagonistic, conflictual, or had more than 
one dispute in the past (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, Wille 1991:12). One view holds that 
when parties had a previous friendly relationship then the chances of a successful 
mediation are more likely and this finding has been confirmed for mediation of 
international disputes (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille 1991:72). More precisely, these 
scholars found that mediation between previously friendly parties are almost twice as 
likely to be successful compared to mediation between parties with any of the other types 
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of previous relationships. Furthermore, these same scholars found that parties which 
have had one or more disputes in the past receive the most mediation attempts but have 
the lowest chance of mediation success. Therefore, these researchers concluded from 
this finding that a previously conflictual relationship may exacerbate a current conflict and 
hinder efforts to settle it. 
3.3.4 Power Differences 
 
A second variable which reflects the characteristics of the parties is the differences of 
power between them or power asymmetries. Crocker, Hampson and Aall (2004: 101) 
remark that mediation does not take place in a vacuum, but in a wider context, and 
understanding the context involves assessing the balance of power between the parties. 
There are several forms of power. For example, there is ‘military power, external 
diplomatic and political support, the financial wherewithal to sustain a struggle, 
international legitimacy or isolation, ‘soft power’ resources, for example (domestic 
legitimacy and cohesion, and legitimacy in the eyes of the international community) or 
skilled manpower and able leadership….’ (Crocker, Hampson and Aall 2004 in Bercovitch 
2005). Moreover, a distinction can be made between the “forms” of power and the 
‘sources’ of power. The sources of a party’s power can either be internal or external and 
the external sources of power can determine a party’s behaviour, interests and 
interactions (Bercovicth and Houston 2000:179). In addition, according to Bercovitch and 
Houston (2000:179) because external sources of power are based on the party’s position 
and relationship in the international system, ‘the ability of a party to defend and negotiate 
its interests in a conflict is conditional on the way it can manoeuvre to obtain additional 
forms of aid and assistance to enhance its position in the conflict management situation’. 
Different forms of power are often distributed asymmetrically between the parties 
(Crocker, Hampson and Aall 2004:101) and there are two views on the role of power 
asymmetries and the success of mediation. The first view holds that, ‘in case of clear 
power disparity, the stronger adversary may not be prepared to countenance any 
concessions or compromises which are essential to mediation success’ (Bercovitch, 
Anagnoson and Wille 1991:11).  Pruitt and Rubin (in Anstey 2007: 427) concur with this 
view and state that ‘power imbalances aggravate conflicts producing positional rigidities, 
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with powerful parties tending to believe they can crush the other and seeing few benefits 
in negotiation, and weaker ones often resorting to intransigence rather than capitulation’. 
However, the second view contends that ‘…. The presence of a fairly unambiguous 
advantage by one of the parties makes the path of settlement clearer by indicating which 
side will be expected to make the greater concessions’ Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille 
1991:11). However, one study has found that when the distribution of power between the 
parties is equal, mediation is more likely to be successful (Bercovitch, Anagnoson and 
Wille 1991). Therefore, one role of the mediator is to address these differences to create 
a level and fair playing field for mediation (Bercovitch and Houston 2000:178). Anstey 
(2007:427) agrees with this view and adds that conflicts with power imbalances would 
require from a mediator procedural fairness to ensure meaningful participation and an 
approach of principled problem solving than power bargaining. 
3.3.5 Nature of Conflict 
   
A second set of variables used for research on mediation success relate to the nature of 
the conflict. Each conflict can have unique characteristics that distinguish it from others. 
The characteristics or the (environmental parameters) of the conflict are, ‘…. the 
conditions that reflect the nature of the disagreement, the parties’ perceptions of it, and 
the level and type of conflict behaviour’ Bercovitch and Houston 2000:177). Two aspects 
that are fundamental for understanding the characteristics of the conflict include; the 
conflict intensity and the issues (Bercovitch and Houston 2000:177). Both of these factors 
have been examined in order to determine their role in affecting mediation success and 
some research on these factors is presented below; 
3.3.6 Conflict Issues 
 
One variable which reflects a characteristic of the conflict is the conflict issues. Bercovitch, 
Anagnoson and Wille (1991:14) state that the ‘issue in a conflict refer to the underlying 
causes of dispute. There may also be more than one issue involved and parties 
themselves may not agree on the dispute issue’. Crocker, Hampson and Aall (in 
Bercovicth 2005) also state that ‘the issues form the shape or structure of the conflict in 
that ‘the issues tell us not only what drives the conflict but also what needs to be settled 
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for the conflict to cease’. To this effect, Crocker, Hampson and Aall (2004 in Bercovitch 
2005) state that issues are a reflection of the parties’ underlying interests and therefore 
they often become the basis for the discussion of any possible settlement. Crocker, 
Hampson and Aall (2004 in Bercovitch 2005) assert that creating new peace agreement 
involves identifying and working with overlapping interests. However, the same authors 
warn that conflicts may become intractable in cases where the interests are mutually 
exclusive. Therefore, ‘the starting place for the mediator, is to develop with the parties ‘an 
agreed upon definition of what the conflict is about, what needs to be settled and what 
will appear on the endgame negotiating agenda: This requires achieving explicit or tacit 
agreement on which issues belong in the settlement (and by implication, which do not’ 
(Crocker, Hampson and Aall 2004 in Bercovitch 2005). This implies that there may be 
more conflict issues than what can and should be addressed by mediation. Some 
scholars assert that mediation should limit the number of issues which it addresses. For 
example, Crocker, Hampson and Aall (2004 in Bercovitch 2005) stress that not all of the 
issues in the dispute should appear on the negotiating agenda, otherwise the process 
may stall. Similarly, the same scholars remark that an agreement which includes provision 
on every issue may place too much burden on the parties and the settlement itself, 
thereby making its failure imminent. It can be concluded therefore that there are several 
reasons to limit the number of conflict issues that mediation will address. The question 
then becomes, how does a mediator decide which issues to address and which to leave 
off the table?  Crocker, Hampson and Aall (2004 in Bercovitch 2005) assert that the 
negotiating agenda must ‘cover those issues that are politically essential to the sides and 
are logically essential to the viability of the settlement’. 
3.3.7 Different Types of Issues and Successful Mediation 
 
Some research has examined whether different types of issues at the heart of the dispute 
will be quite influential in determining the outcome of mediation (Bercovitch and Langley 
1993:676). There are various ways to distinguish different types of issues and one way is 
to distinguish whether the conflict is inter or intra-state (Bercovitch and Houston 2000: 
177). Bercovitch and Houston (2000) argue that the issues are subjective and emotional 
in intra-state conflicts and this makes mediation success more difficult. They note that in 
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these cases, the parties are not in a position to think creatively about solutions to the 
conflict and therefore the mediator may have to build confidence and trust in order to bring 
them together and identify the other’s interest. Similarly, Bercovitch and Langley 
(1993:686) found a very strong correlation between tangible issues (as opposed to 
intangible issues) and low complexity in international disputes; that is; the international 
disputes involving tangible issues which are included in their study also often had a low 
complexity (as indicated by the number of disputed issues) and were therefore more likely 
to result in successful mediation. As such, they suggest that mediators should focus on 
the tangible issues in order to enhance the likelihood of reaching an agreement 
(Bercovitch and Langley 1993:689). However, conflicts can also be distinguished by the 
major type of issue that is at stake and one study distinguished between the five types of 
issues as follows; sovereignty, ideology, security, independence and any other issue 
(Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille 1991:14). These scholars found that disputes over 
territory or security issues were more likely to result in successful mediation than those 
over issues of ideology or independence. Perhaps this observation is in line with the 
argument by Mutisi (2012: 163) that the Mbeki-led mediation in Zimbabwe was protracted 
as the major point of difference between ZANU (PF) and the MDC was largely ideological 
and at political level. 
3.3.8 Intensity of Conflict 
 
Intensity is a second characteristic of a conflict which can influence mediation success. 
For example, Bercovitch and Houston (2000:177) state that ‘the intensity of a conflict is 
recognised as a fundamental determinant of how amenable a conflict will be to mediation 
and how effective a given strategy may be’. Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille (1991:13) 
state that there are two contradictory views in the literature on how conflict intensity 
relates to mediation success. The first view holds that high-intensity conflicts are more 
likely to result in successful mediation because the parties may wish to cut their losses 
by negotiating a new agreement or in contrast the second view contends that high 
intensity conflicts result in polarised positions, thus reducing the chances of successful 
mediation. Crocker, Hampson and Aall (2001:238) provide a second hypotheses 
concerning why high-intensity conflicts may be more likely to lead to mediation success 
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by linking three different levels of violence to the number of possible entry points that the 
mediator has into the conflict, the barriers to making this entry and the mediator’s 
opportunity for exercising procedural control. In sum, ‘the notion of a conflict cycle 
suggests that while the level of violence is low (a condition that may occur at the beginning 
and end of a conflict cycle) there are greater opportunities for a variety of mediators to 
engage both the parties and the larger society in a wide range of activities, investing on 
a long term basis of peace’. These conditions, however, present fewer opportunities for 
real movement towards settlement on disputed issues. As one approaches higher levels 
of violence, the opportunities for mediators to engage the parties may diminish but the 
likelihood of mediation success as in helping the parties to negotiate an agreement 
increases. In other words, as violence levels increase there are fewer chances for the 
mediator to enter into the conflict and the parties may block the entry of new mediators 
into the conflict, but if the mediator can gain entry when it is at high intensity, then the 
parties may easily accept a new agreement because alternatives to mediation such as 
maintaining the status quo of continuing to wage the conflict, have become less attractive 
to the parties and the parties and the mediator entering the conflict at this point would 
therefore be viewed by the parties as having more leverage because they offer a new 
‘way out’ of the conflict as exemplified by their ability to exercise procedural control. 
Having considered the two arguments, the logical question that follows is; which of these 
two competing perspectives on conflict intensity and mediation success is correct then? 
One way to gauge the intensity of a conflict uses the number of fatalities and low intensity 
disputes have been found to be more likely to result in successful mediation outcomes 
(Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille 1991:17). Similarly, Fretter (2002:103) reports that of 
the 615 total UN mediation attempts made during the period of 1945-1995, 45 (73%) of 
them occurred after 10 000 or more fatalities had been reached and that the number of 
fatalities has a negative impact on the success rate of UN mediation (Fretter 2002:121). 
More specifically, Fretter (2002:121) reports that one of ‘the most significant findings in 
these results from her study are seen in the success rate of mediation attempts during 
conflicts where a high rate of fatalities occurred…’ In sum, there are two main propositions 
regarding the intensity of the conflict and how it influences mediation success. One view 
holds that high-intensity conflicts will be more likely to contribute to mediation success, 
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whereas the other view holds that mediation will be more successful if the conflict is low-
intensity. Current research tends to support the notion that achieving mediation success 
will likely be more difficult in high-intensity conflicts. 
3.3.9 Nature of Mediation Process 
 
This study recognises that mediation is a complicated social process. For example, 
Bercovitch and DeRouen (2004:166) state that ‘mediation is a dynamic and reciprocal 
form of social interaction. It is affected by numerous factors and conditions’. A third set of 
factors which have been used for research on successful mediation relate to the 
mediation process. Two factors related to the mediation process and successful 
mediation outcomes are presented below. These two factors are the number of previous 
mediation attempts and the timing of mediation. 
3.3.10 Number of Previous Mediation Attempts 
 
One factor related to the mediation process is the number of previous mediation attempts. 
A conflict may experience one or more mediation attempts by the same or different 
mediators (Bercovitch and Derouen 2004). Previous attempts can provide important 
information for the subsequent attempts. For example, Bercovitch and DeRouen 
(2004:159) state that, ‘the feedback from previous events includes information gathered, 
experience, learning and understanding gained by the mediator and the parties’. These 
factors can be examined empirically by looking at the number of previous mediation 
attempts, their duration, the outcome, and durability of mediation events, mediator’s 
experiences and history of mediation in a specific dispute. Moreover, Bercovitch and 
Houston (2000:172) argue that the factors from previous mediation attempts ‘may directly 
affect the expectations of both parties and the mediators of how current mediation should 
be carried out or how effective it would be’. The number of mediation attempts may 
therefore influence the outcome of the current process. Bercovitch and DeRouen (2004) 
found evidence that suggests that multiple mediation attempts by the same mediator may 
decrease the likelihood of a successful mediation outcome in cases for example of 
internationalised ethnic conflicts. 
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3.3.11 Timing of Mediation 
 
A second factor related to the mediation process and successful mediation concerns the 
timing of the mediation, which is one of the central assumptions made by Zartman’s 
ripeness theory which informs this study. Crocker, Hampson and Aall (2004:102) state 
that ‘in an ideal world, the best moment for third-party interventions is at the preventive 
stages, before the conflict becomes violent’. However, Zartman and Touval (1996:452) 
argue that because mediators are motivated by self-interest, they will intervene only when 
they believe a conflict threatens their interests or it presents an opportunity to advance 
their interests and this usually occurs after a conflict escalates. In other words, their view 
is that early mediation is not very likely to occur. Even if early intervention is not possible, 
however, then there are other points which are attractive for mediation initiation, including 
shortly after violence has broken out in the immediate wake of a dramatic event, after the 
parties have reached a stage of reciprocal exhaustion, or when a new third party has 
been introduced to the conflict (Crocker, Hampson and Aall 2004:102). Bercovitch and 
DeRouen (2004:154) also recognise the importance of mediation timing when they state 
‘to be effective, mediation must take place at a propitious moment in the life cycle of a 
conflict’. But how exactly can this moment be recognised? Bercovitch and DeRouen 
(2004:161) note that there are two views on when mediation should begin in order to 
occur during this most propitious moment: One view states that mediation is more likely 
to be effective if it is attempted early on in a conflict and certainly well before the parties 
experience the increasing costs and their positions become entrenched. Another view 
contends that mediation is more likely to be successful if it is attempted later on in the 
conflict, once the parties have gone through some ‘hurting stalemate’ and are then 
prepared to revise their motivations and expectations. 
There are some scholars in favour of early intervention (Crocker, Hampson and Aall 
2004:102).  In view of the same, Bercovitch and DeRouen (2004) found that mediators 
who initiate early in the lifecycle of a conflict have a better chance of producing a 
successful outcome in cases for instance of international ethnic conflicts. In another 
study, Fretter (2002:119) found that the majority of UN mediation attempts, (65%) of them 
were made after 36 months of hostilities had already occurred. Fretter (2002:119) 
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concludes that ‘frequently, UN mediation is employed far too late to be consistently 
successful’, because by this far into conflict, the hostilities have increased antagonism 
and mistrust between the parties to the extent that they disregard dialogue as a means 
to achieving their objectives. Crocker, Hampson and Aall (2004:102) also argue in favour 
of early mediation because the parties’ positions may still be flexible since they have not 
yet established vested interests in their war time pursuits. Moreover, these same scholars 
argue that initiating mediation during a state of grinding exhaustion, which would likely 
occur much later in the conflict is not necessarily going to lead to successful mediation 
outcomes because leading research suggests that a mutually hurting stalemate 
(intensively discussed in chapter 2) and the prospect that things will get worse is the 
moment when the parties will be ready to negotiate (Crocker, Hampson and Aall 
2004:103). In other words, as asserted by Zartman’s ripeness theory, the conflict is ‘ripe 
for resolution’ if these conditions are present. According to Ripeness theory, when a 
conflict is ‘ripe for resolution’, it is the moment when parties become motivated to escape 
the conflict and develop an authentic commitment to de-escalate tensions in the 
relationship Zartman (in Anstey 2007:416).  In conclusion, there is mounting evidence 
that initiating mediation early is the ideal because the parties have not become deeply 
entrenched in their positions. 
3.4 Mediator’s Characteristics 
 
Mediators can come from a variety of backgrounds, use a range of approaches, and have 
different interests in the outcome of the conflict. These and other variables related to the 
mediator’s characteristics are discussed below: 
 
3.4.1 Mediator’s Alignment and Impartiality  
 
One of the characteristics of a mediator used in the study of successful mediation 
concerns the mediator’s alignment and impartiality. There are many different types of 
mediators. One of the most basic ways to distinguish between different types of mediators 
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is to determine whether they are third party or not. That is; one of the conflicting parties 
can also be the mediator. However, if the mediator is not one of the conflicting parties 
then they are considered to be third party mediators. Third party mediators can vary 
according to their alignment. It is sometimes stated that mediators should maintain a 
neutral alignment and not side with one of the parties-in other words- they should be 
impartial. However, Bercovitch and Houston (2000; 181) observe that ‘there is some 
disagreement in literature about the absence and importance of mediator impartiality or 
neutrality in international conflict’. Moreover, another scholar states that there is a growing 
body of literature which argues against the need for mediator impartiality (Smith 
1994:445). In sum, there is no consensus in the literature on the role of mediator 
alignment and impartiality in creating successful mediation; even though there may be 
more research in favour of the view that a mediator does not need to remain impartial. 
3.4.2 Mediation Strategy 
 
A second characteristic of the mediator concerns their mediation strategy. Bercovicth and 
DeRouen (2004:160) state that, ‘… a mediation strategy is a goal or a means to the overall 
objective of managing a conflict constructively and effectively’. More specifically, 
‘mediation strategies are designed to change, impact or modify aspects of a conflict and 
the interactions of the parties involved’ (Bercovitch and Houston 2000:174). Some of the 
literature on mediation strategies and successful mediation is reviewed in the following 
section of this chapter. There are three main types of mediation strategies: directive, 
procedural and communication-facilitation. Bercovitch and Houston (2000:175) 
summarise the differences between the three types of mediation strategies as follows:  
    
3.4.3 Communication-Facilitation Approach 
 
These describe mediator behaviour at the low end of the intervention spectrum. In this 
approach, the mediator typically adopts a fairly passive role, channelling information to 
the parties, facilitating cooperation but exhibiting little control over the formal process or 
substance of mediation. According to Brown and Shraub (1992:253) in this approach, the 
65 
 
mediator sees the conflict as a breakdown of communication, thus the mediator’s primary 
task is to facilitate communication (Zartman 1996:279). Nathan (1999: 23-25, in Anstey 
2007: 434) would seem to be in support of this approach in relation to African conflicts. 
He argues that in light of evidence in Africa that crude power brokerage by external 
powers aggravates rather than de-escalates conflicts, this calls for a low power 
intervention approach of ‘confidence building between the warring parties’ which in a way 
resonates with the policy of quiet diplomacy as applied to Zimbabwe by Mbeki. However, 
interest groups, individuals and some scholars such as McKinley (2004: 84-103; Anstey 
2007:434)) would seem to be of the view that in intra-state conflicts with human rights 
implications such approaches are ineffectual. 
3.4.4 Procedural Approach 
 
These enable a mediator to exert more formal control over the mediation process with 
respect to the environment of the mediation. In this case, the mediator may determine 
structural aspects of the meetings, control constituency influences, media publicity, the 
distribution of information, and the situation of the parties’ resources and communication 
processes.  
3.4.5 Directive Approach 
 
This is the most powerful form of intervention (Jackson 2009:42). Through this approach, 
a mediator affects the content and substance of the bargaining process by providing 
incentives for the parties to negotiate or by using ultimatums. Directive strategies deal 
directly with and aim to change the way issues are framed and the behaviour associated 
with them. In more specific terms, however, what might a mediator using a directive 
strategy do differently from one who is using a procedural strategy? In order to answer 
this question, it is necessary to associate specific tactics with each one of the three 
different types of the strategies. 
Directive mediation strategies have been associated with successful mediation 
outcomes, for example, one study states that ‘clearly, the more effective strategies in 
international mediation are the more active strategies’. Mediators employing directive or 
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substantive strategies are successful on average 41% of the time. Mediation strategies 
that can provide adversaries that allow mediators to structure and introduce new issues, 
suggest new ways of seeing the dispute or alter the motivational structure of the parties 
are more positively associated with successful outcomes than any other type of 
intervention (Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille 1991:16). Similarly, another study found 
that ‘directive strategies, which enable mediators to balance negotiating powers and 
suggest alternative approaches to issues are important when dealing with parties that 
pursue rigid bargaining positions or are associated with bloc or regional alliances that 
affect their interests and sources of power’ (Bercovitch and Houston 2000:189). There is 
therefore consensus that directive mediation strategies are associated with successful 
mediation outcomes. 
3.4.6 Mediator Experience 
 
A third characteristic of the mediator is their experience. Bercovitch and Houston 
(2000:184) assert that, ‘a mediator’s experience and record may provide information 
about his or her ability to manage a given conflict and it would logically follow that a 
mediator who is highly experienced would be more likely to achieve mediation success 
as they can draw upon this previous experience. Similarly, Bercovitch and DeRouen 
(2004:159) state that: ‘An important dimension in mediation success is mediator 
experience’. The conflict, management experience of mediators has been suggested as 
an important factor in influencing the style and effectiveness of their mediation. Carnevile 
and Pegnetter and Kochan and Jack found that more experienced mediators obtained 
more settlements; and Pearson, Thoennes and Vanderkkooi found that more experienced 
mediators achieved higher quality settlements. This outcome would perhaps be attributed 
to the degree of trust, credibility and legitimacy parties place in the ability of the mediator 
to fulfil their role as well as the rapport built between the mediator and the parties over 
successive mediation efforts, enabling the mediator to manage the process effectively. 
By utilising an original dataset, Bercovicth and DeRouen (2004:162) found that 
experienced mediators are more likely to produce successful mediation outcomes in 
cases of internationalised ethnic conflicts. In addition, the same study found that a highly 
experienced mediator using directive mediation strategies should greatly increase the 
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chances of success. By settling all of the variables to their mean levels, a baseline 
scenario can be generated in which the probability of success is 38% (or about one in 3 
chances that mediation must be successful (Bercovitch and DeRouen 2004:163). By 
changing the mediation strategy variables and the use of a directive mediation strategy, 
however, the success rate increased to 45% and by changing the mediator’s experience 
to ‘highly experienced’, the success rate increased by over 50% from the baseline 
(Bercovicth and DeRouen 2004:165). This study therefore clearly illustrates the 
importance of a mediator’s experience level in affecting the outcome of mediation. In sum 
therefore, the above presents a powerful argument that the mediator’s experience does 
affect the likelihood of achieving mediation success and that an experienced mediator 
employing a directive strategy should greatly improve the odds of success. Having 
considered factors thought to determine mediation success for both inter and intra-state 
conflicts it is important to consider constraints to mediating intra-state conflicts, which 
have been identified in literature as the principle of sovereignty and the norm of non-
intervention. 
3.5 Constraints to Mediation 
 
According to Jackson (2009:33), mediation is generally accepted as a preferred peaceful 
conflict resolution mechanism for both inter-state and intra-state conflicts. Article 33 of the 
UN Charter recognises mediation as a preferred method of peaceful management of 
international conflicts. Mediation is also the acceptable method of conflict resolution for 
SADC seemingly because of its non-coercive nature (Hartmann 2013:5, Mutisi 2012:176). 
To note is that for most intra-state conflicts particularly in Africa, which arguably have 
been on the rise since the end of the cold war (Evans 2001:1, Touval 2000: 19-20), 
mediation would to some extent constitute infringement of sovereignty and interference 
in the internal affairs of a state. In line with this argument, Bercovitch and Derouen (2004: 
162) argue that states show a tendency to reject mediation efforts, out of fear of losing 
sovereignty and autonomy. This could explain the reason Zimbabwean president Robert 
Mugabe was averse to Mbeki’s mediation initiatives with emphasis that Zimbabwe was 
capable of solving its own problems. This is also the same position that Mbeki and SADC 
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took. In that sense, South Africa’s mediation under Mbeki was sensitive to issues of 
sovereignty and non-intervention in Zimbabwe’s internal affairs (Mhandara and Pooe 
2013: 25, Mutisi 2012:176). According to Mutisi (2012: 175-176) the choice of quiet 
diplomacy as the best mediation approach was accentuated by the threats of neo-
imperialism and neo- colonialism and regime change, which threatened to undermine 
Zimbabwe’s sovereignty. Literature on Mbeki’s mediation posits that it was for this reason 
that Mbeki settled for a cautious approach such as the policy of quiet diplomacy (Business 
Day Live: 22 February 2016). In his defence of the policy of quiet diplomacy, Mbeki 
asserted that the approach left room for the Zimbabweans to decide their future, a position 
which is arguably in line with the precepts of a self-determining sovereign state. It 
becomes imperative for the next section to discuss sovereignty and its implications for 
mediation in intra-state conflicts. 
3.5.1 The Principle of State Sovereignty 
 
Contrary to claims by some scholars such as Synman (2002:30) suggesting the erosion 
of state sovereignty, the concept remains an indispensable feature of contemporary 
international relations. Arguments by proponents of the anti-sovereign doctrine, who 
include various interest and advocacy groups such as civil society organisations, 
governments and individuals, claim that the classical conception of sovereignty in 
absolute terms as is premised on the 1648 Peace Treaty of Westphalia is an outdated 
concept in contemporary international politics. They attribute various factors such as 
globalisation to its demise, which they say has placed greater primacy on the recognition 
of individual rights. In that sense, the claim is that state sovereignty is in the process of 
evolving from a notion of absolute and unlimited power to a concept of responsible 
sovereignty. However, as argued before, the chapter will demonstrate that the 
Westphalian sovereignty with its traditional and classical notions of absolutism and 
unlimited power together with the norm of non-intervention is in practice still central to 
contemporary international relations. Kioko (2003:819) concurs with this view and states 
that the international system and regional organisations such as the AU and SADC were 
founded on this classical concept of state sovereignty. This however does not ignore the 
growing advocacy for human rights in the post-cold war era, with its accompanying call 
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for a dual conception of state sovereignty. At this point, it is important to first explore the 
Westphalian concept of state sovereignty before looking at the concept of responsible 
sovereignty. 
3.5.2 The Westphalian Sovereignty  
 
The Westphalian sovereignty, according to Krasner (2001:232; 2006:72), refers to a 
political organisation premised on ‘the exclusion of external actors from authority 
structures within a given territory’. Litfin (1997:169) concurs with this view; he argues that 
sovereignty denotes ‘the state’s exclusive authority within specified territorial boundaries’. 
Krasner (2001:232), quoting Wolff (in Thomas and Thomas 1956: 5) stated that ‘to 
interfere in the government of another, in whatever way indeed that may be done is 
opposed to the natural liberty of nations in its action. According to (Chatham House 
2006:2), Westphalian sovereignty is violated when external factors influence or determine 
the domestic authority structures. (Evans 2001: 5) adds that this form of sovereignty can 
be compromised through intervention as well as through invitation, when a state 
voluntarily subjects internal authority structures to external constraints. According to 
Evans (2001:5), the new world society that was established after the 1648 Peace Treaty 
of Westphalia was premised on the absolute sovereignty of its constituent members. The 
Treaty recognised the equality of states as a principle of modern international relations. 
The equality of states was recognised irrespective of their catholic or protestant faith and 
of their monarchical or republican form of government. The Treaty therefore laid the 
foundation for an international order based on independent sovereign states. It is 
therefore generally accepted that the classical theory of unlimited sovereignty originated 
with the Peace Treaty of Westphalia. According to this classical conception of 
sovereignty, the state has the power to define freely its own competencies. To also note 
is that the concept of sovereignty contained the important but negative principle of non-
intervention in the internal affairs of another state, which according to (Evans 2001:10) is 
surrounded by controversies with respect to its interpretation.  
At this juncture, this study will look in detail at some of the implications of the Westphalian 
sovereignty and some of its notions such as the norm of non-intervention, which is closely 
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associated with the broader Westphalian understanding of sovereignty and which 
incapacitated Mbeki’s mediation in Zimbabwe (Mutisi 2012: 176).  
3.5.3 Non-Intervention and Non-Interference 
 
Chatham House summary meeting on intervention and international law (Chatham House 
2006:2) asserts that non-intervention and non-interference are used interchangeably and 
that non-interference suggests a wider prohibition particularly when used in addition to 
intervention. For the purposes of this study both terms will be used interchangeably. To 
begin with, it can be deduced that the Westphalian doctrine of sovereignty recognised 
and argued for the non-interference of other states in the domestic affairs of another. 
Ayoob (2002:83), in agreement with this view, argued that ‘non-intervention in the 
domestic affairs of states is an essential corollary of sovereignty’. By implication, 
interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state, according to Brown (1996:108) 
cited in Balogun (2011:43), is interpreted as aggression on the part of the interfering state 
and as such, it is illegitimate and can invoke a hostile and forceful response.  
Since the European ethnic wars in general, and German wars in particular, and religious 
wars - which lasted for about thirty years (1618-1648) - were halted at the signing of the 
Westphalia treaty in 1648, sovereignty as a principle of non-intervention in the domestic 
affairs of another state, has played an important part in interstate affairs (Agnew 2005, 
Armstrong, Krasner 200, 2006, Osiander 2001, Rudolph 2005 in Balogun 2011:43). 
However, due to the growing attention to human rights issues, it will be reiterated that 
there has been a gradual shift in the conception of sovereignty and non-intervention, 
which has seen some governments for example the British government, take a leading 
role in advocating for the right of intervention to avert humanitarian catastrophes 
(Chatham House summary meeting on intervention and international law 2006). As stated 
earlier on in this chapter, there are controversies with respect to interpretation of the right 
of intervention and disagreements regarding the scope of behaviour that is prescribed by 
implication (Kinacioglu 2005). Evans (2001:1) concurs with this view and states that until 
the horrifying events of 11 September 2001 brought to centre stage the international 
response to terrorism, the issue of intervention for human protection has been seen as 
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one of the most controversial and difficult of all international relations questions. Evans 
(2001:1) adds that with the end of the cold war, which as noted before in the chapter, saw 
a proliferation of intra-state conflicts with ugly political and humanitarian repercussions, 
the issue of the right of intervention became a live issue as never before. He further states 
that there continues to be disagreement as to whether, if there is a right of intervention, 
how and when should it be exercised and under whose authority. 
According to Evans (2001:1), for some, the right of intervention has been an alarming 
breach of an international state order dependent on the sovereignty of states and the 
inviolability of their territory. He also adds that part of the controversy over intervention 
derives from the potential width of activities this term can cover, up to and including 
military intervention. Some states would regard any application of pressure to a state as 
being intervention this would also include third party interventions by mediators, some 
others would regard almost any non-consensual interference in the internal affairs of 
another state as being intervention including the delivery of emergency relief assistance; 
others would regard any kind of outright coercive actions to just military but actual or 
threatened political and economic sanctions although others would confine it to military 
force (Evans 2001:33).  However, Evans (2001:31) avers that ‘the defence of state 
sovereignty by even its strongest supporters does not include any claim of the unlimited 
power of a state to do what it wants to its people’. This understanding of sovereignty 
implies a conception of sovereignty as dual responsibility; externally to respect the 
sovereignty of other states and internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all 
people within the state (Evans 2001:33). According to Evans (2001:33), this 
contemporary understanding of sovereignty as responsibility has become the minimum 
context of good international citizenship. However, it is widely accepted that when 
sovereign states abdicate their responsibility to protect their citizens either because they 
are unwilling or unable to do so, ICSS (2005) asserts that, that responsibility must be 
borne by the broader community of states under the principle of R2P.  
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3.5.4 Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
 
Barnett (2008:170) notes that there is a growing acceptance of humanitarian intervention 
and a responsibility to protect when states are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens, 
then the international community inherits that responsibility. Barnett (2008:170) adds that 
this revolutionary concept emerged through fits and starts and in response to tragedies 
such as Rwanda. Bellamy and Wheeler (2008:534) add that R2P was adopted by the 
UNGA at the 2005 World Summit, with Lindberg (in Baylis 2008:535) describing it as a 
‘revolution… in international affairs’. The underlying argument behind R2P is that states 
have the primary responsibility to protect their citizens. However, when states are unable 
or unwilling to do so, or when they deliberately terrorise their citizens, the principle of non-
intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect (Bellamy and Wheeler 
2008:535).  
The report broadens this responsibility to encompass not only the responsibility to react 
to humanitarian crises but also the responsibility to prevent such crises and the 
responsibility to rebuild failed and tyrannical states. This reframing of the debate away 
from the question of whether states have a right of intervention towards the question of 
where responsibility rests for protecting endangered peoples formed the basis of an 
attempt to generate a new international political consensus supporting what the ICSS 
report calls ‘intervention for human protection purposes’ (Bellamy and Wheeler 
2008:534). Two crucial motivating factors behind the setting up of ICSS were the 
aspiration to avoid future situations like Kosovo, where the UNSC was paralysed by 
division among the five permanent members of the UNSC, and future situations like 
Rwanda, where the world stood aside as genocide unfolded. According to Bellamy and 
Wheeler 2008:527), this brought to the fore the problem of selectivity of response as well 
as abuse, where the principle of humanitarian intervention was applied selectively and 
thereby cases are not treated the same. Questions have for instance been raised over 
the lukewarm attitude shown by the international community over the episodes of 
humanitarian catastrophes that Zimbabwe endured in the post-colonial era, starting with 
the Gukurahundi. It is argued that the international community did not react as Mugabe 
then was a darling of the West (ibid). Similarly, it’s important to note that some African 
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governments are sceptical about R2P, with concerns of its abuse and misappropriation 
by powerful countries. R2P is thought to be an instrument of the West to recolonise and 
intervene in the affairs of former colonies (Mamdani 2011). Indeed, the fears of the African 
governments are justified, as the powerful countries have time and again violated the 
non-intervention norm for instance the most recent example that comes to mind is the 
issue of military intervention in Libya in 2011 by the United Kingdom and France. A UK 
Parliamentary report released on 15 September 2016 condemned the military intervention 
admitting that it was a result of abuse of the R2P. The effect is that this has further 
amplified the concerns of African countries. Having looked at the constraints of 
sovereignty in mediating intra-state conflicts and the debates on right of intervention, the 
chapter will now turn to various mediation initiatives that have been employed to end the 
conflicts that have occurred in Zimbabwe, starting with the Lancaster House Agreement.  
3.6 Situating the 2008 Conflict in Past Mediation Initiatives in Zimbabwe 
 
It has been mentioned earlier on in this chapter that Zimbabwe has had three landmark 
negotiated settlements; the 1979 Lancaster House Conference, the 1987 Unity Accord 
and the 2008 GNU, which not only affirms the country’s history and propensity of violence 
and conflicts (Mhandara and Pooe 2013:31) but also exposes the failure of the peace 
agreements as effective mechanisms for conflict resolution. This also points to questions 
raised earlier on in the chapter on whether a peace agreement necessarily implies 
mediation success. An inquiry into the 1979 Lancaster House Conference beckons.  
 
3.6.1 The 1979 Lancaster House Conference 
 
The 1979 Lancaster House settlement   is generally lauded for successfully ending the 
15 years of civil war in colonialist Rhodesia and allowing for the establishment of the 
Independent state of Zimbabwe in 1980 (Maclean 2005:1). Kraybill (1994:210) notes that 
given that Rhodesia in the late 1970s was ‘a graveyard of failed peace initiatives’ there is 
no question that ‘winning the peace’ was a significant achievement at that particular time. 
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(Maclean 2005:2) states that a total of 28 mediation attempts had failed to end the civil 
war. The liberation movements; Robert Mugabe’s ZANU and Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU, Ian 
Smith’s Rhodesian Front, Muzorewa’s United African National Congress (UANC), Britain 
and to a lesser extent South Africa, were all represented in the deliberations and became 
party to the agreement. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009) notes that the Lancaster House 
Agreement led to the formation of a coalition government made up of the minority 
Rhodesian Front party, ZAPU and ZANU. Novak (2007:171) asserts that in the immediate 
future, the Accord was a success, the ceasefire held, the elections were judged largely 
free and fair and a democratically elected party won black majority rule and finally 
assumed the reins of government on April 18 1980.  Despite its lauded success, there is 
emerging consensus in literature that the post-colonial crises and conflicts in Zimbabwe 
are rooted in the manner the negotiations at Lancaster House were handled (Qobo 
2008:166, Maclean 2005: 1-4, Novak 2009: Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Benyera 2015:12). 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Benyera (2015:18) state that: 
As a conflict resolution mechanism, the Lancaster House settlement was not 
honest and suffered the lack of honest brokers. Lord Carrington acted as a third 
party negotiator who steered unborn Zimbabwe into a neo-colony rather than a 
sovereign post-colonial nation state. 
In corroboration of this view, Maclean (2005:5) observes that the problems at the time 
were unsatisfactorily resolved and on that note she adds that recently, the more visible 
issues have involved the contentious discourses of race and land ownership, which were 
central concerns in the Lancaster House negotiations. Bakare (1993) concurs with this 
view and notes that in the first place, the land question, which was among the cardinal 
anti-colonial historic grievances that caused the nationalist liberation struggle, was not 
resolved at Lancaster House. According to Bakare (1993) in Ndlovu-Gatsheni and 
Benyera (2015:12), the negotiations were instead dominated by debates over the future 
of the white minority settlers and their economic privileges. In this regard, white economic 
privileges were to be guaranteed in exchange for majority rule, for example 20 House of 
Assembly seats out of 100 were reserved for white voters. Ndlovu-Gathseni and Benyera 
(2015:12) also add that ethnic questions were not raised, as the Zimbabwe African 
Patriotic Front (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) pretended to be a 
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united Patriotic Front (PF), only to fragment prior to the elections of 1980 into hostile and 
contending political formations.  
Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Benyera (2015:19) argue that consequently, incomplete 
decolonisation has continued to haunt Zimbabwe as in the case of the land question that 
has once again put the Zimbabwe question on the global map. They further note that the 
brokers of peace who supported maintenance of unequal ownership of land set 
Zimbabwe on a course for another conflict. They argue for instance that the unresolved 
land ownership also originated from the way in which the Lancaster House negotiations 
were conducted by Lord Carrington- ‘with a fast-paced tempo, hard deadlines and strict 
ultimatums’ Novak (in Ndlovu-Gastheni and Benyera 2015:151). In that way, Carrington, 
a mediator with own interests to protect, managed to deal with the three contentious 
issues of securing a ceasefire, setting a transitional administration to see the country 
through the ceasefire period and all-race elections and a new constitution for independent 
Zimbabwe in such a way that the land question was postponed as a problem to be 
resolved by the administration of Zimbabwe (Ndlovu-Gastheni and Benyera 2015:19, 
Novak 2009:159). Other scholars such as (Qobo 2008:166) state that the pre-
independence Rhodesian state was in essence a security state, which the post-
independence settlement failed to transform. In Qobo’s view (2008:166), the militarisation 
of the state that began with Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 
1965 permeated every societal institution. ZANU-PF simply continued on a path that was 
already charted and sought to militarise the nascent post-liberation society in Zimbabwe. 
 
3.6.2 Mediation Dynamics in the 1979 Settlement 
 
Zimbabwe came into being as a product of a protracted armed liberation struggle that 
spanned over 15 years, from 1965-1979 (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Benyera 2015:18). 
According to Sachikonye (2011:31), over 30 000 civilians died and many other human 
rights violations occurred in the national struggle for independence between the 
Rhodesian Front (RF) and the Liberation movements, ZANU and ZAPU (Ranger 2010, 
Zebora 2012), confirming that it was a violent and bloody war. Moorcroft and McLaughlin 
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1982:222) concur with this view and add that ‘the ripening process’ was a costly one and 
confirm that an estimated 30 000 were killed, 10 000 maimed, 250 000 refugees, 850 000 
homeless and about a million (20%) of the population suffering from malnutrition. There 
is convergence in literature that the nationalist struggle was triggered by the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI) by Ian Smith, on 11 November 1965 (Anstey 
2007:416, Wood 2011:9-24, Band and Manyanya 2002: 6-15, Novak 2009:153, Preston 
2004:67). Smith served as Prime Minister of Rhodesia from 1969-1979.  In Anstey’s terms 
(2007:416), the UDI was an ‘unintentional declaration of civil war’. To put the conflict in 
context, Hill (2003:55) states that in following international trends of the time, the British 
government of the day under Sir Edgar Whitehead and in seeking re-election made it 
clear that they would change laws and allow equal participation of blacks in society. This 
was welcomed by many African nationalists but it was not easily accepted by a few white 
supremacists. In 1959 Harold Macmillan, the British Prime minister brought forward the 
process of relinquishing power to the indigenous peoples of their colonies by more than 
10 years. In view of some British descendants who had settled in these so called colonies, 
it meant that independence was to be granted to countries ‘which lacked the skill of 
government. Power was handed to demagogues who immediately created one party 
states’ (Wood 2011:3). In an attempt to avert this situation, in 1962 Smith and Winston 
Field formed a new party ‘the Rhodesian Front and were seeking mandate to keep power 
in white hands indefinitely’ (ibid) and thus the UDI from Britain in 1965 (Ellert 1989, Band 
and Manyanya 2002:6-15; Wood 2011: 9-24, Moocraft and McLaughin 2008:15) 
confirming that ‘Rhodesia broke away from Britain to avoid black rule’. In line with the 
core assumptions of Ripeness theory that the ripe moment is determined by a 
combination of factors which relate to internal and external factors, Anstey (2007:417) 
states that under sustained pressure, the Rhodesian government moved from a position 
of denying majority rule in the 1960s, to talks with international powers, such as Britain 
and the USA, on a power sharing formula which would retain white control.  From there, 
the Rhodesian government was pressured to hold talks with moderate African leaders 
willing to accept minority control in 1974. Under the same pressure, the Rhodesian 
government was also forced in 1978 to hold negotiations with internal moderate leaders 
such as Muzorewa and Sithole on minority protections in a context of majority rule.  Finally 
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in 1979, the Rhodesian government held negotiations in which nationalist groups first 
forced a place at the table and the parties then power bargained to deal. As the costs of 
conflict rose, so did flexibility around issues of participation in negotiations and majority 
rule. According to Zartman (In Anstey 2007:419), by 1979, the conflict had become ‘ripe 
for resolution’; with military spending rising to 47 percent of government expenditure by 
1979 (Nugent 2004 in Anstey 2007:419) and its diminishing ability to enforce conscription, 
the civil war had become unsustainable for the government (Moorcroft and McLaughlin 
1982 in Anstey 2007:419). For the liberation movements, perceptions of the feasibility of 
a military victory were tempered by heavy losses. The white population had already 
accepted the principle of a universal franchise and power sharing in the internal deal of 
1978. The international community sustained sanctions on Smith’s government and 
supported the guerrillas but the British government lent weight to a negotiated settlement 
but threatening to recognise the Smith-Muzorewa government.  
According to Moorcroft and McLaughlin 1982:99 in Anstey 2007:434), African states, the 
frontline states in particular, pressured Mugabe and Nkomo into a reluctant alliance and 
negotiations. South Africa, despite its support for Smith, also pushed for a negotiated 
settlement, suspending critical oil supplies for a period. Zartman (1985:222-223) notes 
that within this mix of exhaustion, doubt and external pressure, Lord Carrington was able 
to impose terms and deadlines leading to the Lancaster House Agreement. Maclean 
(2005: 5) notes that the ripe moment in1979 occurred probably because of intense 
pressure from the region. However, Anstey (2007:419) is of the view that the ripe moment 
in 1979 occurred because of a combination of factors which were the internal and external 
forces  for instance the economic pressure of sanctions, the costly war and the victory of 
Margaret Thatcher in the UK’s parliamentary elections, which changed the calculus: (if 
the parties could not come to a final agreement, Thatcher would lift British sanctions and 
recognise the Muzorewa regime) which promoted commitment among the protagonists 
to settle differences through negotiation (Anstey 2007:420).  
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3.6.3 The 1987 ZANU/ZAPU Unity Accord 
 
As mentioned earlier on in the chapter, the Lancaster House Agreement failed to address 
the question of ethnicity, which was to later on resurface in tensions between ZANU and 
ZAPU. This seems to resonate with the argument by Collier (in Maclean 2005:3) that ‘a 
country in the immediate aftermath of a conflict is at much greater risk of having conflict 
outbreak than is a country that has not been at war in the recent past’. To be noted is that 
the hostility between the two liberation movements had been put aside during the 
ceasefire negotiations only to escalate into vicious fighting in Matabeleland within three 
years of the successfully negotiated Lancaster House settlement (Maclean 2005:5). From 
1963, the year ZANU broke away from ZAPU, until Zimbabwe’s Independence in 1980, 
the only unifying thread between ZANU and ZAPU was the common goal of liberating 
Zimbabwe (Ellert 1989:3). Hence, the rivalry between these two political parties is still a 
factor today. However, the first national democratic elections were held in February 1980 
and Robert Mugabe emerged as the new leader in the new dispensation (Hill 2003:69). 
After Robert Mugabe came to power in 1980, there was concerted effort to diminish the 
role of the Ndebeles in both Zimbabwe’s past and present.  
The massacres from 1982 to 1987, known as Gukurahundi saw between 10 000 to 30 
000 Ndebeles slain by Mugabe’s private army, the notorious Fifth Brigade, which was a 
specialised military unit trained by North Korea. Gukurahundi is translated to mean the 
wind that blows away the chaff before the rains (Hill 2003:77). The Catholic Commission 
for Justice and Peace (CCJP) (1997:13) avers that it refers to ‘the rain which washes 
away the chaff before the spring rains’. This has been seen by some as a way of wiping 
out ZAPU and the Ndebele population and leadership that predominated ZAPU. By the 
end of 1982, the Fifth Brigade was deployed in Matabeleland in the infamous 
Gukurahundi Operation (Hill 2003: 76). In 1984, the CCJP compiled a report based on 
interviews with victims of Gukurahundi and handed it to Mugabe, but did not release it for 
public consumption until 1989 (Hill 2003:82). In essence, Gukurahundi was a violent 
series of terror attacks on both the dissidents, as claimed by the Government of 
Zimbabwe (GoZ), but mainly on civilians as attested by the CCJP’s report. Dissidents 
were disgruntled former guerrillas and supporters of ZAPU. It is debatable as to when 
79 
 
exactly Gukurahundi was carried out. Various scholars have proffered different dates. 
The Chatham House Meeting Summary (2007:2) avers that it was carried out during 
1983-1984 and Benyera (2013:3) concurs with this view. Rupiya (2005:117) posits that 
Gukurahundi was carried out between the years 1981- 1986, while Hill (2003:35) is of the 
opinion that Gukurahundi happened between 1982 and 1987. The CCJP and the Legal 
Resources Foundation (LRF) argue that it occurred from 1981 to about 1988 (CCJP 1997: 
5-7).  
In late January 1983, Fifth Brigade was deployed in Matabeleland North. Within 
weeks, its troops had murdered more than two thousand civilians, beaten 
thousands more and destroyed hundreds of homesteads (CCJP 1997:14). 
Hill (2003:35) concurs with this observation. There was so much secrecy that surrounded 
Gukurahundi and this is attested by the fact that even to date no one exactly knows the 
number of casualties that were recorded. Benyera (2013:193) agrees with the CCJP 
(1997:12, 15) arguing that the findings of the ‘Chihambakwe and Dumbutshena 
Commission of Inquiry were never made public’. The Chihambakwe Commission was set 
up in 1984 (Chatham House Meeting Summary 2007:2). It was for the purpose of 
investigating what had transpired during that period in the history of Zimbabwe. There are 
variations to the claims made, the then ZAPU opposition party leader, Joshua Nkomo 
mentioned that about 20 00 people were killed and ‘other sources putting the figure as 
700’ (CCJP 1997:18). Hill (2003:35) advances that about 10 000 to 30 000 people were 
killed by the Fifth Brigade during Gukurahundi. This figure was corroborated by Ncube 
(2005:4) postulating the figure to be between 20 000 to 30 000. Rupiya (2005:117) 
corroborates this figure. 
During that time, a lot of curfews and blockades were put up to exclude people from 
entering and leaving affected areas, and the international media from getting the stories. 
The CCJP (ibid: 14) is of the opinion that Matabeleland South was hard hit by 
Gukurahundi arguing that ‘there were no more than 200 dissidents in the curfew region 
and it was the 400 000 civilians who suffered most’, although Matabeleland North and the 
Midlands were also affected (ibid). The CCJP further argued that ‘no journalists were 
allowed near the region, particularly Matabeleland South’. This situation meant that it was 
very hard to get news of events out of the region and hard to judge the truth of the early 
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accounts’ (ibid). It has been argued that dissidents often raped women, which made them 
unpopular. They also killed people they thought were sell-outs’ (CCJP 1997:12). 
Dissidents were viewed as criminals and rightly so, they were outlaws. People living in 
the rural areas were the most affected. This is evidenced by the CCJP report arguing that 
‘it was people living in rural areas who suffered worst once more, mostly from the activities 
of 5th Brigade, but also at the hands of dissidents’ (ibid). The CCJP (1997:13) report goes 
further to state that: 
The Government said quite rightly that it was their responsibility to try and maintain 
law and order during these years. However, their response to the problem was 
seen by many as being too harsh from early 1982, the Government used 
emergency powers to enforce widespread curfews, roadblocks, detention without 
trial and house to house searches. 
As dissidents continued to target white farmers, ‘the dissidents murdered at least 33 white 
commercial farmers or members of their families’.  Farmers were as a result forced to 
move into town (ibid). The Zimbabwe government in response to the civil unrests caused 
by the dissidents targeted both dissidents and civilians indiscriminately. The CCJP 
(1997:13) report further revealed that the then Prime Minister, in April 1983, Mugabe was 
quoted saying ‘We eradicate them. We don’t differentiate when we fight because we can’t 
tell who is a dissident and who is not’. It can be argued that Mugabe’s utterances suggest 
a complete annihilation of the dissidents. The implication of that, unintended as it could 
have been, was that the civilians amongst whom the dissidents hid from the 5th Brigade 
were collaterally killed in the operation.  
Victims of Gukurahundi were forced to flee conflict areas and sought refuge in ‘safer 
places’ in town. Civilians were terrorised by the dissidents and were further terrorised by 
the government which reacted violently to the disturbances caused by the dissidents. 
Gukurahundi ended on 22 December 1987, when another set of negotiations culminated 
in the signing of a Unity Agreement between ZANU and ZAPU (Hill 2003:86), which 
established ZAPU leader, Joshua Nkomo as the Vice President. Mamdani (2009:6) 
describes this agreement as ‘reconciliation’ as although the parties merged to form 
ZANU-PF, it remained de facto ZANU. The Unity Agreement in effect eradicated the 
opposition (Anstey 2007:422). Cheeseman and Tendi (2010: 10) go further to say that 
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ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo accepted a ‘toothless vice-presidency’ in the Unity 
Agreement, allowing for a single party rule in Zimbabwe. Anstey (2007:422) concurs with 
this observation and adds that it is clear that ZANU-PF was pushing even more for a one 
party state with the signing of the Unity Agreement, which in essence was a legacy of the 
Smith regime that ZANU-PF had inherited and maintained and was to characterise the 
way ZANU-PF would deal with opposition in the future. Arguably, this became one of the 
sources of the post 2000 electoral conflict, which will be discussed in detail and 
demonstrated in chapter 4. 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
This literature review chapter has provided an exploration of the relevant available 
literature on mediation and conflict resolution. This is both in the historical and political 
context of Zimbabwe. The chapter demonstrated that one of the central issues to the 
study of international mediation is ascertaining its effectiveness and success in resolving 
conflicts in a sustainable manner. This is in view of the shift of conflicts from the interstate 
to the intra-state domain in the post-cold -war era. It was shown that this shift has brought 
with it increasing attention to issues of human security and human rights. It has also been 
demonstrated that the intractable and violent nature of intra-state conflicts has 
engendered scholarly interest on mediation approaches best suited for the effective 
resolution of such conflicts. The effectiveness of an approach such as quiet diplomacy 
has therefore been questioned.  It has also been demonstrated that the signing of a peace 
agreement is one of the criterias of ascertaining mediation success. However, it has been 
argued that this does not necessarily imply mediation success as conflict has often 
recurred subsequent to signing a peace accord. It has therefore been argued that 
mediation does not address the underlying causes of a conflict and has often put a lid on 
the conflict. For durability and success of mediation, emphasis has been placed on the 
important stage of mediation, which is implementation as well as willingness and 
commitment of the parties to the peace agreement.  The chapter has shown that 
mediation success is contingent on contextual and process variables. Contextual 
variables relate to the nature of the parties, their previous relationship and the power 
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difference between them, the nature of the conflict, intensity of the conflict and the conflict 
issues as well as timing of mediator entry. Process variables relate to mediator’s 
alignment and impartiality, mediator experience and mediation strategies. Mediator 
strategies have been identified as communication-facilitation, procedural and directive. 
Mediation strategy is said to be contingent on the intensity of the conflict and the conflict 
issues. Directive approach is considered the most effective in resolving conflicts. The 
chapter has also shown that mediating intra-state conflicts has often been constrained by 
the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention which African regional organisations 
such as the AU and SADC are committed to. The conception of state sovereignty has of 
late shifted from the absolute notion of state sovereignty as postulated by the Westphalian 
sovereignty to a dual understanding of sovereignty underpinned by a new understanding 
of sovereignty as responsible sovereignty, in view of the increasing attention to issues of 
human rights. The chapter has also argued that the 2008 conflict in Zimbabwe is rooted 
in the manner that past mediation initiatives in Zimbabwe, starting with the 1979 
Lancaster House Agreement and the 1987 Unity Accord were handled. The chapter has 
therefore in essence introduced the 2008 conflict, which will be analysed in detail in 
Chapter Four. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE CONTEXT OF THABO MBEKI’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE 
2008 ZIMBABWE ELECTION DISPUTE 
 
4. Introduction 
 
This chapter, which is analytical and interpretative in nature, explores the context in time 
and place of Thabo Mbeki’s involvement and mediation in the Zimbabwean electoral and 
political dispute of 2008. This chapter will argue that the disputed 2008 election outcome, 
which Thabo Mbeki mediated, is one of the many episodes of political violence and 
election related disputes in post-colonial Zimbabwe. Violence in Zimbabwe has predated 
the colonial period. However, the post-2000 period is of significance as it was a theatre 
of successive episodes of violence especially in the context of elections. This affirms the 
argument by Benyera (2013:162), (Kriger 2005) and (Msipa: The Standard: 3 July 2016)  
that each and every general and presidential election has shown varying degrees of 
violence and intimidation as was the case in the 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2008 elections. 
As such, since independence, no opposition political party has ever succeeded in 
completely wrestling political power from ZANU-PF despite the regular and consistent 
conduct of elections in Zimbabwe (Makumbe 2002). This can be backgrounded in ZANU-
PF’s pursuit of an ideology based on the creation of a one party state, which was 
facilitated by the 1987 ZANU/ ZAPU Unity Accord and which thus determined the 
contours of an authoritarian state early on in the post-independence era (Kagoro 
2003:182). As a result, by 2008, the civic and political space had become more and more 
restricted.  According to Mutisi (2012:164), violence has been central to ZANU-PF’s 
mobilisation of support and consolidation of power, since the colonial era, where acts of 
violence were committed by both the colonisers, the Rhodesian Front and the nationalist 
movements; ZANU and ZAPU.  
To challenge colonialism, the nationalist movements waged wars of liberation which 
although they led to the 1979 Lancaster House Settlement, had huge ramifications for the 
civilian population. The chapter will however focus on the post-2000 period which 
witnessed episodes of politically motivated violence that include the controversial fast 
track land reform exercise dubbed by the GoZ as (the third Chimurenga), the 2005 ‘urban 
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clean-up’ known as Operation Murambatsvina as well as the violent post-2000 elections, 
while bearing in mind the contribution of the Lancaster House Settlement in its failure to 
effectively address issues such as land and state militarisation, which were to later shape 
the future politics of Zimbabwe. In corroboration of this view, Muzondidya (2009:175) 
notes that the 2008 conflict was a culmination of a confluence of both colonial and post-
independence experiences. The chapter will therefore try to situate the 2008 conflict in 
both ZANU-PF’s failure to democratise as well as the unabated economic decline with its 
contagion effects on the region and the impact of international isolation, which all became 
appendages of the conflict and indeed central factors in the mediation process. Thus 
indeed Mbeki’s mediation was the site of intense contestation in which national, regional 
and international forces were embedded in an increasing complexity as will be 
demonstrated in the chapter.  
4.1 Contextualising Zimbabwe’s 2008 Election Dispute 
 
Mhandara and Pooe (2013:1) argue that exploring the gestation of the 2008 Zimbabwe 
crisis is necessary to facilitate an appreciation of the basis for SADC’s and Mbeki’s 
intervention in the Zimbabwe conflict. In that sense, the 2008 crisis cannot be understood 
in isolation of Zimbabwe’s historical context. This has led some scholars such as Ndlovu-
Gatsheni (2003:114) to assert that post-colonial Zimbabwe was fundamentally shaped by 
two legacies; first the legacy of the brutal and authoritarian settler colonial state and 
second; that independent Zimbabwe was in the main a product of a protracted armed 
struggle. Accordingly, these two points form an essential historical context in 
understanding the actions, emotions and roles of the various actors in Zimbabwe (ibid: 
114). In corroboration of this view, Muzondidya (2009:175) points to the ‘continuity of 
authoritarian governance from the Rhodesian Front to ZANU-PF’. It has been argued that 
after rising to power in 1980. 
 ZANU-PF failed to transform colonial structures and institutions in favour of a democratic 
and just dispensation for example the repressive laws and practices used by ZANU-PF 
such as Access to Information and Privacy Act (AIPA) and Public Order and Security Act 
(POSA) are rooted in the Rhodesian regime (ibid: 175). The same laws have been used 
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against political opponents thereby undermining the rule of law and violating human 
rights. Arguably, the failure by ZANU-PF to democratise is noticeable in the first decade 
of independence. Zimbabwe then was largely a de facto one party state, as ZANU-PF 
gripped on to power tenaciously and maintained what (Sithole and Makumbe 1997:123) 
termed electoral hegemony. Anstey (2007:419) calls the post-1980 Zimbabwe a pseudo-
democracy, where the system is shaped such that a governing party can never lose 
power. This argument set the basis for understanding the likely reaction of the ruling elite 
to what they may perceive as a political threat to achieve such an ideology.  It has also 
been put forward by Mutisi (2012:164) that the one party state ideology pursued by ZANU-
PF is embedded in the party’s history of liberation,  which in turn contributed to ZANU-
PF’s sense of entitlement to rule and which Kriger (2006:1151) terms ‘patriotic history’. In 
corroboration of this view (Bratton and Masunungure 2008:163) contend that ZANU-PF’s 
strong conviction that it owns Zimbabwe’s history as it liberated the country from British 
rule partly accounts for the party’s deep intolerance of opposition as well as its ideological 
belief in its right to rule in perpetuity.  As such, to ensure its continued stranglehold on 
power, the party has since independence controlled the conduct of elections leading 
some scholars such as Bratton and Masunungure (2008:163) to conclude that Zimbabwe 
is ‘a militarised form of authoritarianism’. To note is that the belief in the right to rule was 
fundamental in determining how the party would react to opposition. Violence therefore 
became central to the retention of power by the ruling party which it relied on as a 
necessary means to an end.  
Developments in the second decade were also fundamental in shaping Zimbabwe’s 
political future. According to Mandaza and Pooe (2013:9), the second decade marked a 
radical shift in the Zimbabwean political economy. In the 1990s, the state adopted and 
started implementing the World Bank structural adjustment programmes and economic 
liberalisation. To that end, the GoZ attempted to liberalise the economy by ‘deregulating 
the labour market and introducing monetary reform among other measures’ through the 
implementation of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) which was 
launched in 1990 (Kanyenze 2011). According to Raftopoulos and Savage (2005), 
implementation of ESAP represented change from the state-led economic development 
of the 1980s to a more market driven economy. The ESAP elicited a domino effect in the 
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political discourse and consequently contributed to the socio-economic and political crisis 
that unfolded between 1999 and 2008 (Mlambo and Raftopoulos 2010; Sachikonye 
2008). Qobo (2008:168) notes that the droughts of 1992 and 1995 further aggravated the 
situation. However, this was further compounded by the GoZ decision in 1997 to appease 
the war veterans, the former freedom fighters by issuing them cash hand-outs after they 
threatened to destabilise the government with ‘public display of discontent’. The finances 
were unbudgeted for and thereby contributed to inflation as it spiralled out of control. In 
the year 1998, the GoZ decided to engage in military intervention in the conflict in DRC 
to support Laurent Kabila’s regime in a war that ultimately cost an estimated US$ 1 billion 
(Mutisi 2012:168). Zimbabwe committed an initial contingent of 6 000 soldiers to the war, 
with the number eventually increasing to about 13 000, which according to Taylor and 
Williams (in Qobo 2008:169) was approximately one-third of Zimbabwe’s army.  
According to the Financial Gazzette (25 March 1998), the intervention in the DRC was in 
part a regional power play and challenge to the then President of South Africa, Nelson 
Mandela who opposed SADC military involvement. For whatever reason, the decision 
further dismantled budgetary allocations of the state coffers. It should be pointed out that 
the cumulative impact of such policy decisions was economic implosion and a growing 
frustration with ZANU-PF (Mutisi 2012:168).  
Against the backdrop of a crumbling economy which was characterised by erosion of 
safety nets, impoverishment of the working poor, massive retrenchments, job losses and 
heightened food and fuel prices, the civil society intensified activities to lobby and 
advocate for citizens’ rights and good governance. In the decade of the 1990s, the 
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) became very popular as it pressured the 
opposition of the dominant rule of ZANU-PF, which was clearly losing ground in social, 
political and economic policies regulating the country (ibid). Arguably, the 1990s can be 
credited for the rise of Zimbabwe’s most formidable opposition political party, the 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in response to the ensuing economic crisis.  
According to Mutisi (2012:169), the emergence of the MDC was met with the closure of 
political space as well as increasing radicalisation and re-assertion of control by ZANU- 
PF. Makumbe (in Mutisi 2012:169) notes that when the MDC was formed, ZANU-PF 
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government’s initial response was to employ heavy and contentious tactics against the 
opposition and civil society and violent episodes which will be discussed in the chapter 
such as the violent fast track land reform programme, the 2000, 2002 and 2005 elections 
and the 2005 urban clean up (Operation Murambatsvina), attest to this.  
From the above, it has been demonstrated that Zimbabwe was generally seen to be in 
crisis by the late 1990s, which reached its peak in 2008 (Nyakudya 2013:87). As will be 
shown, the conflict was uniquely political in its orientation as the major point of difference 
between the key actors to the conflict; ZANU-PF and the MDC was largely at the 
ideological and political level and as argued in chapter three and in line with Ripeness 
theory which informs this study, mediation efficacy is more difficult to achieve in a conflict 
with entrenched ideological differences. Deserving scholarly scrutiny therefore is the 
political ideology of the MDC as this was central in shaping SADC’s as well as President 
Mbeki’s attitude towards the opposition party and hence the mediation approach of quiet 
diplomacy. This is also particularly given the perception of the MDC by ZANU-PF as a 
‘puppet of the West’, which was orchestrating the Western regime change agenda (Mutisi 
2012: 176). As will be demonstrated in this chapter, such perceptions were to increase 
African sympathy and solidarity with ZANU-PF, which also resonated with President 
Mbeki’s Pan-African inclination and his African Renaissance project (Nyakudya 2009:87).   
4.2 The MDC and its Political Ideology 
 
The MDC which was one of the key parties in President Mbeki’s mediation was born in 
the year 1999 as a coalition party based on an alliance between workers, civil society, 
employers and professionals and was led by the ZCTU Secretary General, Morgan 
Tsvangirai. The MDC emerged in the political scene of Zimbabwe following ZANU-PF’s 
almost two decades of domination. There had been other opposition parties that existed 
in Zimbabwe before the MDC such as the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) and the 
Zimbabwe Union of Democrats (ZUD). However, as argued by Mutisi (2012:166), the 
MDC was the first opposition party to pose a credible, critical and sustained political 
challenge to the ruling party since independence. At its formation, the MDC which 
branded itself as a labour party was readily embraced by a diverse and huge constituency 
88 
 
comprising labour, civil society, and interest groups such as the NCA, Zimbabwe National 
Students Union (ZINASU), academia and former white Commercial Farmers Union 
(CFU). As a result of this competition, the relationship between ZANU- PF and MDC was 
often characterised by militant politics, polarisation and violent clashes. Central to the 
rivalry between the MDC and ZANU-PF are issues of power politics, governance, 
ideological differences and resource distribution. The MDC’s political ideology was 
centred on a neo-liberal democratic agenda, demanding change in governance and 
especially critical of the de-facto one party state Zimbabwe had become. On the other 
hand, ZANU-PF’s political ideology as defined by its liberation history is characterised by 
Pan-Africanism often exhibited in anti-western and ant-capitalism narrative that 
underscores sovereignty and independence as also shared by other liberation parties in 
the region such as the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa and the South 
Western African Peoples’ Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia (ibid). The nature of the 
relationship between ZANU-PF and the MDC is described by Raftopoulos (2002) as 
follows: 
The ruling party drew on a combination of a reviewed nationalism that provided its 
role in the liberation of the country, prioritised the centrality of the fight for the land 
and demonised all those outside the elective “patriotic history” it espoused …. For 
their part the emergent trade union, civic and political opposition forces called on 
the struggles for labour, human rights, local government and gender struggles and 
the post 1989 global discourse on democratisation driven by the fall of the socialist 
regimes in Eastern Europe.  
Given its ideological orientation, the MDC attributed the socio-economic crisis prevailing 
in the country to the poor policy choices of ZANU-PF.  ZANU-PF on the other hand located 
the crisis in Zimbabwe to Western interference in its internal affairs with the intention of 
effecting regime change. As argued by Nyakudya (2013:87), the interpretation of the 
causes of the conflict in Zimbabwe became part of the challenge in finding its solution. As 
already alluded to, in ZANU-PF’s narrative (Nyakudya 2013:87), the MDC was a 
surrogate of the British and a counter-revolutionary force which was orchestrating regime 
change through its calls for the imposition of sanctions on ZANU-PF. It has been argued 
by (Nyakudya 2013: 87) that ZANU-PF’s portrayal of the MDC as ‘a foreign sponsored 
party that plays to the dictates of Western imperialists’ also affected SADC’s and indeed 
President Mbeki’s relationship with the MDC, which in Mutisi’s view (2012: 176) was 
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characterised by mistrust and disdain. It would appear as also argued by Mutisi (2012: 
162) that SADC is largely compromised when dealing with political novices who espouse 
a neo-liberal agenda such as the MDC. It would seem therefore that the concerns within 
SADC that the MDC was too close to the West increased anxieties about the opposition 
party’s future role in the region.  The result was therefore greater solidarity with ZANU-
PF and this attitude and perception towards the MDC also became part of the 
complexities during the Mbeki-led mediation process. However, what also appeared to 
have worked against the MDC as maintained by (Makgetlaneng 2008:1) was the 
opposition party’s lack of position on imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, 
globalisation and north-south relations. This is attributed to the eclectic nature of the party 
drawing from its diverse background. It has so far been demonstrated that the relationship 
between ZANU-PF and the MDC has been belligerent, a variable that is central to 
mediation success.  In view of the electoral threat posed by the MDC, the ruling party 
resorted to violence to reassert its control as will be seen in the ensuing episodes starting 
with the 2000 constitutional referendum. 
 
4.2.1 2000 Constitutional Referendum 
 
The 2000 referendum elections signalled a watershed moment for the ZANU-PF led 
government. Never had it lost an election since independence in1980. The ZANU-PF led 
government failed to garner enough support to change the constitution of Zimbabwe, in 
a referendum with the intention of consolidating presidential powers. What can be 
backgrounded is that Zimbabwe’s constitutional reform process was built on the 
Lancaster House Agreement of December 1979. This settlement plan has been criticised 
as being largely preconceived by the British. The general consensus since the 1990s had 
been that the Lancaster House Constitution is deficient in many respects because of its 
compromised and undemocratic origins. Before the year 2000, the constitution was 
amended 19 times in a largely piecemeal manner (ZLHR 2011). Although some of the 
amendments addressed the entrenched and compromised provisions of the Lancaster 
House Constitution, most were engineered by ZANU-PF to enable it to further centralise 
its power and galvanise executive authority (Gwinyai 2012 1-2) which also resulted in 
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governmental imbalance between the three arms of government as the executive had 
excessive powers. As a reaction to this, in 1997, a consortium of civic organisations that 
included churches, human rights groups, political parties excluding ZANU-PF, trade 
unions, women’s organisations, youth groups and student movements established the 
National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) to lobby for a new home grown constitution for 
Zimbabwe that would be democratic in its creation and content. The NCA’s constitution 
making efforts were largely driven by concerns about the authority of the president which 
appeared to have no boundary. The NCA’s creation was therefore more a reaction to the 
executive presidency created by the 19 constitutional amendments (Sithole and 
Makumbe 1997:123). Recognising the popularity of the NCA’s constitution reform lobby, 
the ZANU-PF government then attempted to hijack the debate by establishing the 
Constitution Commission in April 1999, to consider issues related to constitutional reform. 
The constitution reform process initiated by the GoZ and conducted under the auspices 
of the Constitution Commission from 1999 to 2000 was inherently flawed in that it was 
specifically designed to ensure presidential control. ZANU-PF monopolised the 
Commission’s work from the start. While the GoZ invited members from a cross section 
of society in an effort to give the Commission a semblance of being fully representative, 
the majority of the Commission’s 400 members were ZANU-PF members or supporters. 
The NCA refused to participate in what they perceived to be a fundamentally flawed 
process (Hartchard 2001). ZANU-PF campaigned for a ‘Yes’ vote while the opposing 
movement to the referendum was led by the MDC and the NCA, aided greatly by the 
prevailing socio-economic morass and the general disenchantment with ZANU-PF.  A 
total of 1 275 754, constituting 26 percent of the 5 million registered voters participated in 
the referendum. The new constitution was rejected by 54, 31 percent of the votes 
(Hartchard 2001:213). The victory of the ‘NO’ vote demonstrated that the MDC had 
gained the confidence of the majority of the people. This did not sit well with ZANU-PF. 
However, at the same time as argued by Compagnon (2000:449), the referendum results 
were a serious forewarning for ZANU-PF as the result was largely perceived as a political 
defeat for President Mugabe and a direct challenge to his rule.  ZANU-PF was slowly but 
surely losing ground to the opposition MDC. The National Association of Non-
Governmental Organisations (2007:11) reported that from 2000, the Zimbabwean 
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economy, political and social situation plunged in free fall with the state disregarding the 
law, human rights, economic logic and social injustice. This marked the beginning of the 
dire economic stagnation and collapse. The result of this was an escalation in racial 
politics given the role played by the former white commercial farmers in the rejection of 
the draft constitution. Following the announcement of the victory of the ‘No’ vote, the then 
Minister of Information and Publicity, Jonathan Moyo cited in Chan (2010:10) launched a 
tirade against the Zimbabwean white community by stating that: 
Preliminary figures show there were 100 000 white people voting. We have never 
seen anything like that in this country. They were all over town. Everyone who 
observed will tell you there were long queues of whites. The difference between 
the ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ vote would not have been what it was had it not been for this 
vote. 
In reaction to this defeat, the ZANU-PF dominated parliament subsequently amended the 
1992 Land Acquisition Act in line with the rejected Constitution Commission Draft, which 
provided for the appropriation of land without compensation. The referendum result set a 
new phase of racial politics in Zimbabwe that as later observed cascaded to other sectors, 
such as the new trajectory defined by the State’s economic goals in particular the 
empowerment of indigenous Zimbabweans through such programmes as  land reform 
(Sachikonye: 2003: 231). The referendum result also meant that Zimbabwe was back to 
the Lancaster House Constitution. 
4.2.2 The Fast Track Land Reform Programme 
 
According to Makumbe (2006:56), the rejection of the February 2000 constitutional 
referendum alerted the Mugabe regime of an impending political disaster at the 2000 
parliamentary election.  Sachikonye (ibid: 231) agrees with this view and adds that the 
referendum defeat was a conjuncture which created apprehension within the ruling elite 
and government. There was anxiety that the pending June 2000 parliamentary election 
outcome would mirror the referendum result. Alexander in (Benyera 2013:161) adds that 
the state’s response to the referendum loss was a swift deployment of nationalist 
sentiments against past white economic injustices. The state therefore from March 2000 
employed the tactic of invading white owned commercial farms throughout the country 
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with the resultant gross human rights abuses on the farm owners and their workers. On 
the one hand, the farm invasions were a reprisal against white Zimbabweans including 
commercial farmers, who had joined or publicly supported the opposition MDC party by 
mobilising farm workers to ensure the referendum defeat. On the other hand, they were 
used to win the support of landless black peasant farmers for ZANU-PF and given that 
the party’s predominant political base is largely confined to the rural electorate, the 
resolution of the land question became an immediate political imperative. This therefore 
affirms the argument by (Sachikonye 2002:23) that the Fast Track Land Reform 
Programme (FTLRP) was informed by political expediency as the political factor loomed 
larger in the context of the 2000 and 2002 electoral contest. The GoZ described the 
FTRLP as the ‘agrarian revolution or the third Chimurenga’, which can be interpreted as 
the ‘third uprising” (Sachikonye 2002:20). Several scholars acknowledge that the 
structure of land ownership and use was clearly inequitable at Independence in 1980. 
About 6 000 white commercial farmers owned 15, 5 million hectares of land while 8 500 
small scale African farmers had 1.4 million hectares (ibid).  
There was therefore a keenly felt sense of historical injustice and deprivation over the 
question of land which was also one of the most contentious issues negotiated at the 
Lancaster House Conference. Arguably, political pressures for land reform in the early 
and mid -1990s were less intense than before. Opposition parties were fragmented and 
weak and thus unable to mount a credible challenge to the incumbent party. The FTLRP 
was therefore in essence a response to the political dynamics of the post-referendum 
situation as the MDC presented a formidable challenge to ZANU-PF rule. This explains 
the central role played by the land question in both the 2000 and 2002 election 
campaigns. As had become the established culture of ZANU-PF, the FTLRP was 
characterised by considerable violence and intimidation and displacement which the 
police largely condoned presumably as a result of political instruction. The legal decision 
by both the High Court and Supreme Court in favour of commercial farmers that the 
FTLRP was unconstitutional, led to threats of violence against individual judges 
(Scarnecchia 2006:228) thus undermining the rule of law. 
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The orchestrated violence led to loss of life of black farm workers and white commercial 
farmers. The process was therefore chaotic and opaque with extensive patronage and 
clientelism that saw the privileged members of the political elite getting more favourable 
access to land. The war veterans, peasants and the youth militia colloquially referred to 
as the ‘green bombers’ and members of the army and police played an increased role in 
the farm invasions. There are however varying figures of the number of those affected 
and killed during the process. The resettlement was arguably implemented at an 
enormous cost in terms of intimidation, violence, displacement, lawlessness and 
disruption of production. While the GoZ claimed that it had settled the land question once 
and for all, the country has since then been in the grip of its worst food shortage crisis 
(Mutisi 2012:177). According to Ndovu-Gathseni (2013:152), the violent and disorderly 
way in which the ZANU-PF led government implemented the FTLRP after its failed 
attempts to amend the constitution became the first development that provoked regional 
and international concerns about what was to become the “Zimbabwe issue” at both 
regional and international levels. However as noted by Mutisi (2012:177), the centrality of 
the land issue in the Zimbabwe crisis complicated SADC’s effective intervention in 
Zimbabwe. This is due to the fact that most SADC member states are all faced with the 
prospect of having to deal with land redistribution sooner or later. 
4.2.3 International Responses 
   
The relations between Zimbabwe and the Western governments took a turn for the worst 
in 2000 in direct response to the FTLRP. The United States of America (USA) and the 
European Union (EU), Canada, New Zealand and Australia responded by imposing a 
variety of sanctions and other punitive measures on Zimbabwe in the years 2001 and 
2002 respectively, for the human rights abuses committed during the FTLRP as well as 
the violent conduct of the ensuing elections (Nyakudya 2013:185). The original rationale 
for imposing the sanctions on Zimbabwe was that they would alter the unacceptable 
behaviour of the GoZ and those that presided over the human rights abuses (Tungwara 
2013). This is based on the Western belief that Zimbabwe had failed to meet the 
acceptable Western standards of democracy.  The fundamental objective of the sanctions 
on Zimbabwe was therefore to restore democracy and normalcy (Chingono 2010:192). 
94 
 
The thinking behind was that by limiting access to economic resources for elite members 
of the regime, sanctions would also limit their capacity to sustain repression against their 
own people. In December 2001, the US promulgated the Zimbabwe Democracy and 
Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA)1 and due to the unchanging behaviour of the GoZ, the 
country was by 2005 labelled by the administration of the then US President George W. 
Bush as ‘one of the six outposts of tyranny’ (Kochan and Joffe 2011:26).  In 2002, the EU 
followed in the US footsteps by imposing what it labelled ‘restrictive measures or targeted 
or smart sanctions’ on listed influential individuals and entities associated with the GoZ 
and ZANU-PF ( Kochan and Joffe 2011:26. The GoZ however argues that the sanctions 
were not targeted and are instead ‘economic in nature since their impact has stretched to 
hurting an unintended audience’ (Chingono 2010: 67). The sanctioners’ position is 
however different. The US for example states that: 
The US does not maintain sanctions against the people of Zimbabwe or the 
country of Zimbabwe. The US sanctions target individuals and entities that have 
undermined democratic processes or institutions in Zimbabwe more specifically 
the US sanctions target individuals who among other things are senior officials of 
the government, have participated in human rights abuses related to political 
repression and or have engaged in activities facilitating public corruption by senior 
officials. The US sanctions also target entities owned or controlled by the 
Zimbabwean government or officials of the government. Unless a transaction 
involves a blocked individual or entity: US citizens may and are encouraged to 
conduct business in and trade with Zimbabwe and its people (Businessday in 
Chingono 2010) 
What needs to be pointed out is that the majority of Western policy documents on 
Zimbabwe sanctions cite the measures as involving the suspension of budgetary support 
previously provided to the GoZ by the EU and the imposition of travel bans and asset 
freezes by the US, EU, Canada, New Zealand and Australia. According to the EU, the 
                                                            
1 ZIDERA was enacted by  the US Congress  in 2001. ZIDERA empowers the US  to veto Zimbabwe’s application  to 
multilateral  lending  agencies  such  as  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF),  World  Bank  and  the  African 
Development  Bank  (AFDB),  for  finance,  credit  facilities,  loan  rescheduling  and  international  debt  cancellation. 
ZIDERA  also  permits  travel  bans  and  asset  freezes  to  be  imposed  on  individuals  who  are  regarded  as  being 
responsible for human rights abuses and undermining the rule of law. 
ZIDERA explicitly states that its adoption was meant to ‘support the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle to effect 
peaceful,  democratic  change,  achieve  broad  based  and  equitable  economic  growth  and  restore  the  rule  of 
law’(Chingono 2010:67) 
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measures were informed by the violence that accompanied the March 2002 presidential 
election.  Also included in the measures was an arms embargo and prohibition of military 
support and technical assistance that could enhance the GoZ’s repressive capacity. Two 
contending positions emerge with regards to the genesis of the Western backed sanctions 
on Zimbabwe. The first view advanced by the Western world constituting of the EU 
countries, the US, civil society and opposition parties is that the sanctions were placed 
on Zimbabwe due to a deteriorating human rights record and mal-governance. The 
second view is given by ZANU-PF and her allies including the sister liberation parties in 
the region such as SWAPO and the ANC that sanctions are a neo-colonialist agenda by 
Britain and her allies conspiring with the MDC to effect regime change in Zimbabwe in 
order to reverse the land reform (Chingono 2010:70). These two entrenched positions on 
the genesis of the Zimbabwe sanctions have effectively reduced the Zimbabwe conflict 
to the ‘land versus governance’ discourses (Masunungure and Badza 2010:211). In the 
perspective on land, the argument forwarded is that ‘the crisis was precipitated by 
Zimbabwe’s efforts to redress the problem by embarking on a comprehensive and 
revolutionary land reform programme that displaced a tiny but powerful domestic 
constituency that had powerful allies and enjoyed racial affinity to the British and the White 
global community’.  On the other hand, the perspective on governance articulates that 
‘the crisis in the country is rooted in a governance crisis and therefore resolving the 
governance problem also solves the other attendant problems’ (Masunungure and Badza 
2010: 211). It has also been argued by scholars such as (Chingono 2010:67) that ZANU-
PF’s accusations of the MDC’s involvement in the calling for sanctions are not far-fetched. 
The disclosure by the former UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband to the House of 
Commons (New Zimbabwe.com: 28 January 2010) gave credence to ZANU-PF’s 
position. David Miliband is reported to have said that:  
In respect of sanctions we have made it clear that they can be lifted only in a 
calibrated way as progress is made. I do not think that it is right to say that the 
choice is between lifting all sanctions and lifting none at all. We have to calibrate 
our responses to the progress on the ground and above all, to be guided by what 
the MDC says to us about the conditions under which it is working and leading the 
country’.   
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Despite spirited denials by the MDC (The Financial Gazette: 12 June 2009) and latter 
attempts by the UK government to distance itself from the statement of its Foreign 
Secretary, ZANU-PF was vindicated that sanctions were an MDC and Western countries’ 
baby. What also gave credence to ZANU-PF’s accusations of MDC involvement in the 
sanctions-regime change mantra were the calls by the MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai 
for South Africa to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe. In a BBC interview in 2002, Tsvangirai 
said that: 
The threat to undermine the elections by the military, by Mugabe himself should 
actually send shock waves to South Africa and say ‘Under those circumstances 
we are going to cut fuel, we are going to cut transport links…. those kind of 
measures even if they are implemented at a lowly level send the right signals. 
Tsvangirai’s statements vindicated the GoZ in its position that the MDC had also 
conspired with the Western countries to impose sanctions on the country to effect regime 
change. This also became central in shaping President Mbeki’s attitude towards the MDC 
and his mediation approach which was arguably empathic to ZANU-PF. Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
(2011:12) concurs with this view and asserts that in his mediation efforts in Zimbabwe 
Mbeki is seen as having ‘ideological sympathies with ZANU-PF, a former liberation 
movement’. This is also exemplified by Mbeki’s continued defence of his quiet diplomacy 
as the best mediation approach in view of the regime change agenda against Zimbabwe 
(Business Day Live: 22 February 22 2016). 
The GoZ responded to the sanctions by modifying its foreign policy and adopted what it 
coined the ‘Look East policy’ (Kochan and Joffe 2011:26). China stepped in around 2000 
to fill the gap that was previously occupied by the Western governments with 
unconditional aid replacing the previously rigorous aid of the IMF and the WB (ibid). The 
GoZ embraced China’s intervention to the core as demonstrated by President Mugabe’s 
statement as follows: 
In most recent times, as the West started being hostile to us we deliberately 
declared the Look East Policy (LEP). We have turned east where the sun rises 
and given our back to the west, where it sets. (Daily Mirror; Zimbabwe 18 May 
2005). 
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China has in that sense proven to be a reliable partner and friend to Zimbabwe. As will 
be demonstrated later, China together with the other UN Permanent Security Council 
member, Russia vetoed attempts by the other UNSC members which are the US, the UK 
and France to pass a UN resolution on Zimbabwe in 2008. Both China and Russia argued 
that the crisis in Zimbabwe was a domestic matter and that Zimbabwe’s sovereignty 
needed to be respected.  The Solidarity Peace Trust (2007:26) also cites India, Thailand, 
Malaysia, Iran, Pakistan and Russia as the other partners that Zimbabwe embraced in its 
Look East Policy. Zimbabwe also invigorated its ties with Venezuela, Brazil and Cuba to 
fill the gap left by the West (ibid). As argued by Chingono (2010:67) the effectiveness of 
the Western backed sanctions remains a matter of debate as they have failed to achieve 
their stated goals of ‘restoring normalcy’ to Zimbabwe. As will be demonstrated in the 
chapter, the GoZ became even more authoritarian and intensified its indigenisation 
programmes. The result was Zimbabwe’s further isolation which led to the continued 
deterioration of the economy, with the crisis reaching its climax in 2007.  
4.2.4 Regional Responses 
 
The genesis of SADC’s attempts to find a solution to the crisis in Zimbabwe may be traced 
back to the year 2000, ‘amid worries harboured by regional leaders that the country’s 
deteriorating economy and governance situation directly threatened the stability of the 
region’ (Mhandara and Pooe 2013:14-15). In that same year, SADC despatched 
President Mbeki and the former presidents of Mozambique and Namibia, Joaquim 
Chissano and Sam Nujoma to engage with President Mugabe on Zimbabwe’s land reform 
process following the occupation of white owned farms by war veterans. President Mbeki 
explains the 2000 SADC mission as follows: 
To get a common commitment to solve the Zimbabwe land question, according to 
the framework and programme agreed at the 1998 Conference and thus 
simultaneously, to speak to such questions as the rule of law; To end the violence 
that has attended the effort to find this solution; To create the conditions for the 
withdrawal from the farms occupied by demonstrating war veterans; and To pursue 
these issues in a manner that would be beneficial  to all the people of Zimbabwe 
and the rest of  Southern Africa (Mbeki 2012:3). 
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According to President Mbeki, President Mugabe was fully supportive of the SADC 
objectives. The objectives set by President Mbeki and SADC highlight SADC concerns 
that these occupations were wrong as they made a mockery of the rule of law (ibid). In 
view of these concerns, the issue of the FTLRP was discussed at the 2001 SADC Summit 
of Heads of State and Government which was held in Harare, Zimbabwe. In its concluding 
communique, the Summit:  
expressed its concern about the effects of the Zimbabwe economic situation on 
the region; indicated its readiness to engage in a dialogue with the Zimbabwe 
government and other actors to resolve the situation and announced the 
establishment of a taskforce comprising Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa 
to work with the GoZ on the economic and political issues affecting Zimbabwe 
(SADC 2001). 
In line with this undertaking, SADC and South Africa took the initiative to convince the 
international community to financially support the land redistribution exercise as agreed 
at the 1979 Lancaster House Conference and the 1998 Donor Conference2. At the 
international level, President Mbeki had to engage with the world powers in particular the 
UK government to try to convince them to adopt a win-win situation for both Mugabe and 
the white farmers whose interests were intrinsically linked with those of the UK. However, 
the SADC initiative collapsed due to a combination of factors, notably; a failure by the 
                                                            
2  The  International  Donor’s  Conference  on  Land  Reform  and  Resettlement  in  Zimbabwe  was  held  in  Harare, 
Zimbabwe from 9 to 11 September 1998. The Conference was convened by the GoZ in order to inform donors on 
land reform and resettlement issues and to mobilise support for the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme. 
The Conference was attended by  representatives of Donor  countries and  International Organisations as well as 
representatives  of  Government,  local  institutions,  non‐government  organisations,  civil  leaders  and  other 
stakeholders. Representatives who participated  in the Conference were from more than 21 countries along with 
emissaries from the IMF, the World Bank and the EU. 
The donors unanimously endorsed the need for land reform and resettlement in Zimbabwe and affirmed that this 
was essential for poverty reduction, economic growth and stability. 
Donors adopted a new set of principles to govern a Phase 11 Program and pushed to have redistribution decisions 
made by an independent land commission rather than Mugabe’s cabinet. The donors insisted that such a programme 
should be implemented in a transparent, fair and sustainable manner and with respect for the rule of law. Donor 
support was therefore on condition of those key elements.  The insistence on transparency and accountability irked 
the  GoZ.  For  the  GoZ  this  appeared  as  part  of  the  broader  discourse  on  ‘good  governance’  which  the  Blair 
government propagated with more zeal than the Conservatives under John Major and Margaret Thatcher 
In violation of the agreements made at the Donor’s conference the GoZ between June 2000 and February 2001 gave 
notices of  seizure of  841  commercial  farms  that were  vague on  compensation  and  timing.  The  announcement 
prompted the IMF to suspend US$55 million in earmarked assistance. Some 20 farms were occupied in November 
1998 and the violence and intimidation appeared to be increasingly coordinated. By 1999 it became clear that the 
GoZ had done little or no follow up on the September Donor Conference (Nyakudya 2013:89). 
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international community to provide funding in line with the commitment they made at the 
1998 Donor Conference on the Zimbabwe land question and Mugabe’s continued pursuit 
of the FTLRP that totally disregarded the ownership rights of white farmers (Nyakudya 
2013:89). The historical records show that the Western countries were not interested in 
any other outcome except to change the Mugabe regime, a factor that was to complicate 
the mediation process. This non-cooperation of the Western countries with the SADC 
initiative appears to have had a direct impact on how President Mbeki and the region 
approached the Zimbabwe crisis. The attitude of the Western countries may have sent a 
message of arrogance to SADC and the African Union (AU) leadership and in the process 
benefitted Mugabe and ZANU-PF. Mhandara and Pooe (2013:) maintain that the refusal 
by the West to appreciate the deep emotions and sensitivities of the land issue set the 
stage for the hostilities with SADC on the Zimbabwe crisis. The reticence of the Western 
countries to resolve the land issue could also explain why President Mbeki located the 
Zimbabwe crisis in the unresolved issue of land rather than the governance discourse as 
advanced by the western countries.  Furthermore, as argued by both Hoekman (2012) 
and Ndlovu-Gathseni (2013: 152), South Africa could not contradict Zimbabwe on the 
land issue as Mugabe had earlier agreed to delay land repossession at the time of South 
Africa’s transition to democracy in order to help avoid a ‘racial flare-up’ in that country. 
After the failure of the 2000 SADC intervention, the regional bloc was to take a backseat 
as the crisis in Zimbabwe continued to deteriorate until 2007 when the crisis exploded. 
This is when SADC shifted its stance from non-interference to a more directive 
intervention. Mutisi (2012:177) observes that the fact that it took SADC approximately 8 
years to be able to directly intervene in the crisis in Zimbabwe is a test of the credibility of 
the concepts of African Renaissance and African Solutions for African Problems. In order 
to put SADC’s attitude to Zimbabwe in context, it should be noted as rightly pointed out 
by (Qobo 2008:169) and Ndovu-Gatsheni (2011:13) that as one of the founding members 
of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), formerly SADCC, Zimbabwe 
has always enjoyed a special status. This is presented as one of the reasons SADC has 
treated Zimbabwe with ‘kid gloves’. 
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4.3 2000 Parliamentary Elections 
 
The June 2000 parliamentary elections were held against ZANU-PF’s iconic defeat at the 
constitutional referendum held in the same year in February 2000, which was 
compounded by a deepening and economic and political crisis. According to Sachikonye 
(2002:16), intense political contestation had thus become sharper with increased 
militarisation of political contest. Against its historic defeat in the referendum, ZANU-PF 
mobilised the support of the war veterans, former freedom fighters, to campaign for it in 
the parliamentary elections (Laakso 2002:438) to perpetuate its rule. The election was 
therefore marred by high levels of intolerance of opposition political parties, violence, 
intimidation, beatings and killings of MDC supporters. According to ZESN (2000:15-17), 
7000 teachers fled schools, 250 schools were closed, 5 000 people were disenfranchised 
by the war veterans who confiscated the identity documents of alleged MDC supporters. 
The war rhetoric was also played up with war veterans threatening to go back to war if 
ZANU-PF lost the election. The MDC threatened to boycott the election if held in such 
circumstances. The playing field was evidently tilted in favour of ZANU-PF, which enjoyed 
more media coverage. According to Makumbe (2006:49), during the 2000 parliamentary 
elections, the state broadcaster, the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), 
restricted the appearances of opposition political party candidates on both radio and 
television, whereas ZANU-PF candidates were more than adequately covered each time 
they held campaign rallies. While the SADC and the then OAU generally endorsed the 
election as free and fair, several election observer missions both local and foreign 
concluded that the 2000 parliamentary elections were not free and fair. One monitoring 
mission commenting on the parliamentary elections noted that: 
The political environment did not accord the eligible voters the basic freedoms; the 
freedom of movement, association and expression essential if individuals are to 
make personal, independent political decisions. In many parts of the country, due 
to the unsettled political situation, people are restrained from discussing political 
issues, especially those who are on the opposition side (Transparency 
International Zimbabwe 2000 in Makumbe 2002). 
The EU which had forced its way to observe the elections declared that the ‘term free and 
fair was not applicable to the election’ (EU in Laaksa 2002:456). As argued by Makumbe 
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(2006:48), the situation in some parts of the country was such that opposition political 
parties regarded some rural areas, where the ruling party was strongest as “no go areas”.  
A report by EISA (in Makumbe 2002: 49) on the elections summaries the conduct of the 
elections in the following manner: 
Zimbabwe failed to meet any of the ECF’s five requirements for a successful 
election due to the following: the country’s multiple electoral authorities were state 
appointed rather than independent and non-partisan; the electoral process was 
marred by among other problems, secrecy around and secret irregularities in the 
voter’s roll as well as  last minute changes to the electoral rules, the playing field 
was far from level given that Mugabe’s party had disproportionate access to and 
coverage in the state owned media. Accordingly, SADC failed to uphold its own 
principles of holding a successful election. 
The elections nonetheless proved in no uncertain terms that ZANU-PF’s legitimacy to rule 
the country had been weakened.  A total of 2, 493 925 people voted in the election. The 
MDC narrowly lost by 5 seats in the elections which were characterised by widespread 
violence. ZANU-PF won 62 seats to 57 won by the MDC (Laaksa 2002:451). The MDC 
won in the urban areas and in Matabeleland and Manicaland provinces out of the 
country’s ten provinces. Arguably, the election result represented a ‘seismic shift’ in 
Zimbabwe’s post independent politics from a ‘dominant one party system to a multiparty 
system’ (Sachikonye 2002:18). The conduct of the elections was crucial as it raised 
concerns and drew the attention of both regional and internal organisations such as 
SADC, the Commonwealth and the European Union (EU). However, as argued by 
Sachikonye (2002:17), an authoritarian regime becomes more repressive the bigger the 
opposition. Qobo (2008:170) concurs with this observation and states that when ZANU- 
PF’s authority began to ebb away during the June 2000 parliamentary elections, the GoZ 
created more space for the military in civilian affairs. Tendai Biti (in Qobo 2008:170) 
former secretary general of the MDC, argues that this practice goes back to the Smith era 
when ZANU was intent on using the military to project its authority. 
4.3.1 2002 Presidential Elections  
 
The pervasive political violence which characterised the 2000 parliamentary elections 
was repeated again during the 2002 presidential election Makumbe (2006:49). The third 
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Zimbabwe presidential election was held on 9-11 March 2002 (Raftopoulos 2002:413). 
The election pitted Robert Mugabe of ZANU-PF against Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC 
and was largely a culmination of a closely fought campaign process that started in 1999 
(Sachikonye 2002:17). As in 2000 constitutional referendum and the 2000 parliamentary 
elections, the state of the economy featured more highly in the voters’ calculations than 
the symbolism of nationalism and independence. During the run-up to the election, 
emergency legislation; the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and Access to 
Information and Privacy Act (AIPPA) were in Sachikonye’s (2002:17-18) terms ‘rushed 
through parliament’ a few days before the election.  POSA and AIPA increased state 
powers enshrined in the Rhodesian Law and Order Maintenance Act (Scarnecchia 
2006:227). The laws were designed to stifle independent media coverage and in that 
regard tight restrictions were imposed on local and international election monitors and 
observers. The laws also sought to undermine opposition movement and civic 
organisations. Under these repressive laws, 80 campaign rallies which the MDC sought 
to hold were denied. Against the realisation that Tsvangirai was headed for a landslide 
victory, the service chiefs issued a statement in which they said: 
To this end, let it be known that the highest office of the land is a ‘strait jacket’ 
whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives of the liberation struggle. 
We will therefore not accept let alone salute anyone with a different agenda that 
threatens the very existence of our sovereignty (Zimbabwe Independent 11 
January 2002) 
The state controlled media behaved as a mouthpiece for ZANU-PF and denied access to 
opposition forces. As in the 2000 parliamentary elections, ZANU-PF enlisted the services 
of its former freedom fighters, the war veterans, to spearhead its presidential election 
campaign. As alluded to before, the war veterans had been instrumental in the violent 
farm invasions that began in March 2000 after the ‘No’ verdict in the constitutional 
referendum. War veterans had been put on the government payroll in 1998. Their 
children’s education and health requirements were to be met by the state and 20 percent 
of all the lands acquired by the state was to be allocated to them. Their resolve to repay 
their indebtedness was shown in their zealous pursuit of the land invasion programme 
(Sachikonye 2002: 17-18). 
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ZANU-PF further recruited and trained several thousands of unemployed ‘green bombers’ 
to work hand in hand with war veterans. The youths were recruited under the pretext that 
they needed to be trained in patriotism and in the history of the liberation struggle. 
However, in reality, the youths were trained in military tactics of mass control, torture and 
violence. Evidently, as argued by Sachikonye (2002:17), the war veterans and the green 
‘bombers’ perpetrated most of the violence that the supporters of the MDC experienced 
during the presidential election. The figure of those killed mainly from the opposition in 
the ensuing violence during the campaign and also soon after the polling days varies, 
with some scholars such as Sachikonye (2002:17) saying they were 31, while the 
Zimbabwe Human Rights Non-Governmental Forum in its report on political violence (20-
30 April 2002) states that 100 people were killed for political reasons. 70 000 people were 
displaced between January and March 2002 and ZANU-PF set up 150 military bases in 
various parts of the country (Zimbabwe Independent 1 March 2002). As a result of the 
military bases and illegal roadblocks set up in the run up to the elections many ordinary 
people could not travel to rural areas without valid ZANU-PF cards. Those that travelled 
without were tortured or beaten up. The police were not able to enforce the law or rather 
the police ignored the pervasive violence. The law was in that respect applied selectively, 
with known MDC supporters being severely punished. ZANU-PF activists were not 
arrested for similar acts of violence. As the MDC had come to be associated with the 
urban voters, the Registrar General of Elections deliberately reduced the number of 
polling stations in urban areas and increased the number of rural polling stations 
(Makumbe 2006: 50). During the voting process itself, in MDC strongholds, election 
officials were inclined to deny some voters the ballot for frivolous reasons. Those who 
criticised the government were dismissed as sell-outs to western imperialism and the race 
card became a handy political tool to ZANU-PF (Sachikonye 2002:18). The accusation 
that most of the violence was state sponsored was confirmed by use of state vehicles to 
ferry war veterans and youth militias from place to place. The state provided youth militia 
with uniforms, food and places to stay (Makumbe 2006:59).  
A total of 2, 998 758 people, constituting a voter turnout of 55, 4 percent voted in the 
election (EISA 2008). According to the presidential election outcome, Robert Mugabe 
polled 56, 2 percent of votes cast whereas Morgan Tsvangirai polled 42 percent. The 
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outcome of the presidential election was disputed at both national and international level. 
Tsvangirai disputed the election result as illegitimate and condemned the election 
outcome as a case of ‘highway robbery’ (Barber 2002:1147). Tsvangirai claimed that the 
Zimbabwean authorities had engaged in systematic cheating and spoiling tactics and rigid 
new laws, sheer obstruction and political violence and intimidation during the run-up to 
the election. For these reasons, the MDC held that the election results ‘did not reflect the 
true will of the people of Zimbabwe and consequently are illegitimate in the eyes of the 
people’ (Barber 2002:1147). As a result, the MDC did not accept the election outcome. 
The Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), a network of 38 organisations did not 
judge the election as free and fair. The chairperson of ZESN, Matchaba Hove maintained 
that the elections violated all of the SADC Parliamentary Forum norms and standards 
(Barber 2002:1147). The African response was somewhat different. Presidents Joachim 
Chissano of Mozambique, Bakili Muluzi of Malawi and Sam Nujoma of Namibia all 
indicated their acceptance of the result by attending Mugabe’s inauguration as president. 
The then OAU held that the election was transparent, credible, free and fair. SADC also 
endorsed the election as being substantially free and fair despite acknowledging that 
there were incidents of violence during the run-up to the election and logistical challenges 
during the actual process of polling. The Western response was much more critical. The 
then UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair stated that there was strong evidence that Mugabe 
had stolen the election. The then US President George Bush took a similar position and 
declared that ‘we do not recognise the outcome of the election because we think that it is 
flawed’ (Barber 2002:1151-1153). 
4.3.2 2005 General Elections  
 
Prior to the holding of parliamentary elections on 23 March 2005 and aware of its declining 
electoral fortunes, the GoZ in the year 2004 introduced two new electoral laws; the 
Zimbabwe Electoral Commission(ZEC) Act and the Electoral Act in order to control the 
conduct of the electoral process which were criticised for being anti-democratic. The laws 
were therefore intended to tilt the playing field in favour of ZANU-PF and contain the MDC 
electoral threat. The president was empowered to appoint all the electoral 
commissioners- ZEC lost its independence, the postal vote was limited which in effect 
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disenfranchised the Zimbabweans in the diaspora most of whom were MDC supporters- 
in the year 2005 Zimbabweans in the diaspora were estimated to be around 3.5 million, 
election monitoring was regulated-civic organisations such as churches and NGOs were 
side-lined from a role they had previously performed, a requirement of proof of residence 
was also introduced- which was used to penalise MDC urban supporters, the militarisation 
of the electoral process through a greater role of the army and police in the elections and 
voting was now conducted in a single day- it was previously held over a two-day period 
(Kriger 2005:359-360). The elections were also held against the background of the 
recently introduced SADC principles and guidelines on the holding of democratic 
elections. Zimbabwe was therefore the first member state of SADC to attempt to 
incorporate the SADC principles and guidelines into its laws and procedures. However, 
the conduct of the election fell short of the SADC norms and standards for the holding of 
democratic elections. According to Masunungure (2007:25), a string of irregularities in the 
pre-election period were reported; the electoral roll was allegedly inflated with ghost 
voters, identified as dead people, rights of free association and expression were 
compromised by restrictive legislation, state media favoured the incumbent, impartial 
international election observers were denied entry into the country. On voting day, polling 
stations were disproportionately concentrated in rural areas which are the ruling party’s 
stronghold.  
Consistent with the trend already set in the year 2000, again in the election in 2005, 
ZANU-PF fared badly, losing significantly to the MDC in urban areas. On 31 March 2005, 
parliamentary election results were announced. The MDC won 26 of the 30 parliamentary 
seats in major towns and cities with ZANU-PF winning almost all the rural votes and only 
4 of the 30 urban seats (National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NAONGO) 2007:13). As had become the standard, SADC and the SADC Parliamentary 
Forum endorsed the election as reflecting the will of the people. The AU observer mission 
said the vote was ‘conducted in peaceful and orderly manner but would not comment on 
whether it was free and fair as the team had not witnessed the full electoral process. The 
position taken by the opposition, human rights groups and Western governments was 
that the election was not free and fair and this is captured by The Economist (2005) which 
noted that the election result was ‘a coup by the ballot box’. The 2005 elections results 
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showed that despite ZANU-PF’s success at manipulating the election, the party could not 
conceal that the fact that it had lost control of Zimbabwe’s major urban centres 
(Masunungure 2007:26). It can therefore be argued that the MDC was viewed as an urban 
party, implying that ZANU-PF was a rural party. This resulted in desperate attempts by 
ZANU-PF to rid the urban areas of the ungovernable voters, those who had failed to toe 
the ZANU-PF line, in a violent urban clean-up operation known as Operation 
Murambatsvina.  
4.3.3 Operation Murambatsvina  
 
In the aftermath of the March 2005 parliamentary elections that confirmed that ZANU- PF 
had lost political control of Zimbabwe’s urban areas, on 17 May 2005, the GoZ cracked 
down on urban areas in an operation code named “Operation Murambatsvina”; OM. The 
official translation of OM was Operation Restore Order. However, Masunungure 
(2007:22) observes that a more accurate translation of OM is ‘Operation Drive Out 
Rubbish’. The GoZ argued and justified the operation as a strategy necessary to eradicate 
illegal dwellings and eliminate informal trade.  According to the GoZ, the clean-up 
campaign was an effort at urban renewal aimed at ending the filth and crime associated 
with the unsavoury parts of the informal economy. However, the motive for the operation 
was construed by the opposition political party, the MDC and human rights groups to be 
political, as it followed on the heels of Zimbabwe’s parliamentary elections held in March 
2005. The elections confirmed that the opposition was centred in urban areas where as 
already alluded to, the MDC won 26 of the 30 parliamentary seats in major towns and 
cities. In a way, this justifies the reasoning to suppose that the crackdown constituted a 
form of collective punishment. Amongst the various reasons presented for OM by various 
interest groups, the most plausible interpretation is that OM was an effort by ZANU-PF to 
reassert economic and political control following the 2005 parliamentary elections. 
The Solidarity Peace Trust (2010:17) concurs with this view, arguing that:  
Most of the MDC’s 41 seats were won in urban areas. Coming as it did in 
June 2005, OM has been widely interpreted as an act of retribution against 
areas known by the government to have voted for the opposition, sending 
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a message that it was irrelevant whether urban MPs and town councils 
were MDC or not.   
In view of the above developments, OM was a way to take former rural areas voters back 
to where they belonged and to a place they could easily be controlled by ZANU-PF. The 
labour market also became congested, as many unskilled labourers made their way to 
cities. While city populations grew and expanded, the infrastructure - roads, sewage 
systems, housing, water systems and industry - remained stagnant (National Association 
of Non-Governmental Organisations 2007:12).  
Also to be noted is that OM happened against a background of economic collapse in 
Zimbabwe. The Solidarity Peace Trust (2006:12) asserted that in May 2005, employment 
in the formal sector stood at 20%; and more than 80% of the population of Zimbabwe was 
estimated to be below the poverty datum line. Sachikonye (2002:10) advances that 
unemployment had reached 80% prior to OM. The situation described by the SPT is one 
of dire economic meltdown. The SPT further estimated that at some point about 70% 
citizens of economically-productive age were outside their nation, on the run as illegal 
immigrants, or eking out an existence as cross border traders’ (ibid). The desperation of 
Zimbabwean citizens to try and remain afloat in an environment of economic collapse 
came with many challenges, among those, was competition for the little resources 
perceived to be available to them. The ensuing economic meltdown in Zimbabwe at the 
time of OM came with a multifaceted conundrum of challenges. With the economic 
collapse, Zimbabweans desperately seeking a living were forced into the diaspora 
thereby impacting on the integrity of family units.  It is important to note that the effects of 
OM are difficult to judge given that foreign journalists were banned and local reporters 
were constrained by tight media controls. However, according to the United Nations 
Report for Fact Finding Mission to Zimbabwe, the number of directly affected persons 
was between 650 000 to 700 000. The GoZ however rejected the UN estimate 
(Masunungure 2007:29). Both SADC’s and President Mbeki’s responses were that ‘OM’ 
was an internal matter. 
Noteworthy also is that in the same year of 2005, the MDC split into two factions.  
According to the Solidarity Peace Trust (2007:16) the split which occurred on 12 October 
was in reaction to the party’s failure to answer to state abuse with political action and also 
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the party’s frustrations at the polls. The divisions mainly crystallised around participation 
in the newly created Senate in November 2005 with MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai 
objecting to a decision by his secretary general Welshman Ncube to participate in the 
2005 Senate elections. The creation of the Senate helped to consolidate the ruling party’s 
control of political processes both by dividing and weakening the opposition. Tsvangirai’s 
objection was in line with the MDC’s decision in 2004 that it would not participate in any 
elections until the conditions were conducive for free and fair elections (Mhandara and 
Pooe 2013:14). The split created a larger party led by Tsvangirai which became known 
as the MDC-T and a smaller party which retained the MDC name and led by Arthur 
Mutambara and later by Welshman Ncube. As will be illustrated later, the smaller MDC 
positioned itself as a kingmaker and voice of reason during the Mbeki led mediation. The 
MDC leaned towards supporting ZANU-PF mainly because it did not enjoy much support 
from the West. The Solidarity Peace Trust (2007:16) asserts that the creation of the 
Senate helped to consolidate the ruling party’s control of political processes both by 
dividing and weakening the opposition. It has also been put forward that since the 
establishment of the Senate, there was a growing presence of hardliners ‘deeply 
entrenched in the militant authoritarianism that defines the ruling party culture’ (ibid).   The 
chapter has so far demonstrated how the crisis in Zimbabwe continued to deteriorate with 
increasing episodes of political violence and ZANU-PF’s further consolidation of power 
accompanied by the rapid deterioration of the economy with consequential humanitarian 
crises. As the Zimbabwe crisis evolved, SADC continued to maintain its benign attitude 
towards the GoZ. 
4.3.4 The Economic Crisis Preceding the 2008 Harmonised Elections 
   
The study recognises that the 2008 conflict cannot be looked at in isolation of the 
economic crisis that bedevilled Zimbabwe before the holding of the 2008 harmonised 
elections. This derives from the arguments by the Solidarity Peace Trust (2007:21) that 
politics and economics in Zimbabwe are inextricably interwoven and that the economic 
travails of the country were symptomatic of a broader, structural crisis of national 
governance. It therefore becomes imperative for the chapter to devote a section on the 
economic situation that prevailed before the holding of the 2008 harmonised elections. 
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As already alluded to, signs of economic collapse had begun to emerge since the late 
1990s following implementation of the structural adjustment programmes by the GoZ and 
other poor policy choices by the ZANU-PF led government such as the unbudgeted lump 
sum pay-outs to war veterans and the intervention in the DRC war and arguably the 
FTLRP. As noted by the Solidarity Peace Trust (2007:17) the period after 2000 saw an 
intensification of state involvement in the economy and a rapid militarisation of the state 
apparatus calculated to underpin the barrage of repressive measures the GoZ had put in 
place to stifle dissent and subdue opposition to government policies. In the ensuing years, 
the economy continued to decline until it reached crisis levels in 2008.  By 2006, the 
economy was shrinking at an average of 4.7 %, according to the IMF report of 2006. By 
2007, manufacturing, mining and export sectors had steeply declined. Manufacturing 
which at its height constituted 16% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), shrunk by more 
than 35%. Unemployment was at 80%. The country’s export for example plummeted from 
33,7 % in 1997 to 9, 9 % of the GDP in 2007. The drastic shrinkage of the economy has 
been attributed to the collapse of the key contributors to Zimbabwe’s GDP such as 
agriculture, manufacturing and tourism following the contentious FTLRP (Solidarity Peace 
Trust 2007:16).  
In their discussion of some of the economic indicators; Mlambo and Raftopoulos (2010) 
note that by 2007, per capita GDP was estimated at US$200 compared to US$ 900, while 
80% of the population of Zimbabwe was living on less than US$ 2 a day. These alarming 
statistics caused the World Bank (in Mlambo and Raftopoulos 2010:3) to remark that 
Zimbabwe had ‘the World’s fastest shrinking economy for a country not at war’. According 
to the Solidarity Peace Trust (2007:16), a number of significant developments affected 
the economy in 2007; firstly, Operation Reduce Prices3, which began in June 2007 and 
which had disastrous effects on the economy and secondly; the Indigenisation Bill4 which 
                                                            
3 Operation Reduce Prices was a government crackdown  forcing businesses such as manufacturers, wholesalers, 
retailers and other service providers to reduce prices by 50% to June 18 levels. The crackdown led to the arrest of 
33 company executives and resulted in basic commodities disappearing from shelves amid threats from the GoZ that 
those who failed to comply with the order would have their businesses nationalised. The Operation was intended to 
reverse the price increases of commodities which the GoZ had perceived as intended to foment discontent among 
the people ahead of the 2008 Harmonised elections (IRIN 10 July 2007). 
4 The Indigenisation Bill was passed in Parliament in October 2007. The Bill stated that all foreign owned businesses 
must have 51% indigenous ownership. The central problem relates to the way in which such legislation was used to 
extend patronage of the ruling party elite. 
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was passed in Parliament in October 2007. By the start of 2008, the economy was 
experiencing what The UK Guardian (10 March 2008) terms an ‘economic H.I.V’ with 
insufficient foreign reserves, shortages of power, water, food, fuel, and cash. Inflation for 
example had by 2008 reached 128 billion percent, or 98% per day which according to the 
Zimbabwe Independent (22 April 2016) was the second highest rate in the history of the 
world.  Hyperinflation became the hallmark of the economic implosion and marked the 
climax of the economic crisis. The Zimbabwean dollar became devalued to the extent that 
‘even a trillion dollars could not purchase as little as a loaf of bread ‘(Moyo 2010:16).  With 
fiscal deficits spiralling out of control, inflation on the rise, the authority of ZANU-PF being 
challenged by political opponents, government regulation began to assume authoritarian 
dimensions particularly in view of the growing dissent to the deepening economic crisis. 
Unable to meet the social and economic needs of the electorate, due to shortages of 
foreign currency, the GoZ resorted to repression to crush a looming social revolt. The 
state as had become its culture in response to opposition unleashed vicious violence 
against its opponents to prop up its faltering grip on power and disable a potential 
challenge to its hegemony. In other words, the deepening economic crisis was matched 
by an intensification of state authoritarianism and together propelled the downward spiral 
of the economy. 
For Zimbabweans, the economic crisis had serious socio-economic and humanitarian 
consequences. The once celebrated social services sector collapsed. Health and 
education sectors in particular faced chronic and severe underfunding leading to a 
massive brain drain as many professionals went abroad in search of better prospects. 
While estimates differ on the number of Zimbabweans who had by 2008 left the country 
in response to the deteriorating situation, the Zimbabwe Independent (22 April 2016), puts 
the figure to a total of 3 million. Most of the Zimbabweans fled to neighbouring countries 
such as South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia and Namibia, while others went 
as far afield as the UK, the US, Canada and Australia. However, the influx of the 
Zimbabweans also sparked off serious xenophobic reactions particularly in South Africa 
and Botswana (Mlambo and Raftopoulos 2010:6).  
As a result of the brain drain, the humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe accelerated. Mlambo 
and Raftopoulos (2010:4) observe that the average life expectancy rate which was 63 
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years in 1990 dropped to 40, 9 years in 2005 and child mortality rate increased from 76 
to 132 deaths per 1000 between 1990 to 2007.  Mlambo and Raftopoulos (2010:4) argue 
that the cholera outbreak of 2008 was the ultimate incontrovertible indicator of the total 
collapse of the Zimbabwe health sector and evidence that the system’s governance, 
economic, political and social structures had deteriorated to the extent of not being able 
to provide even basic clean water to its citizens. UNICEF’s description of the situation is 
telling: 
Schools and hospitals are closing, patients cannot access health care, teachers, 
nurses and doctors are not able to come to work. Urban water supplies are erratic 
or not available at all due to weakened infrastructure, and power outages. The net 
effect on Zimbabwean children has been no schooling, lack of health care, no safe 
drinking water, reduced number of meals and increased morbidity and mortality (in 
Mlambo and Raftopoulos 2010:4). 
According to the PMCID report, on the cholera outbreak (2011:541) during the period 
from August 2008 to June 2009, an estimated 95 531 suspected cases of cholera and 4 
288 were reported, making this the largest outbreak of cholera ever recorded in 
Zimbabwe. The outbreak began in Chitungwiza, a high density dormitory town, 30 
kilometres south-east of Harare, in August 2008 then spread throughout the country so 
that by December 2008; cases were being reported in all the 10 provinces. In December 
2008, the GoZ declared the outbreak a national emergency and requested for 
international aid. Doctors Without Borders (2012) report that cholera cases from this 
outbreak were also reported in neighbouring countries such as South Africa, Malawi, 
Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia. Arguably as pointed out by Mlambo and 
Raftopoulos (2010:5-6) the regional dimension of the unfolding crisis in Zimbabwe was 
clear evidence that the Zimbabwe crisis was a regional problem requiring resolution for 
the good of the region and this only occurred following a GoZ crackdown on a prayer 
meeting organised by the Save Zimbabwe campaign in March 2007.  
4.3.5 2007 Save Zimbabwe Campaign and SADC’s Intervention 
 
Against the backdrop of the declining political and economic situation in Zimbabwe, civic 
activism intensified to pressure for the restoration of democracy, human rights and a 
legitimate government. In that regard, a coalition of organisations under the banner of the 
112 
 
Save Zimbabwe Campaign, which includes opposition political parties such as the MDC, 
church groups, civil rights groups and trade unions organised to hold a prayer rally on 11 
March 2007 (Mlambo and Raftopoulos 2010:8). The police broke up the prayer rally and 
arrested over 100 people including the MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai. The Zimbabwe 
police claimed that the prayer rally was in violation of the repressive POSA law which had 
banned political protests. In the resulting unrest, one opposition activist was shot dead. 
This is the event that finally brought about the intervention of the African Union (AU) 
through SADC (Mlambo and Raftopoulos 2010:8). In that regard and according to 
Mlambo and Raftopoulos (2010:8), SADC’s intervention took on an added urgency 
following the violence unleashed on the Save Zimbabwe campaigners and the ensuing 
crackdown on the MDC structures that followed thereafter. The patience of some SADC 
leaders including Ian Khama of Botswana and the late Zambian President, Levy 
Mwanawasa was waning with the continued deterioration of the Zimbabwe crisis. SADC 
was also under pressure from the international community particularly the Western 
countries and local civic society activists to take stronger action on Zimbabwe. According 
to Mutisi (2012: 172), the deepening international criticism of the SADC non-interference 
principle also influenced a more forthright SADC intervention. Such internationalisation of 
the Zimbabwe crisis further pressured SADC to seek what they deemed as an ‘African 
solution’ to the Zimbabwe crisis. Nyakudya (2012:90) concurs with this view and notes 
that the brutal assault by the police on the opposition prayer rally attracted worldwide 
publicity which forced SADC to intervene in the crisis in Zimbabwe.  
Arguably, the Save Zimbabwe incident and the internationalisation of the Zimbabwe crisis 
forced SADC to shift from its non-interference philosophy to a more forceful stance to 
push for a negotiated settlement.  In light of the growing international pressure, SADC 
was forced to hold an extra-ordinary SADC Heads of State and Government Summit in 
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on 29 March 2007 to deliberate on the governance crisis in 
Zimbabwe (Maisiri 2013). In its communique (in Mhandara and Pooe 2013:9) SADC 
expressed its displeasure at the turn of events in Zimbabwe and took the decision to 
mandate President Mbeki to facilitate internal political dialogue between ZANU-PF and 
the two factions of the MDC. On this point, some scholars such as Anstey (2007:433) 
argue that mediation success is guaranteed more in conflicts where the mediator is invited 
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by the disputants than in the case of Zimbabwe where Mbeki was imposed by SADC. 
However, Nyakudya (2013:89) asserts that the choice of President Mbeki was a natural 
one in the sense that he had started his mediation efforts in 2001 working with the 
Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo, in the Commonwealth, to try to bring ZANU-PF 
and the MDC to the negotiating table.  In addition, President Mbeki was a mediator with 
interests and leverage, which according to Ripeness theoretical framework, the theory 
that informs this study, are some of the variables central to mediation effectiveness and 
success (Anstey 2007:433-434). According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012:153), Mbeki was 
worried about the ripple effects of a ‘political and economic implosion in Zimbabwe’ given 
that South Africa was directly affected by the situation in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, Mbeki 
led Zimbabwe’s biggest trading partner and therefore seemed best placed to negotiate a 
settlement, especially as he was espousing an ‘African grand design that crystallised 
around the philosophy of the African Renaissance’ (ibid). Mbeki’s foreign policy ‘included 
a determination to show that Africa was able to take charge of her destiny and use ‘African 
solutions to solve African Problems’ (ibid: 156). However, as will be illustrated in the 
chapter, from the perspective of the parties to the conflict particularly the MDC, Mbeki’s 
partiality was questioned with the MDC perceiving him as a ‘dishonest broker’, which in 
turn put his acceptability as mediator to question (ibid). President Mbeki’s mediation 
process in Zimbabwe is generally prescribed into three phases; firstly, the pre-2008 
harmonised election phase, followed by the post 2008 harmonised election phase and 
the Global Political Agreement Phase (GPA) leading to the to 2013 harmonised elections. 
The GPA phase is beyond the scope of this study as the research treats the signing of 
the GPA as its endpoint. 
4.3.6 The Pre-2008 Harmonised Election Phase 
 
The pre-2008 election phase is defined by the initiation of active mediation by SADC in 
Zimbabwe (Maisiri 2013). The phase covers the period from May 2007 to March 2008. 
President Mbeki made it clear after being mandated by SADC to facilitate internal 
dialogue between Zimbabwe’s political players that at the heart of his mediation was 
addressing electoral conditions and constitutional reform. His mediation goals were 
threefold and aimed to achieve the following among the three parties: 
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 Endorse the decision to hold harmonised parliamentary, presidential and 
local government elections in 2008. 
 Agree on the steps that must be taken…to ensure that everybody 
concerned accepts the results of the elections as being truly representative 
of the will of the people and 
 Agree on the measures that all political parties and other social forces must 
implement and respect to create the necessary climate that will facilitate 
such acceptance (Mbeki in Raftopoulos 2010 and Dzinesa and Zambara 
2011). 
 
Mbeki’s mediation was also focused on addressing the socio-economic challenges and 
the assistance for Zimbabwe’s re-entry into the international community. According to 
Mhandara and Pooe (2013:17), what was critical in the first phase was the creation of an 
election environment that was meant to produce uncontested 2008 harmonised elections. 
Mlambo and Raftopoulos (2010) agree with this view and note that from the onset of the 
mediation process, it was clear that Mbeki’s efforts were concentrated on reaching an 
agreement that would result in a generally acceptable election process in 2008, as a 
means of settling the issue of international legitimacy. Over several months, Mbeki 
mediated between ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations, seeking their agreement to 
free and fair elections that would hopefully end the crisis in Zimbabwe (Nyakudya 
2013:89). It however needs mentioning that ZANU-PF was initially dismissive of the 
mediation initiative.   
President Mugabe’s position was ‘talks to talk about what’ (Nyakudya 2013:89), which 
suggests that ZANU- PF did not perceive the country to be in crisis warranting mediation. 
With time, President Mbeki eventually persuaded the disputants to agree on a range of 
constitutional, electoral and media reforms which were endorsed by the Zimbabwe 
Parliament in December 2007. The mediation had in that sense resulted in some 
minimum agreements on creating conditions for a free and fair election although the MDC 
had wanted more reforms before the holding of elections. The two MDCs’ conditions for 
a free and fair election involved the need for ‘a new democratic national constitution’ 
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(Nyakudya 2013:91). The two MDCs considered the existing constitution as the root 
cause of the many problems that beset the country (MDC 2007 in Mutisi 2012:167). 
ZANU-PF on the other hand located the land question and not the need for a new 
constitution at the centre of the crisis in Zimbabwe.  However, amongst the notable 
electoral reforms credited to President Mbeki’s mediation was Constitutional Amendment 
18 which according to Mutisi (2012:167) was supposed to facilitate credible elections in 
Zimbabwe in accordance to SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic 
elections. However, as noted by Mlambo and Raftopoulos (2010), events over the next 
three months exposed SADC and Mbeki’s helplessness in the face of the continued 
intransigence of ZANU-PF. President Mugabe unilaterally declared 29 March 2008 as the 
election date for the harmonised elections without the consent of the MDC and before a 
new constitution could be crafted and any meaningful reforms effected. Indeed, as noted 
by Raftopoulos (2010), the announcement of the election date by Mugabe ‘amounted to 
a repudiation of the SADC dialogue by ZANU-PF. However, as noted by Nyakudya 
(2013:91) to President Mbeki’s credit, the 29 March 2008 Harmonised elections that 
followed were relatively peaceful, potentially yielding a credible outcome albeit that the 
elections were not conclusive. 
4.4 The 2008 Harmonised Elections  
 
Zimbabwe for the first time simultaneously held harmonised presidential, parliamentary 
and local government elections on 29 March 2008. The elections were viewed by all 
standards by local and regional observers to have passed the legitimacy test of a free 
and fair election in line with both the SADC and AU Principles and Guidelines on the 
holding of free and fair elections. They were also seen as fulfilling the criteria for free and 
fair elections as set out by Elklit and Svensson (1997). This is despite that ZEC, the 
electoral body which conducted the elections is considered to be lacking in independence 
and impartiality as it is a government appointed constitutional body making its 
appointment politically driven (EISA 2008). The pre-election environment was all the 
same relatively peaceful although the electoral playing field was still skewed in favour of 
the incumbent ruling ZANU-PF party. There was none the less some façade of ‘freeness’ 
116 
 
(Badza 2009, Raftopoulos 2013). The country’s population then was 13, 5 million (EISA 
2008).  With a voter turnout of 2,497,265, constituting 42,8 percent, ZANU-PF lost its 
majority in the House of Assembly for the first time since independence in 1980 garnering 
97 seats against a combined 110 seats won by the opposition- the MDC-T won 99 seats, 
MDC Mutambara (MDC-M) won 10 seats and an independent candidate won 1 seat 
(Bamfo 2010:107) out of a total number of 210 seats. In the presidential race, pitting four 
presidential candidates, Robert Mugabe of ZANU-PF, Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC and 
two independent candidates, Simba Makoni of the MKD and Langton Towungana, 
Mugabe was defeated by MDC leader Tsvangirai by 47, 9 percent to 43, 2 percent. To 
note is that for the presidential election Zimbabwe uses the majority electoral system, 
where candidates are elected with an absolute majority of 50 plus one vote (Tendi 
2010:258). According to this system, if there is no ultimate winner, the two round system 
is used to determine the winner.  Scholars such as Bamfo (2010:107) consider the system 
to have subverted the electoral will of the Zimbabwean people.   
As Tsvangirai was short of the 50 plus one vote needed for an outright victory, a decision 
was made to have a run-off election in June 2008 (Tendi 2010:258, Mawere 2011:91). 
There was much contestation over the results particularly since ZEC took nearly a month 
before releasing the election results (Bamfo 2010: 107). The country was thus thrown into 
a tense period and anarchy amid growing suspicions that ZANU-PF was manipulating the 
electoral outcome. The MDC accused ZANU-PF of staging a silent coup (The Nation 12 
May 2008). The ZEC only released the results on 2 May 2008 and declared that none of 
the presidential candidates had won a majority. Mugabe quickly accepted the result as 
announced and offered to contest in the run-off election while Tsvangirai denounced the 
result insisting that he won the first elections outright. As argued by Benyera (2013: 163), 
Tsvangirai’s failure to garner sufficient votes to avoid a run-off presented ZANU- PF with 
an opportunity to re-strategise. The March 2008 election outcome sparked panic in 
ZANU-PF.  Predictably, what was to follow before the run-off election is described by 
Masunungure and Bratton (2008:41-55) as a ‘ruthless election campaign rooted in 
violence and impunity’ in defiance of both the AU and SADC charters on principles 
governing democratic elections. Maisiri (2013) notes that by implication this meant that 
the momentum gained through Mbeki’s 2007 mediation, which created the conducive 
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March 2008 election conditions was lost in the period of the re-run. Nyakudya (2013: 90-
91) notes that an alarmed SADC called an Extra-Ordinary Summit of Heads of State and 
Government which was held on 12 April 2008, where Mbeki brought the SADC mediation 
process into disrepute by claiming that ‘there was no crisis in Zimbabwe’ (Mail and 
Guardian:12 April 2008). According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012:159), this prevented SADC 
from taking formal action against Mugabe and ZANU-PF in order to prevent them from 
using further violence against opposition forces.  
It has been argued though that due to the pervasiveness of the violence in the run-up 
period, Mbeki was advised by Kinglsey Mambolo, the former South African Ambassador 
to Zimbabwe and Head of the SADC Election Mission in the March elections, that a 
presidential re-run could not take place under the deteriorated conditions (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni 2012:159). Mbeki responded by dispatching retired South African generals to 
Zimbabwe to look into the allegations of escalating political violence and intimidation; their 
report, which was not made public, confirmed the evolution of the state’s role (ibid). 
Despite the evidence of the pre-election violence neither Mbeki nor SADC attempted to 
stop the profligacy. Mbeki continued with his kid glove handling of Mugabe in the name 
of ‘quiet diplomacy’. This did not sit well with various role players and interest groups such 
as the MDC-T, civic society, some SADC countries such as Tanzania, Zambia and 
Botswana as well as the Western countries resulting in increasing criticism of Mbeki’s 
mediation (Mlambo and Raftopoulos 2010). Like the MDC, the Western countries were 
increasingly sceptical about Mbeki’s mediation approach of quiet diplomacy. The MDC 
saw Mbeki as a limited actor whose efforts were ineffectual against an entrenched 
dictatorship (Nyakudya 2013:91) and given the credence in the MDC claims, Mbeki’s 
intervention compels an interrogation on the need for more principled third party 
mediation particularly in conflicts with human rights issues.   
The chapter will now consider the immediate post 2008 election phase which 
encompasses the events and activities from the post March 2008 election period, which 
includes the run-up to the run-off election, the election itself and the negotiations for the 
GPA. 
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4.4.1 The Post 2008 Harmonised Election Phase and the AU Intervention 
 
The following subsections focus on the period after the 2008 harmonised elections in 
Zimbabwe up until the political and electoral dispute escalated until SADC and the African 
Union got involved. 
4.4.2 The June 2008 Presidential Run-Off Election  
 
On 16 May 2008, ZEC announced 27 June 2008 as the date for the run-off election.   
What followed was what some civil society organisations termed a ‘reign of terror’ being 
unleashed on innocent civilians. During the run-up to the presidential election, war vets, 
the military, the intelligence and ZANU-PF militia were involved in a bloody campaign of 
intimidation, torture, rape and murder against opposition activists, journalists, polling 
agents, public servants, civic leaders and ordinary citizens suspected of voting for the 
MDC (Bratton and Masunungure 2011:11). Violence was deployed as a political tool to 
instil fear and to influence the voting behaviour of the electorate in favour of ZANU-PF. 
The level of violence was so pervasive to the extent that a collation of 105 representatives 
from civil society wrote a communique which included a discussion on the applicability of 
R2P (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition: 2008). MDC-T National Spokesperson, Douglas 
Mwonzora chronicles how the violence erupted in 2008: 
The electoral process was taken over by the military junta, results took more than 
four weeks to be announced after that the use of brute force and violence was 
state sponsored. Soldiers were deployed to establish camps throughout the 
country and intelligence as well. Violence was condoned by the state as long as it 
was directed to the MDC it was by and large legalised (Mwonzora in Masunungure 
2009). 
 
In affirmation of the unprecedented levels of the state sponsored violence, Masunungure 
(2009:81) argues that ‘April to June 2008 election interregnum was a militarised moment. 
Tendai Biti (Solidarity Peace Trust 2011) former secretary general of the MDC described 
the situation in Zimbabwe as a ‘war zone’ which exemplifies the explosion of the crisis 
and which according to Mlambo and Raftopoulos (2010:9) should be understood in the 
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context of a major threat to the political future of the ruling party. An operation code named 
Wavhotera Papi (‘how did you vote’) was rolled out during the post March 2008 elections. 
This operation was aimed at rooting out, victimising and targeting all people suspected of 
supporting or voting for the opposition MDC in the March elections (Bratton and 
Masunungure 2008:50). It is important to point out at this juncture that while as noted by 
(Matlose 2013: 58), the existence of such state sponsored violence has been confirmed 
by various reports and it has also been acknowledged that the MDC too was responsible 
for some of the political violence. However, due to the prevalence of cases of violence 
with mainly opposition supporters as victims, on 22 June, Tsvangirai withdrew from the 
presidential contest, leaving Mugabe as the sole candidate and winner of the sham 
presidential election. Mugabe was declared the winner with 90, 22 percent (ZEC 2008). 
The results were hotly contested in Zimbabwe and were not accepted internationally. 
Estimates on the number of people affected vary with the Human Rights Watch (2011) 
stating that the widespread and systematic abuses led to the killing of at least 200 people, 
the beating and torture of more than 5 000 people and the displacement of about 36 000 
people. The hapless SADC and Mbeki could only watch as Zimbabwe plunged into a 
leadership legitimacy crisis.  
As noted by Matlose (2013: 56), the one man race was a ZANU-PF tactic clearly intended 
to turn the tables, claim moral high ground for the party and wrong foot the MDC. In that 
regard, the election result re-positioned ZANU-PF strategically; the outcome of the 
shambolic run-off emboldened the party ahead of the tough negotiations which were 
aimed at putting in place a power-sharing mechanism in the form of an inclusive multi-
party government. The election outcome in other words gave ZANU-PF the upper hand 
as it negotiated as a sitting government, with the MDC negotiating from a position of 
weakness, as a divided opposition.  
On the overall, SADC’s response to the crisis was minimal and inadequate with only 
Botswana openly condemning the excesses of ZANU-PF and Ian Khama refusing to 
recognise Mugabe as a legitimate leader. Other countries such as Zambia, with minor 
variance, supported Botswana’s position (Cawthra 2010). It should be noted that SADC 
was not always united on the Zimbabwe issue. SADC’s inaction led the AU to take the 
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decision at the Sharm el-Sheik, Egypt Summit in June 2008, instructing SADC to facilitate 
engagement of political parties and negotiations for an agreement (Crisis in Zimbabwe 
Coalition 2010). This led to fresh inter party negotiations in which Mbeki persevered with 
his quiet diplomacy against all odds. Mbeki’s mediation had now shifted from a focus on 
creating conditions for credible elections to establishing an interim coalition government 
(Nyakudya 2013:84).  
The mediation however experienced stagnation again in July 2008.  Tensions within 
SADC are discussed as part of the reason for the stagnation along with pressure from the 
international community, criticism from the ANC, MDC’s mistrust of the process and 
belligerence from ZANU-PF, which together with the MDC monopoly of victimhood 
undermined the potential for common ground (Raftopoulos and Eppel 2008:375, 
Cheesemen and Tendi 2010:207). Most importantly, Mbeki was seen as having 
ideological sympathies with ZANU-PF (Ndlovu-Gathseni 2011:12). However, on 21 July 
2008, the warring parties in Zimbabwe eventually agreed to a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) that committed them to working for a resolution of the crisis in the 
country. As Ndlovu-Gathseni (2013:160) argues, this was a breakthrough that legitimised 
the concerns of all the warring parties, thus placing them on an equal footing and paving 
the way for the next phase of negotiations which culminated in the formation of the 
Government of National Unity (GNU) under the GPA on 11 September 2008. It however 
needs to be pointed out that for both ZANU-PF and the MDC; the GPA was not 
necessarily a popular concept. According to Mhandara and Pooe (2013:12), some of the 
considerations that influenced the MDC-T to accede to the GPA include the party’s failure 
to dislodge ZANU-PF from power through the ballot box. Participation in the GPA 
therefore presented the party with the opportunity to gain full control of the state and this 
was to be realised by pushing the mediation process from SADC to the AU and ultimately 
the UN which gave credence to the claims by ZANU-PF that the MDC was a western 
puppet. For ZANU-PF, the concept of sharing power following years of unlimited access 
to and grip on the state machinery and most levers of power was highly unattractive. 
ZANU-PF therefore signed the GPA for tactical considerations; the GPA gave the party 
some international legitimacy which it had lost.  
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The GPA was therefore an interlude for the party to regroup. It needs mentioning that the 
very week that the power-sharing agreement was signed; Mbeki faced political pressures 
at home mainly triggered by faction fighting within his ruling ANC. This infighting 
culminated in a decision by the ANC’s National Executive Committee on 20 September 
2008 to recall Mbeki from his presidency. The toppling of Mbeki plunged the power-
sharing agreement into uncertainty as there were deadlocks that would require the 
intervention of the mediator (Matlose 2013: 49). Following the resolution of the ANC 
leadership crisis Mbeki’s successor, Jacob Zuma took over as the facilitator. 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
In a narrative, analytical and interpretative manner, the chapter has demonstrated that 
the 2008 Zimbabwe conflict is one of the many episodes of violence in Zimbabwe. It has 
also been argued that while violence in Zimbabwe predates the colonial times, the post 
2000 period was marked by intensification of violence particularly in the context of 
elections. This has been attributed to ZANU-PF’s pursuit of an ideology based on a one 
party state and its failure over the years to democratise and embrace multiparty politics 
in earnest. It has also been shown that ZANU-PF became more authoritarian with the 
emergence of the MDC on Zimbabwe’s political landscape; violence therefore became a 
tool for the party’s political survival (Mutisi 2012: 164). After ZAPU, the MDC is credited 
for being the first opposition political party to challenge ZANU-PF’s hegemony starting 
with the 2000 Constitutional Referendum, where ZANU-PF lost to the MDC-led campaign 
for a ‘NO’ vote. 
The chapter has illustrated that as a result of its loss at the Referendum, ZANU-PF 
responded by embarking on a chaotic and disorderly FTLRP which in turn was the first 
development to attract regional and international reaction. The US and the Western 
countries reacted by slapping Zimbabwe with sanctions which in turn entrenched ZANU- 
PF rule, while SADC tried to contain the situation by engaging the government of 
Zimbabwe against concerns over ‘the contagion effects of the Zimbabwe crisis on the 
region’ (Ndlovu-Gathseni 2013:160). SADC was however not united in its response to the 
Zimbabwe crisis owing to the sensitivities of the land issue as well as ZANU-PF’s special 
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status in the regional bloc because of its liberation war history, which in turn worked 
against the MDC because of its neo-liberal agenda and closeness to Western countries 
that allegedly financed the party and its activities. 
The chapter has also argued that the crisis in Zimbabwe continued to deteriorate with the 
economic implosion also becoming an appendage of the crisis. As such, ZANU-PF 
reasserted its control in the face of growing unrest to its rule by intensifying state 
involvement in the economy, which only worsened the crisis and increased political 
discontent with civic activism intensifying. SADC all the same continued with its benign 
attitude towards Zimbabwe. It has been shown that it was only in 2007 following the Save 
Zimbabwe Campaign incident that saw the police crackdown on the prayer rally that 
SADC was forced to take a more interventionist approach to the deteriorated political and 
economic crisis in Zimbabwe. President Mbeki was as a result mandated to mediate in 
the Zimbabwe crisis with a view to ‘normalising the political and economic situation’ 
(Nyakudya 2013:84-85).  
It has also been argued that through President Mbeki’s mediation of quiet diplomacy, 
minimal constitutional and electoral reforms were made, which were credited for the 
peaceful harmonised elections held in March 2008. ZANU-PF lost in both the presidential 
and parliamentary election. The failure by MDC-T leader Morgan Tsvangirai to garner an 
outright victory in the presidential election necessitated a run-off presidential election 
which was marred by unprecedented levels of violence that led Tsvangirai to withdraw 
from the presidential contest. Mugabe was declared the winner, an outcome that was 
heavily contested and not accepted internationally. SADC and Mbeki were hapless over 
the unfolding situation in Zimbabwe leading the AU to instruct SADC to facilitate 
negotiations for an agreement amongst Zimbabwe’s political players. Mbeki’s mediation 
approach was increasingly criticised for being ineffective by the MDC, civic society, some 
quarters within the ANC, some SADC countries and the Western countries, particularly in 
the face of Mugabe’s continued intransigence. The MDC also questioned Mbeki’s 
partiality given his close links with ZANU-PF (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011:12). The 
negotiations eventually culminated in the formation of the Government of National Unity 
(GNU) under the GPA on 11 September 2008, which was SADC’s mechanism for 
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resolving the conflict in Zimbabwe. The successes and failures of the GNU as a conflict 
resolution mechanism will be explored in the next and final chapter on findings, 
recommendations and conclusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
124 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
5. Introduction 
 
This concluding chapter presents a summation and analyses of the findings and 
recommendations of the study. Principally, the chapter seeks to address the key question 
of the study, which is the evaluation of Thabo Mbeki’s mediation in the political conflict of 
2008 in Zimbabwe. As President Mbeki’s mediation approach of ‘Quiet Diplomacy’ 
culminated in the formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU), the chapter 
explores the effectiveness of the GNU model as a sustainable conflict resolution 
mechanism. Emphasis is placed on conflict interventions that address structural causes 
of conflict. As this was a SADC mandated mediation, the research findings are followed 
by a few recommendations to SADC on Thabo Mbeki’s mediation, which incorporate and 
emphasise electoral democracy and the need for a more integrated mediation approach 
that is aimed at proper reconstruction and reconciliation, the inclusion of Track II actors 
such as civic society as well as the need for expanded mediation teams. Findings on the 
main research question are complemented with a focus on the following key objectives 
of the research: 
1. Exploring the dynamics and causes of the 2008 Zimbabwe dispute. 
2. Explaining the context of President Mbeki’s involvement in the 
Zimbabwe dispute. 
3. Assessing Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy. 
4. Assessing Mbeki’s contribution towards the democratisation of 
Zimbabwe through the formation of the power sharing government. 
5.1 Findings of the Study 
 
The following subsections of the chapter flesh out the key findings of the chapter and 
provide a summation and analysis of the findings while addressing the key question of 
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the study which is an evaluation of Thabo Mbeki’s mediation in the Zimbabwean electoral 
and political conflict of 2008. 
5.1.1 Dynamics and Causes of the 2008 Zimbabwe Dispute 
 
The research observes and concludes that the 2008 political dispute in Zimbabwe was 
rooted in the authoritarian nature and governance of ZANU-PF, contrary to claims by both 
ZANU-PF and Thabo Mbeki that located the crisis in the land issue and the neo-imperial 
and neo-liberal agenda of the Western countries. The fact is that because of its liberation 
credentials, ZANU-PF believes in its entitlement to rule in perpetuity which explains its 
pursuit of a one-party state ideology since the country’s independence. The party 
therefore continued with repressive laws and institutions inherited from the Rhodesian 
regime. As a result of ZANU-PF’s failure to democratise, the party has shown deep 
intolerance of opposition which heightened in the post 2000 period with the emergence 
of the MDC in Zimbabwe’s politics. The MDC is considered to have presented a 
formidable challenge to ZANU-PF rule since independence. Violence and the control of 
the conduct of elections therefore became central to the retention of power by ZANU-PF, 
which reached its peak with the party’s first ever loss of elections in 2008.  
5.1.2 Context of Thabo Mbeki’s Involvement in the Zimbabwe Dispute 
 
While Zimbabwe had shown signs of being in crisis from the late 1990s, both the AU and 
SADC only reacted to the deteriorating political situation in 2007. This followed an 
international outcry over the degenerating situation in the country exemplified by a 
conundrum of political and economic problems in Zimbabwe. SADC’s appointment of 
Thabo Mbeki was driven more by the growing international criticism and concern than by 
genuine commitment to finding lasting peace in Zimbabwe. This vindicates the considered 
position of this research that the entire process was intended to create the impression 
that Africa was capable of resolving its own problems through the home grown approach 
to conflict resolution under the mantra of ‘African solutions to African problems,’ a mantra 
that  has been associated with Thabo Mbeki’s idea of the African Renaissance.  
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5.2. Assessing Mbeki’s Quiet Diplomacy 
 
The following subsections of the findings of the study are concerned specifically with the 
direct assessment and evaluation of Thabo Mbeki’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ approach to the 
Zimbabwean electoral and political crisis of 2008, and the mediation that followed.  
5.2.1 Successes of Mbeki’s Quiet Diplomacy  
 
Despite the many criticisms levelled against President Mbeki’s mediation efforts in 
Zimbabwe, he is generally credited for successfully bringing the disputing parties; ZANU- 
PF, MDC-T and the MDC to the negotiating table for substantive dialogue through his 
mediation approach of quiet diplomacy. To be borne in mind is that the three political 
parties were highly conflicted with no room for compromise. Both ZANU-PF and the MDC-
T wanted to rule Zimbabwe exclusively. The MDC-T’s stance was that any resolution of 
the conflict should be based on the outcome of the March 2008 election. ZANU-PF on the 
other hand insisted on its recognition as the legitimate government of Zimbabwe because 
of its liberation credentials. However, through President Mbeki’s mediation, the parties 
moved from a zero-sum mentality to a win–win situation. The research also concludes 
that through Mbeki’s mediation, and true to his mediation objectives, he facilitated a 
political climate that reduced the levels of election related violence. As a result, Zimbabwe 
for the first time since 2000 held relatively credible harmonised presidential, parliamentary 
and local government elections in which ZANU- PF for the first time since independence 
lost to the opposition.  
The signing of the power-sharing deal, known as the Global Political Agreement (GPA) 
between the three main protagonists namely; ZANU-PF, MDC-T and the MDC following 
the conflict surrounding the 2008 disputed election results was arguably a seminal 
achievement from Thabo Mbeki’s mediation initiative. The GPA paved the way for the 
formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU), which in the immediate and short- 
term changed the trajectory of the country. In terms of short term mediation success, this 
study notes, the immediate objectives of peace and stability were achieved.  
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While debatable, this research argues and concludes that Thabo Mbeki’s approach of 
quiet diplomacy was underpinned by a certain logic and rationale whereby he wanted to 
avoid the mistakes inherent in his predecessor, Nelson Mandela’s proactive approach to 
foreign policy which alienated some African countries and leaders, and projected South 
Africa more as a regional imperial power aspirant than a well-meaning neighbhour 
(Masunungure 2008:50). Arguably, as discussed in Chapter Four, issues to the 
Zimbabwe conflict were complex, land redistribution was a legitimate requirement, 
sanctions were real, authoritarianism, brutal repression and disregard of the rule of law 
were blatant and outside forces were keenly interested. The research notes that in view 
of this, megaphone diplomacy which has been proffered as an alternative to Mbeki’s quiet 
diplomacy would have scuttled the mediation efforts. 
5.2.3. Quiet Diplomacy and its Weaknesses 
 
Despite the successes associated with quiet diplomacy and the justification presented for 
its adoption as earlier discussed, the approach has been discredited by local, regional 
and international actors for being an ineffectual policy, especially in the case of 
Zimbabwe. The policy proved to be a big disappointment in view of the high expectations 
about South African mediation given its gravitas in the region. While Thabo Mbeki has 
justified its use for reasons that ‘it allows the people of Zimbabwe to decide their own 
destiny without outside interference’ (Anstey 2007: 443) which is in conformity with the 
principle of sovereignty and its corollary of non-interference, the implications have been 
that the approach has perpetuated human rights abuses and entrenched the autocratic 
rule of ZANU-PF. It is argued that Mbeki always avoided directly criticising Robert 
Mugabe over governance issues and in that sense tailored his mediation to encourage 
Mugabe’s participation in the mediation. He was in that regard seen as biased towards 
Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF and was also seen as endorsing what the government in 
Harare was doing. Further implications of Mbeki’s use of quiet diplomacy were that it 
divided international pressure needed to force Mugabe to change. As a mediation tool, 
quiet diplomacy failed to induce ‘ripeness’ in the Zimbabwe conflict. The fact is that 
through quiet diplomacy, ZANU-PF was left in a position of strength to negotiate and 
retain power. 
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The interpretation surrounding Mbeki’s preference for quiet diplomacy is that it protected 
his own ideological interests of pan-Africanism and anti-imperialism which served his 
quest to preserve African solidarity. This gives credence to claims that Mbeki’s choice of 
quiet diplomacy was informed by the desire to avoid alienating some political parties  such 
as ZANU-PF. ZANU-PF therefore was the biggest beneficiary due to its historical ties with 
the ANC and this was worsened by Thabo Mbeki’s personal perceptions of the MDC. 
Mbeki therefore gave more weight to African solidarity than respect for good governance. 
The effect is that his credibility as mediator was compromised given his stated 
commitment to the African Renaissance project and good governance in Africa.  Thabo 
Mbeki’s eroded credibility also raised questions over the integrity of the entire SADC 
process. The previous point is instructive as Mbeki through his quiet diplomacy failed to 
enforce his own agenda of African Renaissance with regards to the Zimbabwe crisis, for 
example ignoring human rights violations in Zimbabwe contradicted his notion of a 
peaceful and inclusive African Renaissance. Arguably, the failure of quiet diplomacy was 
in Mbeki’s futility of trying to persuade Mugabe to change in ways which according to 
some scholars such as (Masunungure 2008:51 and Anstey 2007:441) have drawn 
parallels with Chamberlain’s appeasement strategy with Hitler. As the policy failed to 
change Mugabe, the conflict in Zimbabwe continued to degenerate and violence to 
escalate.  
The research also argues that apart from his personal interests, South Africa as a country 
also stood to benefit from the crisis in Zimbabwe as demonstrated by the fact that South 
African trade and investment interests benefitted from the country’s role as sole mediator 
in the Zimbabwe crisis. Thabo Mbeki therefore, seemingly, failed to rise above his 
interests in the Zimbabwe situation leading to questions over his sincerity in resolving the 
Zimbabwe political and economic crisis. The study concludes that the mediation was 
more of a containment exercise intended to create the impression that the Zimbabwe 
conflict was being attended to and thereby deflect Western criticism and probably 
ameliorate the sanctions. 
It has been argued that had Thabo Mbeki used a more decisive and principled mediation 
approach, the conflict in Zimbabwe could have been resolved much earlier. While there 
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is some merit in Mbeki’s concerns that more confrontational tactics would have worsened 
the Zimbabwe situation, which would have rebounded on Pretoria through mass influx of 
refugees, disrupted trade links and generalised chaos, the argument has been rendered 
baseless as the situation in Zimbabwe still deteriorated to the levels of a collapsed state 
with unprecedented levels of hyperinflation, unemployment and mass exodus of 
Zimbabweans that still had a rebound effect on South Africa. It therefore would have been 
prudent and morally courageous for Thabo Mbeki to intervene more assertively much 
earlier. The use of quiet diplomacy therefore exposed not only moral shortfalls in the 
conduct of conflict resolution as represented by both Thabo Mbeki’s and SADC’s silence 
over ZANU-PF’s human rights abuses but also institutional and structural shortfalls 
prevailing in quiet diplomacy as a mediation tool. This suggests that Mbeki should have 
laced his quiet diplomacy with assertiveness to make it an effective means of managing 
the Zimbabwe crisis. With quiet diplomacy alone both SADC and Mbeki were powerless 
in the face of ZANU-PF intransigence, prevarication and an outright refusal to comply with 
the provisions of the GPA.  
5.3 An Assessment of Thabo Mbeki’s Contribution to Democratisation in 
Zimbabwe  
   
Thabo Mbeki resolved the dispute that followed the 2008 election result in Zimbabwe by 
prescribing an exported version of the South African power sharing model. Thus the 
signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA), a power-sharing deal amongst 
Zimbabwe’s political elites which had no input from the electorate, paved the way for the 
formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU), which was presented and 
rationalised as the ‘African solution to African problems’ (Cheeseman and Tendi 
2010:215) and yet widely discredited for being a flawed power-sharing agreement that 
failed to effectively resolve the conflict in Zimbabwe in a sustainable manner.  
While GNUs have since 2007 emerged as a fashionable model for resolving disputed and 
indecisive elections in Africa, for example in Kenya and Cote’d Ivoire, they have far 
reaching implications for electoral democracy as they undermine the democratic value of 
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elections. The study argues that contrary to Mbeki’s chief objective of resolving the 
governance crisis in Zimbabwe, through constitutional and security sector reform, which 
was undeniably at the heart of the crisis in the country, the process leading to the 
formation of the GNU was instead fraught and dominated with power struggles and 
bickering and debates over distribution of political spoils such as the ministerial and other 
public posts at the expense of national development. Heated disagreements amongst the 
political elites revolved around the allocation of the ministries considered powerful such 
as those of Defence, Home Affairs, Finance, Trade and Industry, Foreign Affairs, 
Agriculture and Information (Cheeseman and Tendi 2010:221). What followed was an 
asymmetrical distribution of power in favour of ZANU-PF which had managed to tilt the 
political balance in its favour by making unilateral appointments to public office with no 
input from the MDC formations. 
ZANU-PF thus on numerous occasions violated the GPA from the time it was signed 
raising questions over its sincerity and commitment to the process. This research argues 
that as a result, there was no genuine power sharing, as the MDC was relegated to the 
position of junior partner in the Inclusive Government, in ways that replicated the 1987 
ZANU-ZAPU Accord. This is demonstrated by the fact that Robert Mugabe continued to 
chair the cabinet which had executive authority, while Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai 
was to chair the powerless council of ministers. As these two centres of power were 
created in a shabby way, it was to result in discordant government resulting in political 
and policy gridlock. On the overall, the implications were that ZANU- PF’s political 
hegemony was reproduced in a different guise which in other words guaranteed the 
party’s political continuity and survival even after it had lost elections. This effectively 
meant that the party continued to have the power to shape and influence how the new 
Zimbabwean state would evolve. This was to later cause functionality problems for the 
Inclusive Government.  
The research concludes that the GNU failed to facilitate Zimbabwe’s transition to 
democratisation given that it was not engineered with structural changes as the primary 
motive. For Thabo Mbeki the immediate imperative was the short-term one of achieving 
peace and security. He was therefore narrowly focused on the signing of the GPA which 
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not only overlooked the need for genuine reform of the forces that animated the 
Zimbabwean conflict, such as the state institutions as well as constitutional and security 
sector reform but also lacked a clear roadmap in relation to the implementation modalities. 
Mbeki was therefore not able to change the structure of the conflict. The undeniable fact 
is that Zimbabwean politics was highly militarised with the security establishment also 
being highly politicised. Security sector reform was therefore central to addressing 
Zimbabwe’s governance architecture and political culture. The posture of the security 
sector during the post-election crisis was decisive. Arguably, without addressing these 
structural issues, there seems to be no guarantee that the MDC-T leader Morgan 
Tsvangirai or any other person that might succeed Mugabe would not use the same 
provisions against their opponents. This gives credence to the assertion by some scholars 
(Cheeseman and Tendi 2010 and Bratton and Masunugure 2008) that the authoritarian 
nature of many post-colonial African regimes stemmed from the fact that leaders of these 
regimes have successfully campaigned for the departure of the colonialists, merely took 
over and maintained the same oppressive laws and procedures that the colonial 
administration had instituted in the country. 
This research also concludes that Mbeki’s failure to effectively resolve the conflict in 
Zimbabwe points to the fact that the conflict conditions were not ripe for resolution as 
demonstrated by the various motives of the parties to participate in the GNU. Arguably, 
ZANU-PF signed the GPA for international consumption given the increased regional and 
international pressure. The mediation was therefore not of interest to ZANU-PF which 
was from the start dismissive of the mediation initiative, the mediation only served to be 
of political convenience and partisan benefit. ZANU-PF also signed the GPA for tactical 
considerations as it gave the party the international legitimacy it had lost. However, 
beyond that, ZANU-PF did not perceive itself to be in a Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) 
which is necessary for sincere commitment to the conflict resolution process and hence 
long term mediation success. Pressure from the Western sanctions was not sufficient to 
‘hurt’ the party which had found an outlet through the Look East policy. Its participation in 
the mediation was therefore not sincere as demonstrated by its violation of the GPA and 
lack of commitment towards the implementation of the power-sharing deal. The GNU was 
therefore an interlude for the party to restrategise. Equally, the MDC also had its own 
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motives to agreeing to share power with ZANU-PF. The GPA presented an opportunity 
to the opposition’s quest for full control of the state after the party’s successive failure to 
dislodge ZANU-PF from power through the ballot box. To achieve this goal, the MDC tried 
to frustrate the mediation process with the hope of getting the UN involvement. As a result 
of these self-serving interests, the mediation was not focused on issues that were to bring 
real political change in Zimbabwe, in a way partisan political jostling overtook national 
interest.  
This study also concludes that the transitional administration was an inclusive 
government in name only. In practice, ZANU-PF and the MDC exercised power 
separately within exclusive and often competing zones of authority. The parties to the 
GNU still remained worlds apart. This demonstrates that the power-sharing arrangement 
was merely a political marriage of convenience and an unhappy compromise for that 
matter. This is given credence by the fact that in the post-mediation environment political 
persecution also continued and Robert Mugabe continued to act unilaterally. This renders 
baseless the argument that GNUs are mechanisms that promote inclusive politics by 
diluting the bitterness inherent in competitive electoral politics (Bratton and Masunungure 
2008).   
5.4. Transient Benefits of the GNU 
 
While the concluded position of this study is that post-election GNUs do not offer a durable 
socio-political order, it has been argued that they are indeed positive interventions for the 
short-term. Following the formation of the GNU, the conflict in Zimbabwe de-escalated on 
both political and economic fronts. The reign of terror which the state had unleashed on 
political opponents in the aftermath of the June 2008 presidential re-run election 
immediately abated. The GNU also rescued the economy from collapse with the most 
visible manifestation of economic recovery being the taming of the stratospheric 
hyperinflation, which in September 2008 was officially at 221 million percent. Many other 
dimensions of social life improved for example consumer goods re-appeared on shelves, 
schools and health centres reopened and basic infrastructure was restored. However, the 
dividends were more visible on the economic than the political front. This study argues 
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that beyond these islands of progress, the success and effectiveness of the GNU as a 
conflict resolution mechanism was largely confined to the immediate and short term, 
which gave the illusion of mediation success as there was a semblance of peace.   
5.5 Recommendations of the Study 
 
The following subsections of the chapter delineate the recommendations of the study that 
derive from the above observations, arguments and conclusions of the study. 
5.5.1 Need for Structural Reform of Conflict  
 
As discussed in Chapter Three and Chapter Four, it can be argued that the crisis that 
unfolded in Zimbabwe as viewed by some scholars (Ndlovu-Gastheni 2013:152) is rooted 
in the country’s governance architecture; particularly Zimbabwe’s stalled transition to 
democratisation. This is demonstrated by the continued prevalence and defensiveness 
of authoritarianism and the prolonged character of the political crisis. This suggests the 
need for genuine democratic reform which would ensure Zimbabwe’s transition to a 
political culture that is more open, inclusive and democratic. This study strongly 
recommends that in future conflict resolution interventions, SADC should address the 
structural causes of conflict such as constitutional and security sector reform that were 
not attended to in the case of Zimbabwe. Structural reform is likely to ensure and 
guarantee sustainable post conflict reconstruction and development. 
5.5.2 GNUs versus Electoral Democracy 
 
This study concludes that GNUs as a response to disputed elections are a negation of 
electoral democracy as they are a subversion of the electoral will of the people. To note 
is that GNUs legitimise power grabs by those who abuse incumbency and who have the 
support of state organs. Further, negotiated governments pose the dilemma of whether 
political stability and peace should be prioritised over and above democracy. The study 
argues that GNUs should never be treated as ‘African solutions to African problems’. This 
would suggest that elections and governments that reflect the electoral will of the people 
remain the first best solution. This study would in that sense recommend that in cases of 
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election disputes, regional organisations such as SADC should instead focus on dealing 
with the smooth transfer of power as this is the only way to guarantee the development 
of democracy on the continent. This is imperative in view of the discernible trend of 
increasing election disputes on the continent. 
5.5.3 Track Two Actors for Effective Mediation 
 
A key lesson emerging from the SADC backed mediation in Zimbabwe relates to the 
composition of actors in the mediation process. The process leading up to the formation 
of the new government and the very composition of that government excluded Track II 
actors who are non-state actors such as civil society organisations, academics and 
churches whose voices were severely curtailed. This suggests that instead of 
empowering such interest groups, post-election negotiated elite pacts tend to disempower 
them, empowering instead the political elites such as the Track I actors.  The involvement 
of civil society is critical in that it is likely to legitimise regional processes of conflict 
resolution given that civil society organisations are important players who understand the 
structural basis of conflicts. The study would recommend that SADC mediators should 
include Track II actors in negotiations and other forms of political dialogue as they can 
influence the peace process. The study recognises that both tracks of negotiators may 
complement each other in the search of sustainable solutions to a conflict. However, at 
regional levels particularly at SADC, there has been a gaping hole as the 
conceptualisation of regional mediation initiatives remains state centred. 
More scholarship is required to engage on the debate about concerns surrounding the 
exclusion of civil society from regional mediation frameworks. This is in recognition of the 
important policy space occupied by non-state actors in enhancing regional mediation 
capacity. This will help to move away from the state-centric and ‘point man’ regional 
approaches that have dominated SADC’s conflict resolution interventions to more 
encompassing regional mediation architecture (Nyakudya 2013).  As a supranational 
body, SADC can make the initiative to hold an all-stakeholders consultation between its 
member states and the various concerned non–state actors to map the way forward in 
coming up with broad based conflict resolution mechanisms that empower all the interest 
135 
 
groups. As this is anticipated to provide a more homegrown solution, it will also address 
the concerns of most African countries that are sensitive about their sovereignty. 
5.5.4 Expansion of Mediation Teams in Cases of Mediator Partiality 
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, SADC’s approach in Zimbabwe relied on Thabo Mbeki as 
the regional body’s ‘point man’ who was guided by his own ideological, domestic and 
international predilections. It can be argued that Thabo Mbeki’s credibility as mediator 
was greatly undermined by his lack of impartiality given his biases against the MDC. This 
study therefore recommends the expansion of SADC mediation teams. This is likely to 
ensure more effective mediation as it will involve more players who work within a clear 
formal framework rather than reliance on ‘point men’ acting on personal whims or the 
whims of their individual countries. 
5.6 Study Limitations 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, one of the variables of mediation success lies in the 
implementation of the peace agreement. It would therefore have been pertinent for the 
study to look at the implementation phase of the GPA in order to ascertain the success 
and effectiveness of Thabo Mbeki’s mediation in a holistic manner; for instance the 
parties’ commitment to the agreement.  Admittedly, the study’s focus was limited to the 
signing of the GPA with implications that this research did not subject the implementation 
phase to academic scrutiny and therefore the research gave a partial assessment of 
Thabo Mbeki’s mediation in Zimbabwe. For a balanced assessment, future studies could 
consider looking at the GPA phase which ended with the holding of the 2013 harmonised 
elections; which also marked the end of South African mediation. Otherwise this study 
was limited in so far as it isolated its efforts to the process of the mediation and its 
immediate results and not the enduring results up to the next election. 
Another limitation is the fact that there were no interviews, questionnaires or direct contact 
with the main disputants which would have given an insider and intimate perspective.  
This would have further enriched the research study.   
136 
 
5.7 Summary of the Study and Conclusion 
 
This concluding section of the chapter provides a summation of the study. Chapter One 
introduced this study and provided the rationale behind the formulation of the research. 
The background and problem statement informing the investigation and discussion of the 
study were identified. The methodology used in the study was also stated and the 
research questions and study objectives were explained. Limitations encountered by this 
study were also identified and the chapter outline was given.  
In Chapter Two, the study highlighted the limitations of the power based approaches such 
as realism, liberalism and constructivism as appropriate tools to analyse Thabo Mbeki’s 
mediation approach to the Zimbabwean political conflict of 2008. William Zartman’s 
Ripeness theory was therefore identified and elected as the best theoretical tool to 
analyse Thabo Mbeki’s mediation approach in Zimbabwe as it has also been used to 
analyse previous mediation initiatives in Zimbabwe by other studies. The theory was also 
identified as best designed to analyse Thabo Mbeki’s mediation as it also recognises the 
integral role played by both primary (disputing) and secondary (mediator) parties in 
conflict resolution.  
Chapter Three of the study alluded to limitations of mediation in resolving the underlying 
issues to conflict. Implications of mediation success and effectiveness were also 
explored. It was recognised that the signing of a settlement agreement does not 
necessarily mean mediation success as this has to be accompanied by commitment from 
the parties involved. The chapter also discussed the potential of mediated agreements as 
sources of future conflicts. The chapter explored the flaws in the 1979 Lancaster House 
Settlement and the 1987 ZANU/ ZAPU Unity Accord and their contribution to the 2008 
conflict in Zimbabwe.  
Chapter Four demonstrated that the 2008 conflict was one of the many episodes of 
violence in Zimbabwe. The chapter situated the 2008 conflict in ZANU-PF’s failure to 
democratise and hence the party’s reliance on violence to maintain its grip on power. The 
chapter also illustrated that because of divisions in SADC, the regional bloc only reacted 
to the crisis in Zimbabwe in 2007, when it appointed South African President Thabo Mbeki 
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to mediate in the conflict. Thabo Mbeki’s mediation was constrained by principles of state 
sovereignty, non-interference and African solidarity. These are presented as the reasons 
he settled for quiet diplomacy as the best mediation policy on Zimbabwe. The Thabo 
Mbeki, SADC backed mediation resolved the conflict surrounding the 2008 disputed 
election results through the formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU), which 
has widely been discredited for failing to resolve the conflict in Zimbabwe in a sustainable 
manner.  
Chapter Five stated the main research findings and offered a few recommendations to 
SADC on the way forward with regards to regional mediation initiatives. Emphasis was 
laid on conflict resolution mechanisms that address structural causes of conflict such as 
the governance crisis in the case of Zimbabwe. Recommendations were also made on 
the need for the involvement of influential citizens as Track Two actors such as civic 
society organisations as a way of empowering them politically. The chapter also 
recommended the expansion of mediator teams to avert cases of mediator partiality. In 
the case of Thabo Mbeki and the Zimbabwean mediation, his ideological interests in the 
African Renaissance and Pan-African solidarity of liberation movements, and his partiality 
to South African national interests were observed by the study to have impinged on the 
mediation and its outcomes. 
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